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1 INTRODUCTION 
Usually when people are sad, they don't do anything.  
They just cry over their condition.  
But when they get angry,  




The opening quote suggests that people intuitively grasp the differential impact of 
specific emotions on behavior. Sadness is believed to be associated with inaction, whereas 
anger is believed to be associated with action. Yet, the specific nature of the change achieved 
by this action remains unspecified. The quote suggests that anger could fuel action to change 
one’s own situation. At the same time, bringing about a change might include action that is 
directed at harming others. The events on 9/11 brought about a change, yet the terrorists’ 
proximate goal was apparently not improving their own condition but rather doing harm to 
whom they perceived to be their enemy – even at the expense of their own lives. 
We might be tempted to disregard severe cases like the terrorist attacks as deviations 
from the normal range of peoples’ behavioral repertoire, as defects of morally inferior people. 
For specific instances we cannot ascertain whether that is actually the case. In fact, we do not 
know for sure whether the terrorists were indeed angry. Principally, however, the realm of 
intergroup behavior theories extends also to quite extreme forms of negative intergroup 
behavior. Other examples of outgroup derogation are hate-crimes (i.e., crimes based on a 
person’s group characteristic; see e.g., McDevitt, Levin, & Bennett, 2002), genocides, and 
ethnic cleansing, but also non-lethal behaviors. These comprise for instance ridiculing 
handicapped persons, harassing homosexuals, and debasing and rejecting obese persons. 
Another example is the overt mistrust and avoidance behavior Arab-looking persons face in 
the Western world, particularly since 9/11. Less conspicuous forms of outgroup derogation 
include devaluing female employees’ skills, punishing immigrant children’s misconduct in 
school harsher than similar behavior of host society children, denying bank customers to raise 
a credit on the basis of their skin color, or higher prosecution rates of racial minority 
members compared with majority members as well as severer sentences once convicted 
(Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, ch. 8). All listed examples share the feature, that the target’s 
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treatment bears on its group membership rather than on its individual characteristics or its 
individual behavior.  
Compellingly little attention has been devoted to empirical research on explicitly 
negative treatment based on group membership, thus far (see Struch & Schwartz, 1989, for an 
exception). The present thesis addresses this gap by proposing one potential mechanism 
underlying explicitly negative group-based treatment. Deviating from research on 
interpersonal aggression, the focus is on a group level. Individuals that share membership in a 
certain social category constitute an ingroup, all other individuals belong to an outgroup. 
Outside the laboratory there is usually more than just one outgroup as when the national 
group Germans is distinguished from Norwegians, Moroccans, Ukrainians, or Peruvians. 
Every individual belongs to a number of social groups. Our various affiliations with social 
groups can impact on how we perceive, feel, and behave in social interactions (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979, 1986). The group memberships of interaction partners can likewise impinge on 
the reactions towards them (e.g., Bushman & Bonacci, 2004). However, only when a group 
membership is perceived and considered relevant to a particular interaction does it affect the 
person’s cognitions, feelings, and actions. 
Intergroup behavior, like interpersonal behavior, is subject to affective influences. 
Particular affective experiences, so-called group-based emotions, can be experienced on 
behalf of groups one belongs to (Smith, 1993, 1999). A prerequisite for the experience of 
group-based emotions is identification with the respective group. Sufficiently identified 
group members experience group-based emotions as a result of what happens to their 
ingroup, they do not need to be personally affected. A woman might thus become very upset 
if her husband narrates how in a meeting the head of the company ordered a female manager 
to go and get coffee while the males would further discuss the managerial issues. The wife 
can experience outrage because of this incident without even knowing the female manager. 
According to intergroup emotion theory (Smith, 1993, 1999), specific categorical group-
based emotions are associated with specific action tendencies. Throughout this thesis I will 
argue and demonstrate empirically that group-based anger has explanatory power for 
explicitly negative treatment of people that belong to an outgroup. Anger is the emotion that 
aggression researchers as well as appraisal theorists conceptualize and empirically find to be 
associated with approach, moving against tendencies, or, most specifically, with aggression 
(e.g., Anderson & Bushman, 2002; Baron, 1971; Berkowitz, 1983; Buss, 1961; Frijda, 
Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Geen, 1990; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Yzerbyt, Dumont, 
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Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003). However, there is no exclusive relationship. Anger can lead to 
various behavioral responses and aggression can occur without the experience of anger (e.g., 
Averill, 1983).  
The research paradigm employed throughout this thesis is derived from triggered 
displaced aggression theory (Miller, Pedersen, Earleywine, & Pollock, 2003; Pedersen, 
Gonzales, & Miller, 2000). It addresses those incidences where the outgroup becomes the 
target of negative behavior after a minor transgression while the aggressor has been 
previously provoked by something or someone else. An initial strong provocation and a 
subsequent comparatively mild provocation interactively produce an escalated response to the 
second provocation. Explicitly negative group-based treatment is not assumed to be restricted 
to such conditions, yet this operationalization allowed investigation of the underlying 
mechanisms. Moreover, results from a longitudinal study conducted within the context of the 
German re-unification (Kessler & Mummendey, 2001) fit a triggered displaced aggression 
explanation, thus hinting at the ecological validity of the construct. Xenophobia expressed by 
East Germans that self-categorized as German was significantly predicted by resentment 
elicited by another intergroup context, namely the relation between East and West Germans. 
The next chapter explicates the theoretical background of the research presented in 
this thesis. Subsections address the social identity approach, intergroup emotion theory, and 
triggered displaced aggression theory along with relevant research. Chapter 3 elucidates how 
the precise hypotheses were derived. First empirical evidence from a questionnaire study 
relating to naturally occurring intergroup relations is presented in chapter 4. This initial study 
exclusively utilized categorical emotion scales to assess participants’ affective reactions to 
the experimental manipulations. A different approach to the assessment of affect is outlined 
in chapter 5, core affect measures are proposed as an alternative to the much more common 
emotion adjective rating scales. Subsequent studies, reported in chapters 6 and 7, employed 
core affect measures as well as the adjective rating scales. Study 2, reported in chapter 6, is 
again a questionnaire study relating to naturally occurring groups. Two computer-based 
studies employing a minimal group paradigm (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971) are 
reported in chapter 7. All studies aimed at demonstrating outgroup derogation as a result of 
triggered displacement and investigating the role of group-based anger. The concluding 
chapter 8 summarizes and discusses the obtained results, infers implications and future 
research objectives. 
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2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Every individual belongs to a number of social groups. Commonly relevant groups 
base for example on nationality, gender, age, race, or religious affiliation. These group 
memberships oftentimes guide our behavior when we interact with other people (e.g., 
Bushman & Bonacci, 2004; Gaertner & Bickman, 1971), our cognitions about other people 
(e.g., Devine, 1989; Pettigrew, 1979; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997), and how we feel 
about them (e.g., Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Gordijn, 
Wigboldus, & Yzerbyt, 2001). Intergroup bias is the scientific construct that incorporates all 
the behaviors, cognitions, and attitudes along group lines that are systematically more 
favorable towards ingroup than outgroup members (see Brewer & Brown, 1998; Hewstone, 
Rubin, & Willis, 2002, for reviews) The terms denoting behaviors, cognitions, and attitudes 
along group lines are social discrimination, stereotypes, and prejudice, respectively. The 
focus of the research presented in this thesis is on intergroup behavior.  
Social differentiation is unequal treatment based on group membership. It is important 
to note, however, that social differentiation is not inherently discriminatory. There are cases 
where differential treatment according to group membership is reasonable, like denying 
children access to alcohol because of their age-group or allowing only people who hold a 
driver’s license to actually drive a car. Even positively differentiating members of particular 
groups like unequally extensively supporting children with learning disorders qualifies as 
social differentiation. Social discrimination on the other hand denotes such differentiating 
behavior that is based on group membership and that is perceived as illegitimate 
(Mummendey & Otten, 2001). The interacting parties or even a non-involved observer may 
disagree whether or not unequal group-based treatment is adequate, their perspectives may 
thus diverge whether an unequal group-based treatment is merely social differentiation or 
social discrimination. The evaluative judgment of the differential treatment as illegitimate is 
pivotal. This aspect points out the difficulty to determine social discrimination objectively 
while each party may consider its own view as indisputably correct.  
As will be argued in more detail below, explicitly negative treatment of outgroup 
members is one form of social discrimination, distinguishable from favorable treatment of 
ingroup members. A group perspective is warranted to address this intergroup phenomenon. 
Fundamental to the theorizing in the current thesis is the social identity approach.  
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2.1 The Social Identity Approach 
The social identity approach (Turner, 1999) encompasses social identity theory (SIT; 
Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986; see Brown, 2000, for a review) and self-categorization theory 
(SCT; Turner, 1985; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Both theories have 
major impact on research on group phenomena in general and negative intergroup relations in 
particular. The primary focus in this section is on SIT.  
According to SIT, intergroup behavior encompasses all behavior that is driven by a 
person’s social identity rather than by the person’s unique self (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). 
Social identity refers to those aspects of a person’s self-concept that originate from the 
person’s perceived social category memberships and the associated affective impact. Yet, 
instead of a simple dichotomy SIT postulated a dimension from interpersonal to intergroup 
behavior, behavior can be located anywhere on this dimension (Tajfel, 1978). On the 
intergroup pole, behavior is determined by the social identity, it bears on group concerns, and 
different ingroup members are almost interchangeable. SCT substituted differentially 
inclusive levels of self-categorization for the hypothesis of the interpersonal-intergroup 
continuum (Turner, 1985). A hierarchical system of cognitive representations of the self (i.e., 
self-categorizations) with different levels of abstractness is assumed. The more inclusive a 
self-categorization, the more abstract it is. 
Four central ideas of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) can be 
distinguished. These are the three psychological processes (1) social categorization, (2) 
identification, and (3) social comparison. The fourth central idea relates to a motivational 
principle, the striving for positive ingroup distinctiveness. 
Firstly, the basic cognitive process of social categorization, the perception of 
membership in a particular social category, is fundamental for any group phenomenon to 
occur. SCT (Turner et al., 1987) emphasizes that the psychological activation, the salience, of 
a particular level of self-categorization relative to other levels of self-categorization varies as 
a function of an interaction of contextual and personal features. The accessibility of a 
particular social categorization reflects the person’s motivational state and knowledge 
structure, it refers to the person’s readiness to utilize a social categorization. Fit of a level of 
categorization and the given social situation is distinguished in two aspects. Comparative (or 
structural) fit refers to the differences perceived between single members of a social category 
relative to differences perceived between the social category and other social categories 
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within the comparative context. Small intragroup differences relative to the perceived 
intergroup differences constitute high comparative fit. Normative fit on the other hand relates 
to the social meaning of a categorization, it is defined by consistency of the perceived intra- 
and intergroup similarities and differences with stereotypical beliefs about the content of the 
particular social categorization. The salience of a particular level of self-categorization is thus 
functionally related to a given context, social categories are salient to the extent that they are 
normatively appropriate and provide meaning (Oakes, 1987). 
One facet of the accessibility of a specific social categorization relative to other levels 
of categorization is the strength of identification with the respective category. At the same 
time, identification with the category and the associated affect, attachment, emotional 
involvement, and valuing one’s group membership constitute the second psychological 
process postulated by SIT. This illustrates the fundamental nature of categorization as an 
ingroup member, it is a prerequisite for affective experiences in relation to that group. 
Thirdly, SIT builds on Festinger’s (1954) recognition of the importance of social 
comparisons. Social comparisons are central to persons’ identities, by means of comparison 
they learn who they are. The ingroups’ differences from other groups and the individual’s 
shared similarities with other ingroup members define the person’s social identity. 
Importantly, evaluative intergroup comparisons are performed only along relevant 
dimensions with relevant outgroups. Both qualifications “relevant” are significant. Not each 
and every outgroup but only those that are similar and, at best, slightly inferior are suitable 
for a comparison. On irrelevant dimensions ingroup members might be comparatively lenient 
towards the outgroup and outgroup favoritism may occur (Mummendey & Schreiber, 1984; 
Mummendey & Simon, 1989). The reason for differential suitability of comparison 
dimensions and outgroups is given by the fourth central idea of SIT.  
As its fourth major idea, SIT posits a desire for positive ingroup distinctiveness as the 
central motivational force in intergroup relations. Positive differentiation of one’s ingroup 
benefits the self, because a positive ingroup enhances the social identity and thus the positive 
value of the self-concept. A positively distinct social identity is achieved and maintained 
through evaluative intergroup comparisons with a favorable outcome for the ingroup. 
Outgroup superiority on a relevant comparison dimension can be detrimental with regard to 
the ingroup’s positive identity. Therefore, when confronted with a negative comparison 
outcome, individuals are assumed to engage in strategies to re-establish a positive social 
identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). Reactions to a threatened or negative social identity 
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are distinguished in individual mobility, social creativity, and social competition. Social 
creativity includes reevaluation of a comparison dimension as well as change of comparison 
dimension or of comparison outgroup (see Blanz, Mummendey, Mielke, & Klink, 1998, for 
an empirical systemization of identity management strategies). 
2.1.1 Ingroup favoritism versus outgroup derogation 
Importantly, the striving for a positive social identity is not restricted to the cognitive 
activity of making social comparisons. People are not only motivated to make favorable 
comparisons, but also to favor the ingroup over the outgroup in terms of behavior. Relatively 
favorable ingroup treatment compared with outgroup treatment is conceptualized to serve the 
function of making the ingroup more positively distinct (but see Mummendey, 1995, for a 
critical discussion of the proposed functional link between social discrimination and positive 
distinctiveness). A study employing the minimal group paradigm (Tajfel et al., 1971) 
demonstrated that even explicitly arbitrary categorizations can under certain conditions ensue 
differential treatment of people according to their group membership (Billig & Tajfel, 1973). 
Unlike realistic conflict theory (Campbell, 1965; Sherif, 1967) that proposes real conflict of 
group interests over objective resources or incompatible goals as causes of intergroup 
conflict, SIT is thus also applicable to intergroup relations without a common history. 
Besides, SIT extends to intergroup relations without negative interdependence of groups’ 
realistic interests. 
Relatively favorable treatment of the ingroup is proposed to serve the creation, 
maintenance, and enhancement of one’s positive social identity, it ameliorates the ingroup’s 
evaluation relative to the outgroup. Positive distinctiveness is most effectively established by 
maximizing the difference between ingroup and outgroup rather than by maximizing the 
absolute status of the ingroup on the respective dimension. Independent from the absolute 
ingroup status, the larger the difference between ingroup and outgroup, the more positively 
distinct is the ingroup. Indeed, participants sacrifice absolute ingroup gain for a relative 
advantage over the outgroup (Brewer & Silver, 1978). This observation can on the other hand 
be interpreted to signify that the outgroup status may under certain conditions, on some 
comparison dimensions, be a necessary reference point for an evaluation of the ingroup 
status. Absolute ingroup status by itself may not always be conclusive as to whether or not it 
implies a positive evaluation of the ingroup whereas positive distinctiveness from the 
outgroup verifies a positive ingroup status.  
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Even if maximal differentiation is employed as a strategic rather than an evaluative 
device it is not unequivocally interpretable. An empirical problem with maximal 
differentiation between ingroup and outgroup is that – without a proper standard – it is 
impossible to deduce whether it rests on promoting the ingroup, downgrading the outgroup, 
or both. An alternative to the interpretation that maximal differentiation is driven by the 
motive to maximize the ingroup’s relative superiority is that ingroup profit is consciously 
sacrificed to diminish the outcome for the outgroup. It is however of major importance to 
distinguish between (1) preferential treatment of ingroup members, termed ingroup 
favoritism, and (2) explicitly negative treatment of outgroup members, termed outgroup 
derogation1. Outgroup derogation focuses on outgroup treatment as opposed to ingroup 
treatment, the intention is to inflict harm on outgroup members, not to promote the ingroup. 
This definition pinpoints aspects that distinguish outgroup derogation from ingroup 
favoritism. Preferential treatment of the ingroup is the primary and more frequent 
phenomenon. Positive regard for and identification with the ingroup are furthermore 
presumed to be a necessary but not sufficient precondition of outgroup derogation (Brewer, 
1999, 2001). In the beginning of intergroup research, however, it had not been recognized 
that these two differentiating behaviors are separable phenomena.  
Brewer (1979, 1999, 2001) argued as early as 1979 that ingroup favoritism and 
outgroup derogation are distinct phenomena, not simply two sides of the same coin. Brewer 
and Campbell (1976) had found no negative correlation between favorability of evaluations 
of one’s ingroup and social distancing from outgroups. Moreover, Struch and Schwartz 
(1989) found the predictors for explicitly negative behavioral intentions towards the outgroup 
to be at best very weak predictors of relative evaluative ingroup favoritism on positive traits. 
Neither did any of the predictors for negative outgroup-directed behavioral intentions reliably 
predict relative evaluative outgroup negativism on negative traits. These findings are 
consistent with other studies on the attitude-behavior link in intergroup relations research 
(e.g., LaPiere, 1934). A whole range of possible explanations apply to this imperfect link 
(Mackie & Smith, 1998). Most importantly with regard to the current objective, the reported 
results call the assumption into question that ingroup- and outgroup-directed attitudes or 
ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation form a single dimension or are reciprocally 
                                                 
1 Explicitly negative treatment comprises behaviors imposing something undesirable on a person as well as 
withholding or taking something desirable from a person.  
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related. In fact, different underlying processes are assumed. Consequently, an explanation 
why people come to derogate (members of) outgroups cannot simply be deduced from the 
knowledge already acquired about why individuals tend to favor their ingroups; the 
phenomena need to be researched separately.  
With the exception of Struch and Schwartz (1989), research explicitly addressing 
outgroup derogation is still largely missing to date. When behavior or at least behavioral 
intentions regarding social discrimination have been studied, most of the time it was ingroup 
favoritism that has been looked at. Since the data obtained by Struch and Schwartz (1989) 
were correlational no causality propositions could be tested. By contrast, the research 
presented in the current thesis addressed outgroup derogation with experimental studies. It is 
such the first attempt to investigate the process underlying outgroup derogation.  
2.1.2 Outgroup derogation and positive distinctiveness 
Superficial consideration might deem outgroup derogation as running counter to 
achieving or maintaining a positive identity. People should be motivated to conform with 
norms in order to maintain or improve their positive social self-image. Bringing the 
motivational force postulated by SIT and negative treatment of outgroup members together, 
they appear incompatible at first glance. However, such a conclusion would be premature. 
Depending on the relevant intergroup relation, explicitly negative treatment of the outgroup 
may be accepted and even normatively expected from ingroup members. Appropriate 
behavior is defined by reference to the norms of groups one belongs to and these norms hinge 
on the particular intergroup relation (Turner et al., 1987). Policemen, for example, most 
probably adhere to disparate norms when interacting with suspects than with superiors or 
victims of crime. If an outgroup is perceived as threatening, a pre-emptive strike might be 
considered appropriate. The treatment of the detainees in the Guantanamo Bay camps is 
probably likewise viewed as rational and appropriate by the U.S. military. From a 
perpetrator’s perspective explicitly negative treatment of outgroup members may be 
legitimate differentiation. Divergences of appraisal are at the heart of many, if not all, 
intergroup conflicts. Most probably, judgmental biases come into play (e.g., Pettigrew, 1979). 
Importantly, the perpetrator may not conceive of his actions to wrong someone. Negatively 
differentiating the outgroup from the ingroup can thus also result in a relatively more positive 
ingroup-concept and consequently in a more positive self-concept. Accordingly, both forms 
of behavioral intergroup bias are capable of creating an ingroup favoring intergroup 
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comparison. Still, explaining torture and murder with a desire for positive distinctiveness 
seems to unduly expand the scope of this indisputably powerful motive. Thus, the processes 
underlying outgroup derogation remain a topic for further research. One potential route to 
outgroup derogation is proposed in the next subsection and tested in the empirical part of this 
thesis. 
2.2 Intergroup Emotion Theory 
Emotions are regarded as functional for the human organism (e.g. Averill, 1983; 
Cosmides & Tooby, 2000; Damasio, 2000; Keltner & Gross, 1999). The significance of 
affect is also recognized in intergroup research. Theories that focus on particular intergroup 
relations, namely aversive, modern, or symbolic racism (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; 
McConahay, 1986; Sears & Henry, 2003), assign central importance to negative outgroup 
affect. Emotions have been demonstrated to be potent and consistent predictors of attitudes 
towards outgroups (Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993; Stangor, Sullivan, & Ford, 1991). 
Additionally, the importance of affect is recognized with regard to intergroup contact, Tropp 
and Pettigrew (2004) discuss contact research with a particular focus on the affective ties 
with the outgroup. One theory addressing affect as an intergroup phenomenon widely 
applicable is intergroup emotion theory (Smith, 1993, 1999).  
Smith (1993, 1999) proposed the idea, that emotions cannot only be felt on behalf of 
the self but can also be experienced on behalf of social groups the individual belongs to. Such 
affective experiences are referred to as group-based emotions. Smith’ proposition followed 
from an integration of appraisal theories of emotion (Frijda, 1986; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 
1988; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) with social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986) 
and self-categorization theory (Turner, 1985; Turner et al., 1987).  
In the elicitation of emotions, the perceiving individual actively and constructively 
appraises the environmental situation in relation to its needs and goals (Lazarus, 1991b). This 
active role of the appraising person accounts for flexibility, for interpersonal differences as 
well as intrapersonal differences over time in response to identical stimuli (Roseman, 1984). 
Appraisal theorists view emotions as adaptive responses, specific emotions involve a 
readiness for specific action tendencies (Frijda, 1986; Frijda et al., 1989; Lazarus, 1991b; 
Roseman, 1984; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; see also Damasio, 2000). 
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As explicated in the previous subsection, social groups can become part of a person’s 
self, they then constitute a person’s social identity. Like any other part of the self, the social 
identity takes on motivational and affective significance. The experience of group-based 
emotions is thus predicated on identification with the group. Provided an individual does 
identify with a particular group, situations or events with affective significance for that group 
elicit group-based emotions. For group-based emotions to occur, the individual need not be 
affected personally. A quite similar idea already found expression in Frijda and colleagues’ 
(1989) appraisal dimension self-relevance.  
When the social self is concerned, the individual person appraises the environmental 
situation in relation to its group’s needs and goals. In other words, the appraisal process is 
highly dependent on the appraising individual’s group membership given the situation is 
relevant to that particular group and the individual identifies with the group. Specific group-
based emotions are associated with specific group-based action tendencies. The fundamental 
importance of the salience of a particular categorization was demonstrated in research 
showing differential appraisal outcomes depending on categorization among highly identified 
group members (Gordijn, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, & Dumont, 2006), differential emotional 
reactions (Gordijn et al., 2001) as well as differential behavioral tendencies (Yzerbyt et al., 
2003) and actual behaviors (Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003). Group-based 
emotions are functionally directed at the regulation of intergroup behavior. Group-based 
anger, specifically, is associated with action tendencies moving against the provoking 
outgroup (Mackie et al., 2000; Yzerbyt et al., 2003) and is furthermore assumed to be 
associated with action tendencies intended for outgroup harm. Successful implementation of 
such emotion-induced intergroup behavior diminishes the subjective experience of the 
respective group-based emotion; unsuccessful implementation or exerting a behavior that 
does not satisfy the emotionally induced behavioral tendency sustains or even intensifies the 
group-based emotion (Maitner, Mackie, & Smith, in press). 
Quite interestingly, the relationship between identification with a particular group and 
the intensity with that group-based emotions are experienced does not seem to be simply 
linear. It is not always the case that with increasing identification with a group more intense 
group-based emotions are experienced. Group-based guilt, for example, is lower in highly 
identified participants as compared with lowly identified participants (Doosje, Branscombe, 
Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Gordijn et al., 2006). Different interpretations pertain to this 
result. Either highly identified participants concede less group-based guilt than lowly 
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identified participants who do not have a comparably strong need to cope with the unpleasant 
emotion or participants who experience strong group-based guilt reduce their identification 
with the respective group (cf. Kessler & Hollbach, 2005). 
2.2.1 Empirical results on group-based emotions 
Much research activity building on intergroup emotion theory focused on negative 
group-based emotions. The specific negative emotions that have been addressed comprise 
fear (e.g., Dumont et al., 2003), Schadenfreude (Leach, Spears, Branscombe, & Doosje, 
2003), guilt (Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty, 2002; Doosje et al., 1998; Iyer, Leach, & 
Crosby, 2003; Miron, Branscombe, & Schmitt, 2006), and anger (e.g., Gordijn et al., 2001; 
Gordijn et al., 2006; van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004; Yzerbyt et al., 2003).  
Gordijn et al. (2001) showed a stronger anger-reaction from those participants who 
were led to perceive victims of unfair treatment as similar to themselves (instigating an 
ingroup categorization) compared with participants who either focused on differences 
between the target and themselves or whose focus was not manipulated. In addition to mere 
categorization, the level of identification with the particular group is highly important for the 
experience of group-based emotions (Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999). 
Stronger anger responses to unfair treatment of persons that participants categorized as 
ingroup members emerged for participants highly identified with that group than for 
participants lowly identified (Gordijn et al., 2006; Yzerbyt et al., 2003). On the other hand, 
anger towards either in- or outgroup impacts on the level of identification (Kessler & 
Hollbach, 2005). Whereas anger towards the outgroup increased identification with the 
ingroup, anger towards the ingroup decreased identification with that same group.  
In line with Malcolm X’s vision, the experience of group-based anger was also 
demonstrated to predict collective action tendencies when one’s ingroup was disadvantaged 
(van Zomeren et al., 2004). Mummendey and collaboraters (1999) had shown fraternal 
resentment to mediate the effect of identification on collective identity management strategies 
of a group with inferior status. 
Mackie and collaborators (2000) provided empirical evidence that group-based 
emotions can have behavioral consequences and what is even more intriguing, specific 
behavioral consequences. Group-based anger was demonstrated to be a potent predictor of 
the tendency to move against the outgroup. With regard to the aim of the current thesis, 
however, it has to be noted that their dependent variable cannot be equated with outgroup 
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derogation. Categorization in ingroup versus outgroup based on adherence to opposing values 
and the move-against tendency scale seemed to primarily tap disputatious inclinations (“want 
to confront them”, “want to oppose them”, “want to argue with them”; exception: “want to 
attack them” in study 2). Only one item unarguably implied harmful intentions. 
Consequently, the motive underlying the move-against tendency rather seems to have been to 
change the other group’s opinion. The present thesis addressed group-based anger as a 
predictor of explicitly harmful behavior towards an outgroup.  
2.2.2 Relations between affect and cognition 
An affective route to outgroup derogation is unlikely to exist independent of 
cognition. Of course, there is reason to doubt a simple, linear causal relation between 
cognitive appraisal and affect (e.g., Lazarus, 1991a). The mood-as-information hypothesis 
(Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 2003) and the affect infusion model (Forgas, 1995) are two 
theoretical approaches that, although being highly dissimilar, both formalized affective 
influences on cognition. The mood-as-information hypothesis holds that subjectively 
experienced affect can be used as a source of inference in its own right, it can in other words 
also be the object of appraisal. The affect infusion model proposes different levels of 
affective infusion into cognitive processes depending on the processing strategy. Applied to 
intergroup relations, intergroup bias has been observed differentially depending on 
participant’s particular kind of mood (happy vs. sad) in combination with personal relevance 
of group membership (Forgas & Fiedler, 1996). Measurement of processing latencies 
established that greater intergroup bias resulted from more heuristic processing when 
personal relevance of group membership was low and participants were in a happy mood. 
More elaborate motivated processing, by contrast, produced greater intergroup bias among 
participants who were in a sad mood and to whom group membership was of relatively high 
importance. Anger, other than sadness, has further been shown to be associated with an 
increased reliance on simple heuristic cues, specifically on stereotypes (Bodenhausen, 
Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994).  
Emotions are assumed to result from cognitive appraisal processes. Yet, at the same 
time, the emotional experience itself consists, in part, of the perception of a particular 
appraisal pattern (Frijda, 1993; Lazarus, 1991a). Appraisal is therefore not only antecedent 
but also content of emotional experience. Moreover, the actual antecedent appraisals need not 
be accurately represented by the perceived appraisal structure. Emotional experiences 
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themselves summon cognitive consequences like attributions or attentional changes and these 
secondary elaborations modulate and more fully determine the emotional experience (see also 
Berkowitz, 1990, 1993). 
Insights from neuroscientific research might foster the understanding of the relations 
between affect and cognition. Thus far, empirical evidence for bi-directional pathways is only 
available for fear. The neuroanatomical structures of fear directly and indirectly project to 
other brain structures, thus influencing the subsequent input they receive (cf. LeDoux, 2000). 
An elaborated model that integrates insights from neuroscience demonstrating how affect and 
cognition are inextricably linked through recursive processes was proposed by Lewis (2005). 
In conclusion, intergroup emotion theory provides a framework for understanding 
emotional reactions to outgroup members deriving from social identity concerns. The current 
thesis aims at further corroborating the notion that individuals who identify with the social 
category they belong to experience specific group-based emotions following group-based 
appraisal of situations or events relevant for the respective group. Situational characteristics 
enter the explanatory process via appraisal and it further seems reasonable to assume, that 
cognitive appraisals processes are themselves influenced by affect. Group-based emotions are 
functionally related to intergroup behavior. Differentiated emotional and behavioral reactions 
towards the same outgroup in different contexts are rational and explainable by the 
constructive role of the appraising individual. In particular, group-based anger is proposed as 
an antecedent of out-group derogation. 
2.3 Triggered Displaced Aggression 
One classical explanation of aggression, the frustration-aggression hypothesis 
(Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939), holds that people act aggressively when 
they have been frustrated. At the same time, frustration was conceived as the necessary 
antecedent of aggressive behavior. Frustration is defined as blockage of goal attainment or 
failure to obtain anticipated rewards. While this simple explanation had to be revised – 
frustration can lead to a variety of behaviors and aggression can occur without frustration – 
the general idea is still present in more recent theories. The cognitive-neoassociationistic 
model of emotional aggression (Berkowitz, 1990, 1993) conceptualizes aggression as one 
possible action tendency following from aversive stimulation; frustration is one form of 
aversive stimulation among others (e.g., pain, physical or psychological discomfort). 
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Aversive stimulation can also result from non-human sources like hot temperatures. 
Similarly, frustration because of getting stuck in a traffic jam has no tangible source that 
would pose an appropriate target for an aggressive response. In other cases, the target is not 
available for direct retaliation as when one is upset about a politician or an aggressive 
response to the source of the aversive stimulation may be suppressed because the person 
enjoys considerable power or is a child. The aggressive response may then be displaced to 
another target. A recent meta-analysis found displaced aggression to be a robust effect with a 
mean effect size of d = 0.54 (Marcus-Newhall, Pedersen, Carlson, & Miller, 2000). 
Participants who had been provoked but were unable to retaliate were more aggressive 
towards an innocent target than non-provoked participants. 
Displaced aggression can further be distinguished from triggered displaced aggression 
(Miller & Marcus-Newhall, 1997; Miller et al., 2003; Pedersen et al., 2000). Triggered 
displaced aggression denotes an interactively produced, disproportionately aggressive 
response towards a target that committed a minor provoking transgression. This response is 
conceptualized to result when the aggressor, prior to the interaction with the aggression 
target, experienced a comparatively strong provocation that precluded an aggressive 
response. The term triggered displaced aggression can thus be decomposed as follows. The 
aggressive response is displaced in the sense that it is not directed towards the source that 
elicited the aggressive behavioral tendency in the first place. The aggressive response is 
triggered in the sense that it is not invariably directed towards any target but only towards 
such a target that subsequently provides a minor provocation. In triggered displaced 
aggression, the initial strong provocation and the subsequent minor provocation interact to 
produce the disproportionately aggressive response to the trigger2. It exceeds the aggression 
that would be expected based on the intensity of the trigger alone or that would follow from 
simple additive effects of initial and triggering provocation. The reliability of the triggered 
displaced phenomenon cannot be determined yet, because the conditions specified (Miller et 
al., 2003; Pedersen et al., 2000) have to date only been fulfilled by a couple of studies. 
Supposedly though, triggered displaced aggression has greater ecological validity than 
aggression displaced on absolutely innocent targets (Miller & Marcus-Newhall, 1997). 
                                                 
2 Note that both incidents are provocations, though differing in intensity. From now on I will relate to the 
second, mild provocation as “trigger” owing to its function in the experimental paradigm, to the initial strong 
provocation I will simply refer as “provocation”. This linguistic rule facilitates reading while maintaining a clear 
distinction between both manipulations. 
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Triggered displaced aggression was first mentioned by Dollard (1938) in an article 
concerned with prejudice. Curiously, it had lost popularity after an initial period of high 
interest in the phenomenon. When it was recently re-discovered (Miller & Marcus-Newhall, 
1997; Miller et al., 2003; Pedersen et al., 2000) impressive research was conducted on 
interpersonal aggression (Bushman, Bonacci, Pedersen, Vasquez, & Miller, 2005; Pedersen et 
al., 2000; Pedersen, Bushman, Vasquez, & Miller, in progress; Vasquez, Denson, Pedersen, 
Stenstrom, & Miller, 2005). To outgroup derogation it has thus far not yet been applied.  
2.3.1 Processes underlying triggered displaced aggression 
The underpinnings of triggered displaced aggression are not yet determined. Miller 
and colleagues (2003) suggest two complementary processes that may apply under 
differential circumstances: arousal-based and rumination-based triggered displaced 
aggression. The arousal-based explanation suggests that persisting negative affective arousal 
that was elicited by the initial provocation causes the aggressive response towards the 
triggering target. The still-present arousal may combine with the arousal induced by the 
target. Due to its dependency on physiological arousal, this explanation is only applicable to 
chains of incidents, where the triggering event followed the initial provocation within a 
couple of minutes. After a long temporal delay, the arousal would have dissipated.  
This explanation resembles excitation-transfer theory which also accounts for 
aggression-enhancing temporal carry-over effects (Zillmann, 1971, 1983). Excitation-transfer 
theory holds that within a certain time frame excitatory reactions to unrelated stimulation 
intensify subsequent emotional experiences to current stimuli when the person is unaware of 
the actual source of the residual excitation. A current excitatory state that resulted from the 
combination of the reaction to the current stimuli and the residues of excitation from prior 
stimulation will be falsely ascribed to the current stimulus. The research on excitation-
transfer, however, is not informative with regard to triggered displaced aggression. Two key 
conceptual differences of the research paradigms prohibit direct inferences (Miller et al., 
2003). In excitation-transfer research, the target of the aggressive response is the person that 
delivered the initial strong provocation, not a displaced target. Besides, the analogue of the 
trigger in excitation-transfer studies is not trivial but moderately to highly arousing.  
Rumination denotes recurrent unintended conscious thoughts that revolve around a 
particular theme (cf. e.g., Martin & Tesser, 1996). The ruminatively-based explanation of 
triggered displaced aggression holds that rumination maintains an aggressive internal state 
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that disposes towards later displaced aggression. Rumination might result in the formation of 
cognitive representations of the subjective state instigated by the initial provocation. 
Rumination might thus function as a prime such that an ambiguous triggering event is more 
easily noticed and is more probably attributed to intention on the side of the elicitor of the 
triggering event. This explanation is consistent with Berkowitz’ cognitive-neoassociationistic 
model of emotional aggression (1990, 1993) which assumes that aggression-related affect, 
thoughts, memories, and expressive-motor and physiological reactions are linked by means of 
an associative network. Activation spreads along the associative network when any one 
component is activated, thereby also activating the other components. Rumination would 
maintain a certain level of activation of the aggression network, subsequent minor 
transgressions would therefore be more readily perceived as provoking and would elicit an 
aggressive response more easily. Furthermore, rumination might maintain or regenerate the 
physiological arousal stemming from the initial provocation. 
The ruminatively-based explanation of triggered displaced aggression makes a 
different prediction than excitation-transfer theory (Zillmann, 1983) when rumination is 
explicitly concerned with the initial provocation. Whereas the excitation-transfer theory 
predicts a decrease in displacement because of the high salience of the original source of 
anger, the rumination-based explanation predicts that the rumination maintains the internal 
aggressive state and thus, that higher amounts of displacement result. Indeed, ruminating 
about a provocation has been shown to increase the aggressive response towards a triggering 
target (Bushman et al., 2005, studies 1 and 2). 
The arousal-based explanation is confined to constellations where the triggering 
incident follows up on the initial provocation rather quickly. Rumination, in contrast, has 
been shown to augment triggered displaced aggression even when the trigger occurs not until 
8 hours later (Bushman et al., 2005, study 3). It should be noted, however, that the effect 
obtained after the 8 hour delay is not unequivocally attributable to the maintenance of an 
aggressive internal state resulting from rumination. Participants had initially been writing an 
essay and received a bad evaluation from an ostensible other participant. In order to induce 
rumination, the experimenter told participants that the partner in the next experimental 
session 8 hours later would have access to the essay and the evaluation. He further instructed 
participants explicitly to think about how they might justify their essay and explain the 
evaluation to their next partner. Whereas in the no rumination conditions the initial strong 
provocation and the triggering event were independent, both incidents were coupled in the 
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rumination conditions. Consequently, in the rumination conditions, the ostensible second 
interaction partner is highly likely to be perceived as biased on the basis of his knowledge 
about the previous bad evaluation. His slightly negative evaluation of the participant’s 
performance on an anagram task (i.e., the trigger) may have been easily conceived as an 
unfairly distorted judgment. Through the established association between both interaction 
partners the triggering person may have acquired the quality of an aggressive cue. 
Rumination throughout the extended period of time and the assumed maintenance of an 
aggressive internal state are not necessary to explain the observed results. Considerably 
stronger results corroborating the significance of rumination would have been obtained had 
the augmented triggered displaced aggression been shown towards an absolutely unrelated 
target (a confederate of course), for instance in the hallway prior to the second experimental 
session. In case that would have actually worked out, this would give rise to ethical concerns. 
One would have to ask whether ruminatively-based triggered displaced aggression also 
occurred during this 8 hour delay towards real-life interaction partners.  
2.3.2 Triviality of the triggering provocation 
For the interactive effect observable in triggered displaced aggression to occur, it is 
crucial that the second provocation is trivial, that is, of low intensity (Vasquez et al., 2005). 
Low intensity triggers are more ambiguous with respect to whether or not they constitute a 
provocation. An interaction of initial strong provocation and subsequent minor provocation 
(i.e., the triggering event) is impossible when the second provocation exceeds a certain 
intensity and thus looses its quality of ambiguity. Someone stepping on one’s foot might well 
be dismissed as an unintended accident but could function as a trigger if one had experienced 
a strong provocation prior to this incident. By contrast, being kicked into the stomach is 
hardly ambiguous and would elicit an aggressive response in its own right. Equally high 
levels of aggression could of course follow from a strong second provocation, but in that case 
the second provocation would be salient and unequivocally perceived as provocative. 
Consequently, it would not function as a trigger, that is, it would not interact with the initial 
provocation to produce a disproportionately aggressive response. 
However, what precisely the requirement regarding “triviality” is, remains somewhat 
unclear. In their conceptual analysis, Miller and Marcus-Newhall (1997) define triviality in 
relative, not in absolute terms. Trivial triggers are such actions that “by themselves (in the 
absence of prior provocation), would elicit small [emphasis added] amounts of aggressive 
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retaliation” (Miller & Marcus-Newhall, 1997, pp. 84). The theoretical model of triggered 
displaced aggression (Miller et al., 2003) does not explicitly address this issue. It does 
however relate to research (Pedersen et al., 2000) where the trigger, “when it was not 
preceded by a strong prior provocation from another source at Time 1, its presence or absence 
had absolutely no effect [emphasis added] on aggressive responding toward this second 
person” (Miller et al., 2003, p. 78). Nevertheless, manipulation checks regularly indicate a 
reliable difference between the mild trigger and the no trigger (or neutral) condition in terms 
of resulting affect and/or rational judgments concerning the triggering event (Bushman et al., 
2005, study 1; Pedersen et al., 2000; Pedersen et al., in progress, studies 2 and 3; Vasquez et 
al., 2005). On the basis of available evidence it cannot be decided whether the distinction 
identified here is indeed significant. Triggering events that, in themselves, warrant some 
small amount of aggressive responding and triggering events that have no effect at all on 
aggression in the absence of prior provocation may lend themselves equally to interaction 
with the initial provocation. 
2.3.3 Triggered displaced aggression and intergroup relations 
Triggered displaced aggression has thus far not yet been researched in intergroup 
relations. However, Kessler and Mummendey (2001) demonstrated in a longitudinal study 
that determinants of conflict with a specific outgroup at the same time predicted conflict in 
another intergroup context. The study had been conducted in the context of the German re-
unification. Specifically, resentment of the relationship between East and West Germans 
directly and indirectly enhanced xenophobia in East German participants. The indirect path 
worked via self-categorization as German (i.e., categorization on the superordinate level). If 
mentioning the outgroup foreigners brought to mind irritating thoughts about the Germans-
foreigners intergroup relation (e.g., the negative interdependence on the job market), the 
influence of resentment stemming from the inter-German relation on xenophobia might be an 
instance of triggered displaced aggression. 
Furthermore, the status of the triggering target as either in- or outgroup member has 
been demonstrated to moderate the effect of a triggering action following a comparatively 
strong provocation on displaced aggression (Pedersen et al., in progress, study 2). Group 
status was determined following a minimal group procedure (Tajfel et al., 1971). Although no 
non-categorized triggering targets were included in the design to serve as comparison 
standards, evidence strongly suggests that the ingroup status functioned as a buffer against 
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triggered displacement of aggression rather than outgroup status inducing further escalation. 
The procedures regarding implementation of provocation and trigger had been used before 
and shown to be effective (Pedersen et al., 2000, study 1; Vasquez et al., 2005) so that 
interactively produced levels of aggression could reasonably be expected to occur. Therefore, 
the failure to find more aggression towards ingroup targets when provoked participants 
subsequently encountered a trigger as compared with no subsequent trigger can rationally be 
interpreted as reduced aggression following the mitigating influence of the target’s ingroup 
status. For outgroup targets the effect of trigger in the provocation condition was highly 
significant, more aggression was displayed towards targets providing a triggering action as 
compared with non-triggering targets. Notably, the negative affective reaction to the 
triggering incident among provoked participants was independent from group status of the 
person emitting the trigger. It thus seems that participants refrained from acting on their 
negative affect when the target would have been an ingroup member. Similar results were 
obtained when targets were not explicitly categorized as either ingroup or outgroup members 
but expressed similar versus dissimilar attitudes relative to the participant’s own attitude or 
were described as possessing either positive or negative personality traits (Pedersen et al., in 
progress, studies 1 and 3). No triggered displaced aggression was observed towards targets 
that supposedly held similar attitudes or targets that were said to possess positive personality 
traits. For targets with dissimilar attitudes or possessing negative traits the disproportionately 
aggressive response to a trigger was observed among previously provoked participants. In 
addition, the study manipulating valence of the triggering target included a control condition 
(Pedersen et al., in progress, study 3), the target was described with neutral personality traits. 
Results corroborate the notion that the observed difference between ingroup and outgroup 
targets resulted from the mitigation of aggression towards an ingroup member. In the trigger 
condition, neutral and negatively valenced targets similarly received augmented levels of 
aggression, whereas for positively valenced targets the trigger had no such effect. 
Outgroup status did not seem to particularly enhance the augmentation of displaced 
aggression (Pedersen et al., in progress, study 2). This is consistent with results that the 
default for novel minimal outgroups is rather neutral than negative (Otten & Moskowitz, 
2000; Otten & Wentura, 1999). Inasmuch as outgroups are conceived as sources of conflict 
and competition or are associated with negative stereotypical expectations, though, the mere 
appearance of an outgroup might function as a triggering event. In the longitudinal study that 
appears to have documented triggered displaced aggression directed at foreigners, the 
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research material did not include a triggering provocation (Kessler & Mummendey, 2001). 
How much the mere appearance of an outgroup is perceived as provoking potentially depends 
on the history of the particular intergroup relation.  
Results from another field of research imply, that outgroup status compared with other 
target attributes might however be particularly prone to augment aggression. The 
interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect repeatedly demonstrated by Insko, Schopler, 
and colleagues (see Schopler & Insko, 1992, for a review) illustrates that intergroup contexts 
promote competitiveness compared with interpersonal contexts. Furthermore, the 
interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect was demonstrated to extent to aggressive 
behavior; groups were significantly more aggressive than individuals and higher levels of 
aggression were directed at groups than at individuals (Meier & Hinsz, 2004).  
2.3.4 Affective mediation of the relationship between trigger and displaced aggression 
The effect of the trigger manipulation on displaced aggression among provoked 
participants has been shown to be mediated by the negative reaction to the trigger (Bushman 
et al., 2005, study 2; Pedersen et al., 2000; Vasquez et al., 2005). This negative reaction can 
be decomposed in affective and cognitive reactions to the trigger. Both components have 
been shown to mediate the effect. Evaluative judgments of an alleged research assistant’s 
performance mediated the effect of the trigger manipulation on aggression towards the 
research assistant (Pedersen et al., 2000, study 1). Anger and happiness about a triggering 
incident were shown in separate analyses to mediate the effect of the trigger on displaced 
aggression whereas an evaluative judgment only partially mediated the same relationship 
(Pedersen et al., 2000, study 2). Mediation by negative affect has also been demonstrated for 
physical aggression against the triggering target (Vasquez et al., 2005). 
The present thesis aimed at establishing such an affective route to explicitly harmful 
behavior towards outgroup members. Importantly, in the case of triggered displaced outgroup 
derogation the individual target personally need not have done anything to elicit an 
aggressive response. The aggressor may likewise not be affected personally by the 
provocation, instead the aggressor may act upon a provocation directed at an ingroup. Since 
the behavior to be explained is an intergroup phenomenon, the assumed mediator should 
likewise be group-based. The role of group-based anger in an affective route to outgroup 
derogation was investigated. 
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3 HYPOTHESES 
From the theory and empirical evidence explicated in the previous chapter the 
following hypotheses were derived.  
3.1 Contrast Hypothesis of Triggered Displaced Aggression 
The basic experimental design comprises two orthogonal factors, initial provocation 
and triggering provocation, each with one provoking and one non-provoking level. In the 
resulting 2 × 2 design, outgroup derogation will be observed only in the provocation-trigger 
condition. Participants who receive the comparatively strong initial provocation but 
encounter no triggering event afterwards will not show outgroup derogation, because the 
displacement is not assumed to occur arbitrarily towards any stimulus met following an 
anger-arousing incident. Outgroup derogation in this condition would represent mere 
displacement instead of triggered displacement of aggression (Miller & Marcus-Newhall, 
1997). Without the initial strong provocation participants will not show aggression regardless 
of the level of the triggering factor. The non-provoked participants who do experience the 
triggering event will not show an aggressive response towards the outgroup delivering the 
triggering event, because the triggering event is operationalized to be trivial. The non-
provoked participants who do neither experience the triggering event do not have any reason 
to aggress against the outgroup, provided participants do not perceive the outgroup per se as a 
provocation. In other words, the two provocations are expected to interactively lead to 
disproportionate outgroup derogation in the provocation-trigger condition.  
According to the results from Marcus-Newhall and colleagues (2000) that revealed 
displaced aggression to be a robust effect, a main effect of provocation should be expected, 
either in addition to or instead of the predicted interaction effect. Marcus-Newhall et al. 
(2000) however seem to not have systematically excluded studies that may actually 
demonstrate triggered displaced aggression instead of mere displaced aggression. The 
inclusionary criteria of their meta-analysis do not refer to a potential trigger and, indeed, 
examples reported for the considered moderator variables suggest that some displacement 
targets may have shown irritating behavior. The target of aggression in a study by Worchel, 
Hardy, and Hurley (1976), for example, behaved in a fashion that closely matched the 
operationalization of the trigger conditions in more recent studies (Bushman et al., 2005, 
study 1; Pedersen et al., 2000, study 1; Pedersen et al., in progress, study 3). Therefore, the 
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hypothesis in the present thesis is, that aggression is not indiscriminately displaced on any 
target, but only on targets that themselves provide a minor provocation. 
Planned contrast analyses are the most sensible test for the prediction of interactively 
produced outgroup derogation  (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1985; Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1989). In 
contrast to the diffuse hypotheses tests performed with omnibus F tests, planned contrast 
analyses test specific hypotheses and therefore possess higher statistical power. A 3 -1 -1 -1 
focal contrast tests the prediction that the provocation-trigger condition deviates from the 
other three conditions. To use all degrees of freedom, additional contrasts orthogonal to the 
focal contrast and to each other have to be computed. Only when a General Linear Model that 
includes the three contrasts simultaneously reveals the focal contrast statistically significant 
and the other contrasts as a set not significant can the results be regarded consistent with the 
prediction. Statistical significance of the remaining contrasts as a set would indicate 
substantial residual between-group differences, that is, substantial variance left unexplained 
by the focal contrast. The procedure used in the current thesis to test for significant residual 
variance followed the recommendation by Niedenthal and colleagues (2002)3. Niedenthal et 
al. (2002) employed a 1-df test, the F value was obtained by adding up the sum of squares 
associated with the non-focal contrasts and dividing it by the mean square error (i.e., the 
quotient of error sum of squares and df of error). In effect, this procedure corresponds with 
testing the best possible 1-df contrast for all the remaining variance. Consequently, no 
orthogonal contrast could possibly become significant unless this test is significant. 
In principle, significant residual variance is explored by means of the contrasts 
orthogonal to the focal contrasts. Deviating from that procedure, in the present thesis 
omnibus F tests were conducted whenever the 3 -1 -1 -1 contrast failed to account 
parsimoniously for the observed between-group differences. With the present research 
objective, specific comparisons among the remaining conditions would be less instructive 
than the tests of main and interaction effects. 
The focus of the present research is on affective processes. The experimental design 
translated in affective terms is depicted in Figure 1. The first experimental manipulation was 
supposed to elicit an anger response in the provoking condition, in the non-provoking 
                                                 
3 The test for significant amounts of residual variance proposed by Abelson and Prentice (1997) with two 
degrees of freedom is too liberal, it potentially fails to detect significant amounts of variance left unexplained by 
the focal contrast. 
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condition participants are not expected to experience anger. The second experimental 
manipulation by itself was supposed to elicit minor irritation in the triggering condition, no 
irritation was expected to result in the non-triggering condition. 
 
 anger no anger 
minor irritation outgroup derogation  
no irritation   
Figure 1. Experimental design in affective terms and contrast hypothesis of triggered 
displaced outgroup derogation. 
If a triggered displaced behavioral response results from a priming effect such that the 
triggering event is more easily noticed or perceived as provoking, then the 3 -1 -1 -1 pattern 
should also be observable for variables representing cognitive appraisals preceding the 
behavioral response to the triggering outgroup (e.g., perceived threat or perceived legitimacy 
of the triggering incident). Furthermore, the rumination-based explanation and the arousal-
based explanation both predict the highest level of anger among participants in the 
provocation-trigger condition, but for different reasons. Following the rumination-based 
explanation, participants in the provocation-trigger condition should report the highest level 
of anger, because due to the activation of aggression-related mental representations they 
appraise the triggering event as anger-eliciting, more so than participants in the other three 
conditions. The increased anger is then a consequence of the perception of the trigger as 
being more provocative in the provocation-trigger condition as compared with the other three 
conditions. The arousal-based explanation holds that an augmented experience of anger 
reflects persistent arousal instigated by the initial provocation combined with the arousal 
elicited by the triggering event itself. The trigger-elicited group-based emotions are 
interactively produced by both experimental manipulations in the provocation-trigger 
condition. 
3.2 Mediated Moderation Hypothesis 
Group-based emotions are hypothesized to mediate the relationship between the 
triggering provocation and the behavioral outcome, namely outgroup derogation. More 
precisely, a mediated moderation is expected to occur (Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2006). 
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Trigger-elicited anger will only lead to an increase in outgroup derogation when participants 
had previously experienced anger elicited by the initial provocation. Without a prior anger-
reaction to the provocation, the minor irritation elicited by the trigger will not lead to 
outgroup derogation. At the same time, the affective reaction to the trigger moderates the 
effect of provocation-elicited anger on outgroup derogation. Only when trigger-elicited anger 
is present will displaced outgroup derogation occur. In the absence of trigger-elicited anger, 
provocation-elicited anger will not be associated with outgroup derogation. 
Moderation analyses followed recommendations from Aiken and West (1991). The 
first order anger terms were z-standardized4, afterwards an interaction term was computed by 
multiplying both z-standardized measures. Regression analyses were performed with all three 
predictors. Since the interaction is symmetrical, a significant interaction term signifies that 
the effect of one predictor on the criterion is conditional on the respective other predictor. 
However, for the sake of clarity, only the moderating effect of provocation-elicited anger will 
be reported. 
3.2.1 Emotion-specificity hypothesis 
Specific negative group-based emotions are hypothesized to relate differently to 
specific behavioral tendencies. Valence is not the only relevant dimension to distinguish 
between emotions (Lerner & Keltner, 2000). Anger is hypothesized to exert an influence on 
outgroup derogating behavior distinguishable from another negatively valenced emotion, 
namely dejection. An anger-response to the triggering incident will mediate the relationship 
between the trigger and the outgroup derogation whereas neither dejection nor positive 
emotions will mediate this relationship to a comparable extent. 
3.2.2 Identification is a prerequisite for group-based phenomena 
Identification with the ingroup is a necessary prerequisite for group-based appraisals, 
group-based emotions, and intergroup behavior. A mediation of the effect of the triggering 
event on outgroup derogation by the affective reaction to the trigger is therefore not expected 
among participants who do not identify with the social category they belong to. Neither 
group-based emotions nor outgroup derogation should occur among those participants who 
                                                 
4 Centering as well as z-standardization reduce the correlation between first order term and product term and 
thus the problem of multicollinearity (Aiken & West, 1991). 
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are formally members of the respective group (which applies to all participants) but who do 
not identify with this group. 
3.3 Overview of the Present Studies 
The hypotheses were tested in four studies. All studies conducted within the scope of 
this dissertation employed the same basic experimental design. Participants learned at the 
very beginning that they would work on two separate studies that had only been combined for 
efficient data collection. The first study served to apply the comparatively strong provocation, 
the second study applied the triggering provocation and contained the dependent measures. 
Both experimental factors had two levels, one provoking and one non-provoking level, 
respectively. The design was fully crossed.   
Importantly, the trigger manipulations as well as the dependent measures did not 
address participants individually but on the level of their respective social identities. The 
provocation manipulation on the other hand related to the individual person as well as to the 
social identity of the research participants across studies. Theoretically, the distinction 
between self-based and group-based initial provocation should be insignificant. Any kind of 
provocation is hypothesized to be capable of inducing the initial moderately strong negative 
affect.    
Study 1 was a paper-and-pencil questionnaire study. The questionnaires related to two 
completely unrelated naturally occurring intergroup contexts. All affect measures were 
obtained with adjective rating scales. In Study 2, again a paper-and-pencil study, participants’ 
relevant group membership only changed from a subcategory level (East German) to a 
superordinate level (German). The affective reaction to the initial provocation was assessed 
with a pictorial core affect measure (cf. chapter 5.5). In the first two studies, the initial and 
triggering provocations were applied by means of written information participants received in 
the questionnaires. The next two studies were conducted in the laboratory, they employed a 
minimal group procedure (Tajfel et al., 1971). Slightly varied initial provocations across 
studies were not group-based but directed at the individual participant. Specifically, an 
illegitimate action of the experimenter resulted in a negative outcome for participants. The 
triggering provocation related to participants’ minimal ingroup. Across studies, verbal and 
pictorial core affect measures assessed whether the initial provocation was successful. The 
laboratory studies allowed to employ measures of actual behavior instead of rating scales 
measuring behavioral intentions.
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4 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM A QUESTIONNAIRE STUDY 
The interactively produced aggressive behavior in response to the combined effect of 
a strong initial provocation and a subsequent trivial triggering provocation has been 
demonstrated in interpersonal aggression research (Pedersen et al., 2000). The purpose of 
Study 1, which encompassed two questionnaires, was to produce a similar effect in a 
naturally occurring intergroup context. In the first questionnaire, participants were addressed 
as Europeans as opposed to US-Americans, in the second questionnaire as members of the 
young generation as opposed to the elderly. Many cues were placed in the material that made 
the respective group membership salient. It was assumed that flexible changes in self-
categorization would be performed easily. Consequently, participants were expected to 
perceive, experience, and act based on the currently salient group membership. Participants in 
the provocation-trigger condition were expected to display higher levels of outgroup 
derogation than participants in the other conditions. To the extent that triggered displacement 
based on priming effects, previously provoked participants should also judge a subsequent 
trigger more negatively. The second intergroup relation would thus be appraised more 
negatively in the provocation-trigger condition than in the other conditions. Group-based 
anger following the trigger manipulation was similarly expected only to occur in the 
provocation-trigger condition. The contrast effects were particularly expected for those 
participants who were sufficiently identified with their own social category (cf. Yzerbyt et al., 
2003). The interactive effect of both manipulations on outgroup derogation is hypothesized to 
be mediated by the group-based anger experienced after the second manipulation. 
4.1 Method 
Participants and Design. Forty students from the Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, 
volunteered to take part in the study in return for a bar of chocolate. Twenty-three 
participants were female, 16 male, 1 participant gave diverging answers in the two 
questionnaires, thus, the participant’s gender cannot be determined. Participants ranged in age 
from 19 to 28 years (M = 22.03, SD = 2.43). In the 2 (provocation, no provocation) × 2 
(trigger, no trigger) between-subjects design, each cell contained 10 participants.  
Procedure. The first questionnaire broached the issue of European–US-American 
relations. In the provoking conditions, a report informed participants about US-American 
measures in the so-called “war against terror”, including a vivid and extensive description of 
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the outrageous torments that have been inflicted on a Canadian citizen of Syrian descent. To 
establish the European–US-American intergroup context, the report further mentioned 
European’s criticism of the Bush administration’s anti-terrorism measures. It closed with an 
account of hindrances towards Europeans that resulted from the Patriot Act, it portrayed how 
European business-men and tourists have been arbitrarily imprisoned, subjected to 
interrogation, and, finally, to deportation. In contrast, the non-provoking conditions 
reproduced the events on and surrounding D-Day on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of 
the invasion of Normandy by the Allied Forces on June 6, 1944. The report emphasized the 
US-American contribution to these events and the importance for European history. Flags 
were printed on top of each page of the questionnaires (“Stars and Stripes” and the European 
flag) to subtly increase the salience of the current intergroup context.  
Six filler items diverging depending on the level of provocation served to maintain the 
cover-story by assessing participants’ knowledge and at the same time they served to increase 
the salience of the particular intergroup context (e.g., “I know reports from Europeans 
concerning arbitrariness of American authorities.”5 and “I already knew that thousands of 
US-soldiers died in the course of the liberation of Europe.” in the provoking and non-
provoking conditions, respectively; see Appendix for the full scale). Rumination was 
inconspicuously encouraged in the provocation conditions by asking questions about 
sensitive aspects mentioned in the report; the items were not analyzed.  
Whether the manipulation of affect by the provocation was successful was measured 
by 10 categorical emotional adjectives. Participants rated how much they experienced each 
emotional quality when thinking about what they had read. Four items assessed anger 
(“outraged”, “indignant”, “furious”, “angry”), three items assessed dejection (“sad”, 
“uneasy”, “dejected”), and three items assessed positive emotions (“optimistic”, “hopeful”, 
“confident”). The respective items were averaged to form composite scores with high 
reliabilities, Cronbach’s α = .92, α = .90, and α = .90 for anger, dejection, and positive 
emotions, respectively. Anger and dejection were significantly correlated, r(39) = .44,  p < 
.01. The positive emotions index was marginally correlated with anger, r(39) = -.30,  p = .06, 
and uncorrelated with dejection, r(39) = -.14,  p = .41. 
                                                 
5 All items, as reported in this thesis, were translated from German into English. 
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Finally, three items measured the identification with Europe. One item 
straightforwardly asked for identification (“I identify with Europe.”), the other two items 
assessed the affective evaluation of being European (“I like being European.”, “I consider it 
positive to be European.”). All three items were averaged to form a composite identification 
index, Cronbach’s α = .89. All items of the first questionnaire were rated on 9-point Likert-
type scales. The filler scales and the identification scale ranged from 1 (not true at all) to 9 
(absolutely true), the categorical emotion scale ranged from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much). 
Participants worked on the questionnaire individually and returned it to the experimenter 
once they were finished. Then, they received the second questionnaire. 
The second questionnaire addressed the student participants as members of the young 
generation as opposed to members of the older generation. Participants read a description of a 
fictitious residential home for the elderly as could have been found in the feature pages of a 
newspaper. Contrary to the prevalent notion of rather bleak institutions, this home for the 
elderly offered a variety of activities and services. A whole range of pets and animals was 
also said to live on the estate. In the triggering conditions, inhabitants were described to 
immoderately indulge in the amenities offered with a scarce interest in giving employees a 
hand maintaining the large garden or taking care of the animals. On top of this, the place was 
allegedly financed by taxes. In the non-triggering conditions, inhabitants were appreciative 
and grateful, they gladly worked in the stables and in the garden, and it was their relatives 
who paid for this unusual accommodation. 
Agreement with statements demanding outgroup derogating measures was assessed 
by three items (“The payments that pensioners receive should be curtailed.”, “In support of 
our solidary community, the pensioners also have to cut back, eventually.”, “Early retirees 
should suffer financial forfeit.”; Cronbach’s α = .83). Two items assessed perceived threat 
(“The older generation’s pretensions threaten the younger people’s future.”, “The older 
generation is enjoying prosperity that is not affordable.”; Cronbach’s α = .75). Perceived 
threat assessed an appraisal that related quite directly to the intergroup relation. Outgroup 
derogation items and perceived threat items were mixed within one scale. Instructions to the 
scale stressed the intergroup context by addressing participants as members of the younger 
generation.  
Next, participants reported their affective reaction to the description of the residential 
home for the elderly. Again, the majority of the categorical emotions were negative in 
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valence, two items assessed anger (“angry”, “outraged”; Cronbach’s α = .92), and three items 
assessed dejection (“worried”, “depressed”, “scared”; Cronbach’s α = .73). Another three 
items assessed positive emotions (“happy”, “relieved”, “optimistic”; Cronbach’s α = .72). It 
has to be noted that for the negative emotions scores were generally quite low and the 
distributions were positively skewed (modes = 1). Not only both negative emotion indices 
were highly significantly correlated, r(39)anger-dejection = .66, p < .001, but each was also 
significantly correlated with the positive emotions index, r(39)anger-positive emotions = -.49, p < 
.01, and r(39)dejection-positive emotions = -.47, p < .01.  
Since the intergroup context was different from the one in the first questionnaire, 
participants indicated how much they identified with the young generation. Six items tapped 
two different aspects of identification, namely membership (“I see myself as a member of the 
young generation.”, “I feel part of the young generation.”, “I identify with today’s young 
generation.”) and evaluation (“I like being part of today’s young generation.”, “I am glad to 
belong to precisely this young generation.”, “I appreciate to belong to today’s young 
generation.”). All items were averaged to form a single index of identification with the young 
generation with sufficient reliability, Cronbach’s α = .80.  
The last scale addressed the perceived appropriateness of the living conditions in the 
residential home for the elderly. This scale tapped the appraised legitimacy of the status quo 
although not in relative terms but relating to the absolute outcome for the outgroup. SIT 
nominated perceived legitimacy as a pivotal feature with regard to the evaluation of the 
intergroup relation. Appraisal theories of emotion find legitimacy to be one critical appraisal 
dimension for anger to occur (Frijda et al., 1989; Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990). The 
perceived inappropriateness reflected a moral judgment. Participants indicated their judgment 
on four items (“It is egregious that pensioners are enjoying such prosperity.”, “All pensioners 
should be allowed for a live such as on the Kastanienhof.”6, reverse coded, “I perceive it as 
provocative that pensioners are indulging themselves in such a manner.”, “It is appropriate 
that as many amenities as possible are made available to pensioners.”, reverse coded). After 
reverse coding the positively phrased items so that higher scores indicated stronger judgments 
of inappropriateness the four items were averaged to form a composite score of 
inappropriateness judgment with satisfactorily reliability, Cronbach’s α = .78. To disguise the 
relatedness of both questionnaires and to prevent distortion of the assessment of trigger-
                                                 
6 “Kastanienhof” was the name provided for the fictitious residential home for the elderly. 
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elicited affect by using the exact same format for the emotion scales twice the second 
questionnaire exclusively used 7-point rating scales. The poles always read not true at all and 
absolutely true except for the emotion scale that was again labeled not at all and very much 
for the lower and upper pole, respectively. Additionally, different numbers of items were 
included in the emotion scales and the assortments of specific adjectives were only partially 
overlapping. 
4.2 Results and Discussion 
Checking for multivariate outliers, variables included in the analysis were outgroup 
derogation, inappropriateness judgment, perceived threat, identification with the young 
generation, and trigger-elicited anger. One multivariate outlier was identified using 
Mahalanobis distance with a criterion α = .001, critical χ²(5, N = 39) = 20.515. Except for 
outgroup derogation, all variables distinguished the outlier from the other cases. Therefore, 
this participant was excluded from further analyses. 
Manipulation check provocation-elicited affect. Provocation-elicited affect indices 
were subjected to independent t tests in order to investigate how they were influenced by 
provocation. The provoking conditions’ mean for anger exceeded the non-provoking 
conditions’ mean, t(37) = 4.85, p < .001, d7 = 1.59, indicating an effective manipulation (cf. 
Table 1 for means and standard deviations). Furthermore, the provocation and no provocation 
means differed statistically significantly on the measure of positive emotions, t(37) = -4.69, p 
< .001, d = -1.54. Thus, the provocation manipulation not only evoked anger in the 
provocation conditions, but at the same time it reduced levels of positive emotions compared 
with participants in the no provocation conditions. Both effects were comparable regarding 
magnitude of the effect. Yet, in line with the emotion-specificity hypothesis, there was no 
statistically significant difference between the provocation and the no provocation conditions 
on the dejection measure, t < 18. Apparently, the initial manipulation did not impact 
                                                 
7 Cohen’s d = M1 - M2 /[(σ1² + σ2²)/2]
0.5 (Cohen, 1988). Cohen (1988) defined effect sizes of 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8 as 
small, medium, and large, respectively. 
8 For test statistics (t, F) < 1 no effect size measures are reported. Assessing the magnitude of standardized mean 
differences is not informative when the observed differences in means are highly likely due to chance. Equally 
unreasonable would be assessing the strength of the relationship between an effect (main effect, interaction 
effect, etc.) and a dependent variable when the reliability of the relationship is extremely low. 
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participants’ affective reaction on a general level, differences between conditions did not 
occur for each specific categorical emotion.  
Table 1. Means and standard deviations for provocation-elicited emotions and identification 
with Europe separately for both provocation conditions (Study 1).  
 provocation no provocation 
anger 6.59 (2.17) 3.52 (1.76) 
dejection 4.85 (2.05) 4.61 (2.26) 
positive emotions 2.16 (1.64) 4.86 (1.95) 
EU identification  7.05 (1.45) 7.60 (1.26) 
Note. Standard deviations are specified in brackets. 
Identification as European. Following results from Kessler and Hollbach (2005), 
identification as European should be higher in the provocation than in the no provocation 
conditions, because the provoking report induced anger towards the outgroup whereas the 
non-provoking report did not. The independent sample t test however revealed no statistically 
significant difference between provoked and non-provoked participants, t(37) = -1.25, p = 
.22, d = -0.40. Identification as European was across conditions well above the mid-point of 
the scale, t(19) = 6.33, p < .001, d = 1.429 for the provocation and t(18) = 8.95, p < .001, d = 
2.06 for the no provocation conditions (cf. Table 1 for means and standard deviations). The 
generally high level of identification as European may account for the absence of statistically 
significant correlations of identification with the provocation-related emotion indices, r(39) = 
-.22, p = .18 for anger, r(39) = -.09, p = .59 for dejection, and r(39) = .03, p = .87 for the 
positive emotions. An alternative interpretation is however that the emotion ratings did not 
reflect group-based experiential knowledge but rather semantic knowledge (cf. Robinson & 
Clore, 2002). A third possibility is, that the report affected participants’ personal sense of 
morality. Yet, whether the initial provocation is person-based or group-based is conceptually 
no important distinction. 
                                                 
9 For comparisons of sample means with specific scale points, the following formula was used to compute 
Cohen’s d, d = M - C /σ, where C is the specified scale point, M is the population mean, and σ the population 
standard deviation (Cohen, 1988). 
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Planned contrast analyses 
Outgroup derogation. The initial provocation and the trivial triggering provocation 
were expected to interactively produce a disproportionately aggressive response to the 
triggering event. The provocation-trigger condition indeed produced significantly higher 
levels of outgroup derogation than the other three conditions (3 -1 -1 -1), F(1, 35) = 4.56, p = 
.04, ηp
2 = .11510. The 1-df test for significant between-group differences unexplained by the 
focal contrast yielded an F(1, 35) = 2.21, p = .15, ηp
2 = .05911, indicating that indeed the 3 -1 
-1 -1 contrast best described the relation between both manipulations and outgroup 
derogation (cf. Table 2 for means and standard deviations). Triggered displacement of 
aggression from one intergroup context to a totally unrelated outgroup thus indeed occurred. 
Inappropriateness rating. The priming explanation for triggered displaced aggression 
that subsequent minor provocations are more readily noted and/or interpreted as provoking 
predicted an interactive effect of both experimental manipulations also for evaluative 
judgments. Those participants who were first provoked and subsequently encountered a 
trigger should perceive the living conditions in the residential home for the elderly as more 
illegitimate, they should score higher on the inappropriateness judgment measure than all 
other participants. A planned contrast analysis yielded however no significant focal contrast, 
F(1, 35) = 1.50, p = .23, ηp
2 = .041, yet a significant amount of residual variance remained, 
F(1, 35) = 5.78, p = .02, ηp
2 = .142. To explore the observed variance an omnibus F test was 
conducted. The 2 × 2 between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant 
main effect of trigger, F(1, 35) = 4.76, p = .04, ηp
2 = .120, both other effects were non-
significant, Fs < 1. The triggering information was perceived as more inappropriate in the 
triggering than in the non-triggering conditions, regardless of the level of provocation (cf. 
Table 2 for means and standard deviations). The judgment regarding the legitimacy of the 
conditions in the residential home for the elderly was made independently from prior 
unrelated incidents. Results are thus not consistent with the priming explanation, the mild 
                                                 
10 Partial eta squared (ηp
2) denotes the ratio of the variation accounted for by an individual independent variable 
to the sum of the variation accounted for by the independent variable and the variation unaccounted for by the 
model as a whole as computed by SPSS 12. Transforming the conventional levels for small, medium, and large 
effects for Cohen’s d, .0099, .0588, and .1379 result for the effect size measure ηp
2 (Cohen, 1988). 
11 Since SPSS 12 provides no partial eta squared (ηp
2) for this test, it was computed as follows (cf. Pierce, 
Block, & Aguinis, 2004): ηp
2 = SSalternative contrasts / (SSalternative contrasts + SSerror). 
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provocation was no more readily noted or more harshly judged by provoked participants than 
by non-provoked participants. 
Table 2. Means and standard deviations for the dependent measures separately for all four 
experimental conditions (Study 1). 
 provocation no provocation 
 trigger no trigger trigger no trigger 
outgroup derogation 4.48 (1.56) 2.73 (1.55) 3.52 (0.99) 3.67 (1.76) 
inappropriateness judgment 2.95 (1.47) 2.10 (0.85) 2.98 (1.13) 2.17 (1.19) 
perceived threat 3.40 (1.97) 2.70 (1.48) 3.00 (1.73) 3.25 (1.32) 
trigger-elicited emotions     
 anger 1.55 (1.30) 1.00 (0.00) 2.00 (1.25) 1.90 (1.02) 
 dejection 1.43 (0.89) 1.30 (0.48) 2.70 (1.57) 2.43 (1.19) 
 positive emotions 4.27 (1.90) 5.63 (0.87) 3.89 (1.05) 4.78 (1.22) 
identificationyoung generation 5.29 (0.86) 4.90 (1.16) 5.17 (0.85) 5.77 (0.73) 
Note. Standard deviations are specified in brackets. 
Perceived threat. A similar theoretical argument applied to perceived threat as to 
outgroup derogation and the evaluative inappropriateness judgment, therefore an analogous 
analysis was conducted. Yet, no contrast was statistically significant, all Fs < 1, indicating 
that there was no systematic variance in the data (cf. Table 2 for means and standard 
deviations). Appraisal of the older generation as threatening the young generation was not 
interactively augmented in the provocation-trigger condition as should have been the case had 
the first manipulation functioned as a prime. 
Trigger-elicited emotions. Following the theoretical argument, affect at this point in 
time was the result of both the initial strong and the subsequent trivial provocation. 
Therefore, planned contrast analyses were conducted for the trigger-elicited affect measures 
(3 -1 -1 -1). Contrary to expectations, the focal contrast for anger was not significant, F < 1, 
but significant amounts of residual variance remained, F(1, 35) = 5.61, p = .02, ηp
2 = .138 (cf. 
Table 2 for means and standard deviations). A similar pattern emerged for the positive 
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emotions. The focal contrast was not significant, F(1, 35) = 1.07, p = .31, ηp
2 = .030, but the 
test for residual variance revealed substantial unexplained between-group differences, F(1, 
35) = 8.21, p < .01, ηp
2 = .190. For dejection the focal contrast was marginally significant, 
F(1, 35) = 3.17, p = .08, ηp
2 = .083, with a lower reported mean for dejection in the 
provocation-trigger condition compared with the other three conditions. However, substantial 
amounts of residual variance, considerably larger in effect size than the focal contrast, 
remained, F(1, 35) = 9.06, p < .01, ηp
2 = .206. Obviously, the 3 -1 -1 -1 contrast was not 
appropriate to capture the systematic variance in the data. 
As the predicted contrast failed to describe the observed pattern of means for trigger-
elicited emotions, omnibus F tests were conducted to get a better understanding of the data. 2 
× 2 between-subjects ANOVAs revealed that despite the disruptive experimental procedure, 
the influence of the initial provocation still predominated the second affect measures. For 
both negative emotion indices, only the main effect provocation was statistically significant, 
F(1, 35) = 4.18, p = .048, ηp
2 = .107 for anger and F(1, 35) = 11.82, p < .01, ηp
2 = .252 for 
dejection, all other Fs < 1. Unexpectedly, non-provoked participants reported significantly 
higher levels of trigger-elicited anger and dejection than provoked participants – regardless of 
the level of trigger. Possibly, the provocation manipulation served as a comparison standard 
so that a contrast effect resulted for provoked participants. In light of the strongly provoking 
report in the first questionnaire, the irritating information about the fastidious elderly 
apparently appeared rather negligible. The strong initial provocation thus seems to have 
functioned as an emotional buffer against negative affective reactions towards the elderly. 
This is all the more noteworthy in light of the results for the inappropriateness rating that 
participants did perceive the triggering home for the elderly as more inappropriate than the 
non-triggering one. Only the positive emotions index demonstrated that the trigger also had 
some impact on affect experienced after the second manipulation, F(1, 35) = 7.08, p = .012, 
ηp
2 =.168 for the trigger main effect. Participants reported significantly lower levels of 
positive emotions in the trigger conditions than in the no trigger conditions. The main effect 
provocation and the interaction of provocation and trigger were not statistically significant, 
F(1, 35) = 2.09, p = .16, ηp
2 = .056 and F < 1, respectively. While the triggering depiction 
failed to increase levels of negative emotions relative to the non-triggering depiction, it did 
ensue relatively weaker positive emotions. All in all, the strong direct effect of the first 
experimental manipulation on the second affect measurement was clearly contrary to 
predictions. 
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Identification with the young generation. Assuming a successful manipulation of 
participants’ affective reaction to the description of the residential home for the elderly in 
conjunction with a successful manipulation of provocation-elicited anger, anger towards the 
elderly and consequently the identification with the young generation (cf. Kessler & 
Hollbach, 2005) should be higher in the provocation-trigger condition compared with the 
other three conditions. Therefore, a planned contrast analysis with the focal contrast specified 
as 3 -1 -1 -1 was also computed for identification with the young generation. However, the 
focal contrast was not statistically significant, F < 1. Substantial between-group differences 
were not explained by the focal contrast, F(1, 35) = 4.61, p = .04, ηp
2 =.116 (cf. Table 2 for 
means and standard deviations). This is not surprising in light of the results for the trigger-
elicited emotions. A subsequently conducted 2 × 2 ANOVA with provocation and trigger as 
between-subjects factors however revealed neither main effect statistically significant, Fs(1, 
35) < 1.61, ps > .21, ηp
2s < .044. The interaction effect showed a non-significant tendency, 
F(1, 35) = 2.85, p = .1003, ηp
2 = . 075. Identification with the young generation was in all 
conditions above the mid-point of the scale, ts > 2.46, ps < .04, ds > .77. 
Regression analyses 
Theoretically, the inappropriateness judgment should predict how much trigger-
elicited anger is experienced because perception of illegitimacy or unfairness is an important 
appraisal dimension associated with the emotion of anger (Frijda et al., 1989; Roseman, 
Spindel, & Jose, 1990). Group-based emotions are further hypothesized to be predicated on 
identification with the young generation (Smith, 1999). As the inappropriateness judgment is 
an appraisal that is potentially influenced by the group’s needs and goals, though not 
explicitly relating to them, it might also be dependent on the level of identification with the 
young generation. Consequently, multiple regression analyses according to Aiken and West 
(1991) were conducted. Identification with the young generation and the inappropriateness 
judgment were both z-standardized and an interaction term was computed by multiplying 
both z-standardized terms. Each trigger-elicited group-based emotion was then regressed on 
the inappropriateness judgment, identification with the young generation, and both variables’ 
interaction term.  
The regression model explained significant amounts of variance in trigger-elicited 
anger, R² = .562, F(3, 35) = 14.98, p < .001. All three predictors were statistically significant, 
β = .39, t(35) = 3.39, p = .002 for identification with the young generation, β = .58, t(35) = 
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4.90, p < .001 for the inappropriateness judgment, and β = .27, t(35) = 2.30, p = .03 for the 
interaction term. The stronger participants identified with the young generation and the more 
inappropriate they judged the living conditions in the residential home for the elderly to be, 
the more anger they reported after reading the depiction of the residential home for the 
elderly. Simple slope analyses12 for anger investigating the significant interaction term 
revealed that for highly identified participants judgments as inappropriate highly significantly 
increased levels of trigger-elicited anger, β = .87, t(35) = 6.01, p < .001 (cf. Figure 2). For 
participants relatively lowly identified the inappropriateness judgment was not significantly 







Figure 2. Trigger-elicited anger as a function of inappropriateness judgment and 
identification with the young generation (Study 1). 
Significant amounts of variance were also explained in trigger-elicited dejection and 
the positive emotions, R² = .272, F(3, 35) = 4.37, p = .0103 and R² = .555, F(3, 35) = 14.53, p 
< .001. Identification was however no significant predictor of dejection or the positive 
emotions, β = .15 and β = -.03, respectively, ts < 1. The inappropriateness judgment 
significantly predicted trigger-elicited dejection, β = .47, t(35) = 3.08, p = .004, and the 
positive trigger-elicited emotions, β = -.79, t(35) = -6.55, p < .001. The interaction term was 
not significant for dejection, β = .13, t < 1, a non-significant tendency was observed for the 
positive emotions, β = .20, t(35) = 1.67, p = .103. Specifically anger could thus be shown to 
result from appraising situations as inappropriate among participants highly identified. 
 
 
                                                 
12 Simple slopes were computed for identification one standard deviation above and one standard deviation 
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Moderation analyses 
A multiple regression analysis according to Aiken and West (1991) was conducted 
regressing outgroup derogation on both anger terms (after z-standardization) and their 
interaction term. This analysis investigated how provocation-elicited and trigger-elicited 
anger were associated with the behavioral measure and whether they interacted. The 
regression model explained marginally significant amounts of variance in outgroup 
derogation, R² = .167, F(3, 35) = 2.34, p = .09. Provocation-elicited anger did not 
significantly predict outgroup derogation, β = .07, t < 1, however trigger-elicited anger was a 
significant predictor, β = .41, t(35) = 2.38, p = .02. Higher levels of trigger-elicited anger 
were associated with higher levels of outgroup derogation. The interaction term was revealed 
to be a marginally significant predictor, β = .33, t(35) = 1.96, p = .06. Exploring the 
marginally significant interaction term, a simple slope analysis was conducted (cf. Figure 3). 
The trigger-elicited anger reaction had no impact on outgroup derogation when provocation-
elicited anger was low, β = .03, t < 1. In contrast, for high levels of provocation-elicited anger 
trigger-elicited anger led to an increase in outgroup derogation, β = .79, t(35) = 2.58, p = 
.014. These results corroborate the hypothesis, that the effect of the trivial provocation on 
derogative behavior towards an outgroup is moderated by a prior anger experience. A strong 
association of trigger-elicited anger with outgroup derogation only occurred when the 







Figure 3. Outgroup derogation as a function of provocation-elicited anger and trigger-elicited 
anger (Study 1). 
Next, perceived threat was regressed on both anger terms (after z-standardization) and 
their interaction term. The model explained significant amounts of variance in perceived 
threat, R² = .306, F(3, 35) = 5.14, p = .005. Whereas provocation-elicited anger was a non-
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predicted perceived threat, β = .60, t(35) = 3.81, p < .001. Stronger experiences of trigger-
elicited anger were associated with more outgroup derogation. The interaction term also 
significantly predicted perceived threat, β = .36, t(35) = 2.36, p = .02. A simple slope analysis 
for high versus low levels of provocation-elicited anger was computed to explore the 
significant interaction term (cf. Figure 4). For low provocation-elicited anger trigger-elicited 
anger and perceived threat were not significantly associated, β = .19, t(35) = 1.01, p = .32. 
However, trigger-elicited anger led to a significant increase in perceived threat when 
provocation-elicited anger was high, β = 1.01, t(35) = 3.64, p < .001. The effect of trigger-








Figure 4. Perceived threat as a function of provocation-elicited anger and trigger-elicited 
anger (Study 1). 
Parallel analyses with dejection terms did not yield significant results. The multiple 
regression model did not explain significant amounts of variance in outgroup derogation, R² = 
.154, F(3, 35) = 2.12 p = .12. Neither provocation-elicited dejection nor trigger-elicited 
dejection were significant predictors of outgroup derogation, β = -.18, t(35) = -1.14, p = .26 
and β = .26, t(35) = 1.60, p = .12. The interaction term was also non-significant, β = .25, t(35) 
= 1.56, p = .13. For the next criterion, perceived threat, the regression model again failed to 
explain significant amounts of variance, R² = .110, F(3, 35) = 1.44, p = .25. Provocation-
elicited dejection was non-significant, β = -.12, t < 1, trigger-elicited dejection showed a non-
significant tendency, β = .28, t(35) = 1.66, p = .106. The interaction term was likewise not 
significant, β = -.02, t < 1.  
The third set of moderation analyses was run with the positive emotions terms as 
predictors. The multiple regression model explained no significant amount of variance in 
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outgroup derogation, βs < │.26│, ts(35) < │1.44│, ps > .15. For the criterion perceived 
threat the regression model was non-significant, too, R² = .117, F(3, 35) = 1.55, p = .22. 
Provocation-elicited positive emotions did not predict perceived threat, β = .02, t < 1, 
however the trigger-elicited positive emotions term was a statistically significant predictor of 
perceived threat, β = -.35, t(35) = -2.04, p = .049. Lower levels of trigger-elicited positive 
emotions were associated with higher levels of perceived threat. The interaction term was not 
significant, β = -.03, t < 1. In sum, the moderating influence of provocation-elicited affect on 
the association between trigger-elicited affect and threat perceived to be posed by an 
outgroup as well as derogation of that respective outgroup was specifically observed for 
anger, neither for dejection nor for the positive emotions index. 
Multiple regression analyses  
Due to the emotion-specificity demonstrated above, subsequent analyses including 
affective responses to the experimental manipulations were confined to anger. Both anger and 
the inappropriateness judgment were tested simultaneously as predictors of outgroup 
derogation. The first model included only the inappropriateness judgment, it explained a 
significant amount of variance, R² = .208, F(1, 37) = 9.69, p < .01, the inappropriateness 
judgment significantly predicted outgroup derogation, β = .46, t(37) = 3.11, p < .01. Entering 
the three anger measures did not lead to a significant increase of the proportion of variance 
explained, R²change = .079 with change in F(3, 34) = 1.26, p = .30. The first order anger terms 
did not predict outgroup derogation, β = .07 for provocation-elicited anger and β = .14 for 
trigger-elicited anger, ts < 1, whereas the interaction term of provocation- and trigger-elicited 
anger was marginally significant, β = .31, t(34) = 1.94, p = .06. The inappropriateness rating 
remained a significant predictor of outgroup derogation in the second model, β = .43, t(34) = 
2.39, p = .02. The variance the inappropriateness judgment explained is primarily shared with 
trigger-elicited anger. Substantial change compared with the regression model including the 3 
anger terms only occurred for trigger-elicited anger. Besides, trigger-elicited anger was 
highly significantly predicted by the inappropriateness judgment. 
The above hierarchical regression model was next used to predict perceived threat. 
The inappropriateness judgment was entered first in a hierarchical model with the criterion 
perceived threat, the 3 anger terms as a set in the second step. The first model again explained 
a highly significant amount of variance, R² = .336, F(1, 37) = 18.73, p < .001, the 
inappropriateness judgment significantly predicted perceived threat, β = .58, t(37) = 4.33, p < 
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.001. The anger terms only marginally significantly contributed to the explanation of 
perceived threat, R²change = .119 in the second model with change in F(3, 34) = 2.47, p = .08. 
Provocation-elicited anger was no significant predictor of perceived threat, β = .19, t(34) = 
1.40, p = .17. Trigger-elicited anger, however, was a marginally significant and the 
interaction term of provocation- and trigger-elicited anger a significant predictor, β = .30, 
t(34) = 1.74, p = .09 and β = .34, t(34) = 2.44, p = .02, respectively. The inappropriateness 
rating remained a highly significant predictor of perceived threat in the second model, β = 
.48, t(34) = 3.05, p < .01. Accordingly, anger and cognition empirically captured some non-
overlapping portions of variance of the criterion perceived threat. The affective route, 
moderated by provocation-elicited anger, accounted for variance in addition to the variance 
that was explained by the inappropriateness rating. 
The next multiple regression model of outgroup derogation included the 
inappropriateness rating, perceived threat, and the three anger measures. This model 
significantly predicted outgroup derogation, R² = .410, F(5, 33) = 4.58, p < .01. Notably, the 
only statistically significant predictor of outgroup derogation in this multiple regression 
model was perceived threat, β = .47, t(33) = 2.62, p = .013, all other ts < 1.08. Perceived 
threat thus captured the predictive power of the cognitive appraisal as well as that of the 
anger measures. 
Analyses of baseline conditions 
The expected mediated moderation could not be shown, the trigger-elicited affect was 
not interactively produced by both experimental manipulations as predicted. Contrary to 
predictions, the affective response to the trigger manipulation was more favorable in the 
provocation conditions than in the no provocation conditions. A main effect of the trigger 
manipulation was only observed for the positive emotion index.  
To advance the understanding of the impact of the trigger manipulation, additional 
data were collected. Twenty students from the Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena volunteered 
to take part in the study and also received a bar of chocolate as compensation. The 15 women 
and 5 men ranged in age from 19 to 27 years (M = 22.40, SD = 2.37). In the 1 × 2 (trigger, no 
trigger) between-subjects design, the provocation manipulation was omitted, each cell 
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contained 10 participants. With regard to the two demographic variables the subsamples did 
not differ from one another, t < 1 for age and t(43.0013) = 1.33, p = .19, d = 0.35 for gender. 
Outgroup derogation did not significantly differ as a function of the trigger 
manipulation, t(18) = -1.39, p = .18, d = -0.66 (cf. Table 3 for means and standard 
deviations). Besides, no difference between baseline conditions was observed with regard to 
the inappropriateness judgment, t < 1. The differential perception of the trigger levels that 
was observed in the experimental conditions of the current study was apparently dependent 
on a previous provocation manipulation. This demonstrates that the trigger manipulation was 
indeed trivial. Although both questionnaires were said to be unrelated, the first one 
apparently served as a comparison standard. Without a prior comparison standard the levels 
of the trigger manipulation were not judged differentially. A more negative perception of the 
triggering event compared with the non-triggering event thus did occur and only occurred in 
conjunction with the first manipulation. Curiously, the comparatively strong provocation as 
well as the non-provoking first factor level ensued a perception of the trigger as more 
negative than the no-trigger.  
Table 3. Means and standard deviations for the dependent measures in the baseline conditions 
separately for both trigger conditions (Study 1). 
 trigger no trigger 
outgroup derogation 2.80 (1.26) 3.60 (1.31) 
inappropriateness judgment  1.80 (0.67) 1.90 (1.11) 
perceived threat 2.20 (0.75) 2.78 (1.56) 
trigger-elicited emotions   
 anger 1.11 (0.22) 1.25 (0.79) 
 dejection 1.56 (0.55) 1.93 (1.03) 
 positive emotions 5.90 (0.74) 4.90 (1.66) 
Note. Standard deviations are specified in brackets. 
                                                 
13 Decimals are reported in spite of being nil to indicate that the variances were unequal. 
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In line with results for the experimental conditions, the baseline conditions did not 
differ with regard to perceived threat, t(17) = -1.04, p = .31, d = -0.51 (cf. Table 3 for means 
and standard deviations). As to the affective impact of trigger in the baseline conditions, no 
difference at all was observed on the anger or on the dejection measure, t < 1 for anger and 
t(14.08) = -1.01, p = .33, d = -0.47 for dejection. The positive emotions index showed a 
marginally significant effect, t(18) = 1.74, p = .098, d = 0.82. The direction of this effect was 
however reversed compared with the trigger main effect observed in the former 2 × 2 
ANOVA for the experimental conditions. Participants in the baseline conditions reported 
higher levels of positive affect after learning about the affluent residential home for the 
elderly as compared with the nice but comparatively modest one. Although only marginally 
significant, the effect size for positive emotions together with the descriptively more 
favorable scores for outgroup derogation and perceived threat in the triggering condition as 
compared with the non-triggering condition suggested an unexpected interpretation. In the 
baseline conditions, participants may have been more pleased with the triggering 
manipulation than with the non-triggering manipulation. The participants actually seemed 
happy for the elderly when they had not been previously provoked. 
4.3 Summary 
Triggered displacement of outgroup derogation was predicted to result interactively 
from a comparatively strong initial provocation and a subsequent trivial provocation. Indeed, 
outgroup derogation was significantly stronger in the provocation-trigger condition than in 
the other three conditions. 
Anger- and dejection-related emotions were expected to relate differentially to 
behavioral tendencies towards the outgroup and to the threat appraisal. Trigger-elicited anger 
and dejection were clearly not interchangeable with regard to their relation to outgroup 
derogation and perception of the outgroup as threatening. At the same time, absence of 
positive emotions did not show the same effects as anger. For group-based anger, 
specifically, a moderation of the effect of trigger-elicited anger on outgroup derogation and 
on perceived threat by provocation-elicited anger was demonstrated.  
The current study did however not reveal the predicted mediation of the moderated 
effect of the trigger manipulation on outgroup derogation by trigger-elicited anger. This 
failure is primarily due to the fact that both manipulations related to each other quite contrary 
to expectations. Instead of enhanced negative affective reactions to the trigger resulting from 
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the initial provocation, a contrast effect occurred. Apparently, the trigger was judged against 
the comparison standard of the initial provocation so that the transgressions by the fastidious 
elderly appeared rather negligible. The trigger did not result in significantly more negative 
affective reactions than the non-triggering manipulation. Affective reactions to the trigger 
were primarily determined by the provocation manipulation. Participants in the non-
provoking conditions scored significantly higher on both trigger-elicited negative emotions 
than participants in the provoking conditions. It is conceivable that this contrast effect was 
facilitated by the repeated use of categorical emotion rating scales. 
The provoking level of the first manipulation hence fulfilled a buffering effect against 
negative affective reactions to the triggering depiction of the luxurious home for the elderly. 
This interpretation is based on the observation that the triggering manipulation was indeed 
appraised as more inappropriate than the non-triggering manipulation, but only when it was 
preceded by an experimental treatment (i.e., a provocation or no provocation treatment as 
opposed to no treatment in the baseline conditions). When encountering the trigger without 
first working on the provocation questionnaire, participants did not judge the 
inappropriateness of both levels of the trigger differently. Apparently, the provocation did 
influence the subsequent judgment of on unrelated incident, possibly by means of priming, 
but independent of the level of provocation. Although the focus in the non-provoking report 
dealing with D-Day had been on the positive outcomes, it also mentioned for example the 
death of many soldiers, thus potentially also activating negative cognitive representations. 
Therefore, similar priming effects may have occurred in the provoking and non-provoking 
conditions.  
Although higher levels of provocation-elicited anger were observed in the provocation 
conditions than in the no provocation conditions and level of identification as European was 
high across conditions, it may have been the case, that the manipulation affected participants 
on a personal instead of on the European group level. This distinction is not supposed to be 
significant, though, when the initial provocation is concerned. Still, a further possibility is 
that participants answered the provocation affect measure according to naïve theories or 
situation-specific beliefs, that is, beliefs about emotions that are likely to be elicited in a 
particular type of situation (Robinson & Clore, 2002). Hence, instead of genuine affective 
experience provocation-elicited affect scores may reflect semantic knowledge. Trigger-
elicited anger instead, unlike the other trigger-elicited emotions, was highly significantly 
associated with identification with the respective ingroup. 
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Study 1 provided first evidence that the affective route via group-based anger 
contributes to the explanation of outgroup derogation and also of appraisal of the intergroup 
relation. Much variance that trigger-elicited anger explained in outgroup derogation and 
perceived threat, respectively, was shared with the inappropriateness judgment, but 
particularly the moderated effect explained unique variance. In the second study, I sought to 
replicate the triggered displacement of outgroup derogation and further investigate the 
possibility of mediation by group-based anger in different intergroup contexts. Additionally, 
a different response format was selected for the first affective measurement. Thus, 
methodological associations between the two affect measures and participants’ potential 
attempts to correct for suspected influences while working on the second questionnaire 
(Berkowitz, Jaffee, Jo, & Troccoli, 2000) should be reduced. The next chapter deals explicitly 
with measurement of affect before Study 2 is presented in chapter 6. 
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5 MEASUREMENT OF AFFECT 
An exhaustive discussion of the conceptualization of emotion or affect is clearly far 
beyond the scope of the present dissertation (see e.g., Russell & Barrett, 1999, for a review). 
Yet, investigating the role of group-based anger in the generation of outgroup derogation 
necessitates careful consideration of the measure employed to assess participants’ level of 
anger. The research question, derived in part from intergroup emotion theory (Smith, 1993, 
1999), implies a categorical approach to emotion as it was used in Study 1. Categorical 
emotion scales were also utilized in the relevant literature reviewed in chapters 2.2 and 2.3 
(e.g., Bushman et al., 2005; Gordijn et al., 2006; Mackie et al., 2000; Pedersen et al., 2000; 
Yzerbyt et al., 2003). This is particularly problematic when the same or highly similar scales 
are employed twice within one experimental session, artificial contrast or assimilation effects 
may result. Subsequent studies therefore substituted core affect measures for the categorical 
emotion scales assessing the affective reaction to the provocation manipulation. 
5.1 Prototypical Emotional Episodes versus Core Affect 
The terms affect and emotion are used in the literature as well as in everyday language 
to refer to a number of distinguishable concepts (e.g., mood, feeling, prototypical emotional 
episode, sentiment, core affect, simple evaluative response). For the present purpose it is 
sufficient to distinguish prototypical emotional episodes from core affect. The concept of 
prototypical emotional episodes corresponds closely with the categorical approach. 
Prototypical emotional episodes can be decomposed into the following necessary 
constituents: particular overt behavior in relation to the object the emotional episode is about, 
attention towards, appraisal of, and attributions to that object, the subjective experience of 
having a specific emotion, physiological changes, and, finally, core affect. In spite of 
apparently distinct categories like anger, fear, and happiness there are no discrete boundaries, 
membership in emotion categories is rather a matter of degree (Barrett, 2006; Russell & 
Barrett, 1999). 
Core affect is defined as “that neurophysiological state consciously accessible as the 
slightest raw (nonreflective) feelings evident in moods and emotions” (Russell, 2003, p. 148). 
Some state of core affect is always present, it can but need not be directed at an object. Core 
affect corresponds with the dimensional approach to emotion. Two independent dimensions 
of core affect, (dis)pleasure (which I refer to as valence) and (de)activation (a sense of 
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mobilization and energy which I refer to as arousal), are subjectively experienced as a single 
integral blend. The present research is based on the conceptualization of Russell and Barrett 
(Barrett & Russell, 1999; Russell, 2003; Russell & Barrett, 1999), who convincingly argue 
that other two-dimensional structures of core affect (Larsen & Diener, 1992; Thayer, 1989; 
Watson & Tellegen, 1985) are alternative descriptions of the same two-dimensional space 
(Russell & Barrett, 1999).  
Every single categorical emotion can be located in the two-dimensional space 
constituted by the bipolar dimensions arousal and valence. Anger, for example, is 
characterized by negative valence and a fairly high level of arousal (cf. Figure 5). While 
likewise being characterized by negative valence, dejection is distinguished from anger by a 
low level of arousal. The extent to that anger and dejection are experienced as similar 
emotional episodes depends on the individual’s arousal focus. Arousal focus and valence 
focus refer to how much an individual attends to the valence and the arousal component of its 
currently experienced affective state, respectively (Feldman, 1995). Generally, the focus on 
valence is stronger than the focus on arousal, but in addition to this primacy of valence there 
are also interindividual differences with regard to the relative emphasis of valence and 
arousal focus (Barrett, 1998, 2004; Feldman, 1995). For persons with a weak arousal focus 
the vertical axis of their affective space is considerably shorter than in the depiction in Figure 









Figure 5. Schematic depiction of the localization of anger in the two-dimensional space build 
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Prototypical emotional episodes typically start as an abrupt change in core affect 
caused by an antecedent event and then dissipate after a specific amount of time (Russell, 
2003). It should be stressed, however, that core affect is only one of emotional episodes’ 
constituents and that some state of core affect endures, though it changes, when the emotional 
episode ceases to exist. Prototypical emotional episodes can also be terminated by the onset 
of another prototypical emotional episode as when anger is replaced by satisfaction, a core 
affect state with positive valence and low arousal, once the anger-eliciting incident has been 
appropriately responded to (Maitner et al., in press).  
The structure of affect might be better understood when the neurobiological substrates 
have been identified. It is actually one of the most important neuroscientific questions how 
affect is generated in the brain. Two opposing landmarks formulated decades ago delimit 
theorizing in affective neuroscience research. The notion of a single undifferentiated state of 
physiological arousal as proposed by Schachter and Singer (1962) did not receive empirical 
support. At the same time, the notion that discrete emotions each have a unique and invariant 
physiological pattern (James, 1884) most probably has to be rejected. It is highly unlikely that 
distinct and reliable patterns will be identified that represent discrete emotions. The debate 
about emotion-specific neurophysiology has not finally been settled, however, results are 
inconsistent (see Cacioppo, Klein, Berntson, & Hatfield, 1993; Zajonc & McIntosh, 1992, for 
reviews). This debate taps one fundamental question of the conceptualization of emotions 
that is whether or not emotions are natural kinds (Barrett, 2006). A natural kind view of 
emotions holds that all experiences of anger belong to a shared category that is distinctly 
different from other categories like, for example, sadness and fear. Instances within each 
category proposedly possess the same set of properties and features that systematically co-
occur. 
5.2 Self-Report versus other Affect Measures  
Prototypical emotional episodes are assumed to involve a number of necessary 
constituents. Yet, how the different constituents are related and, specifically, which 
constituent is most closely linked to the action tendencies or whether the associations 
between the different components are differentially strong at all are questions to be resolved 
by future research. The studies presented here relied on self-report, thus addressing the 
subjective experience of the emotional episode. Other measurement options like 
observational techniques (e.g., coding facial expression) or physiological reactivity 
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recordings likewise only assess single components of the complex emotional episode. 
Furthermore, observational techniques are better suited for research with a stronger 
interactive character than for paper-pencil or computer-based studies in which participants 
individually work on the research material as these generally do not elicit noteworthy 
quantities of observable behavior. Besides, expression of anger in particular is restricted by 
social norms so that participants are expected to be motivated to control observable signs of 
anger experiences. Generally, display rules (e.g., Ekman, 1972) constrain the validity of data 
obtained by observational techniques. Assessment of physiological reactivity on the other 
hand is highly obtrusive. Furthermore, physiological measures are problematic with regard to 
the interpretability of the results. It is quite unclear, what measurable physiological changes 
alone actually indicate with respect to the emotional episode. Assessment of the subjective 
experience indicated in self-reports potentially suffers from cognitive distortion. People have 
naïve theories and hold subjective beliefs about which emotions apply to which kind of 
situation (Robinson & Clore, 2002). Furthermore, participants may even give willfully 
incorrect reports because of concerns about social desirability or the experimenter’s 
expectations. Methodological problems that pertain particularly to self-reports are, for 
example, discussed by Schwarz (1999). 
Traditional emotional adjective rating scales were complemented in Studies 2 through 
4 by core affect measures of varying formats. The core affect measure was always employed 
in association with the first experimental manipulation. The first affect measurement 
primarily functioned as a manipulation check, the second assessment of affect was a 
dependent variable. Although conceptually the core affect dimensions represent each and 
every particular emotional quality, assessment of anger may be more reliable when 
participants rate their subjectively experienced anger as opposed to rating their current level 
of arousal and the perceived valence of their current affective state. Problems with self-
reports arise particularly with regard to arousal, people are much less used to explicitly state 
their current state of arousal than to provide information regarding their affective valence or 
specific emotions. On the other hand, adjective rating scales are much more prone to 
voluntary distortion motivated by social desirability concerns. 
A second argument, at least as substantial as the first, for using the core affect 
measure for the first assessment of affect is to prevent participants from labeling their 
affective state in terms of specific emotions. Assessment of core affect does not require 
participants to categorize their affective state. Though participants were required to 
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introspect, they did not necessarily think about their affect in terms of anger. Asking 
participants to rate how strongly they currently experience a whole range of specific emotions 
might promote a dissipation or even a dissociation, because people strive to correct for 
suspected influences through incidental affect (Berkowitz et al., 2000), even in an emotion-
specific manner (DeSteno, Petty, Wegener, & Rucker, 2000, study 4; Lambert, Khan, Lickel, 
& Fricke, 1997). A final argument for using different scales for the two measurement points 
is that the relatedness of the ostensibly independent studies was further disguised.  
Another option to circumvent some of the methodological problems would have been 
to assess the affective reaction to the initial provocation in retrospect at the end of the study 
(like e.g., Bushman et al., 2005, study 1; Pedersen et al., 2000, study 2; Pedersen et al., in 
progress, study 2). The compelling advantage of online measurement however is that it is not, 
at least less severely, contaminated by situation-specific beliefs (Robinson & Clore, 2002). 
Furthermore, the alleged independence of the two parts of the study would have been 
impaired by such a procedure. Additionally, answering both affect measures in quick 
succession might have artificially increased or decreased similarities between the answers. 
5.3 Verbal versus Non-Verbal Affect Measures 
Difficulties generally associated with verbal measures follow directly from the fact 
that they rely on language proficiency. They cannot reliably be used with certain participants 
like children or second-language speakers. Additionally, verbal affect measures suffer more 
than non-verbal measures from interpersonal differences regarding the ability to reflect and 
verbalize one’s affective state. Whether reported differences are actually due to differences in 
experiences or to differences in language usage is a fairly unresolved issue (but see Barrett, 
2004). Non-verbal pictorial measures generally also require a smaller number of judgments. 
Unfortunately, no available measure seemed to provide a satisfying account for assessing 
core affect non-verbally.  
The Self Assessment Manikin (SAM) is a non-verbal measure for three affective 
dimensions (pleasure, arousal, dominance) (Lang, 1980). Judging by face validity and 
following descriptions from Bradley and Lang (1994), the SAM does not assess the two 
dimensions arousal and valence independently. Yet, orthogonality of the dimensions is a 
fundamental requirement. Rather than representing positive and negative valence abstractly 
the valence measure depicts specific emotional qualities, happiness versus dejection. The 
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arousal measure on the other hand appears to range between sleepy and furious. Assessed via 
SAM, the arousal and valence dimensions are confounded.  
Consequently, a new pictorial measure was constructed to assess core affect. Two 
pretests served to validate a German version of the verbal core affect scale from Barrett and 
Russell (1998) and the new pictorial measure, respectively. 
5.4 Pretest: German Core Affect Scale 
To my knowledge, no verbal core affect measure has to date been used with German 
participants. Therefore, a pretest verified the suitability of a German core affect scale. The 
items were translations from a set that Barrett and Russell (1998) found to be almost 
orthogonally representing the dimensions activation (i.e., arousal) and pleasantness (i.e., 
valence). For reasons of parsimony the German adaptation only included the four orthogonal 
clusters and omitted the additional 28 items resulting from crossed dimensions (i.e., 
unpleasant-activated, pleasant-deactivated, pleasant-activated, unpleasant-deactivated). 
Besides, the translation was not exactly literal, but guided by methodological considerations. 
Specifically, the deviations comprise replacement of double-barreled items with single-
barreled items and including the same number of items for all clusters. As a result, arousal 
and valence were each represented by six items, three items for positive valence (e.g., “I am 
in positive spirits.”), three items for negative valence (e.g., “My mood is bad.”), three items 
for high arousal (e.g., “I feel full of energy.”), and three items for low arousal (e.g., “My 
internal engine is running slowly.”) (cf. Appendix for the full scale). 
Sixty students from the Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena (38 female, 22 male), aged 
18 to 29 (M = 22.33, SD = 2.38), volunteered to answer the questionnaire in exchange for a 
bar of chocolate. Participants completed the core affect scale under the presumption of taking 
part in a survey that examined students’ opinion about the introduction of tuition fees. 
Unusual levels of self-consciousness might have arisen had this pretest been introduced as 
validating an affect measure. Participants read one of two versions of a forged letter to the 
editor dealing with students’ protest against tuition fees that had taken place shortly before 
the pretest was conducted. Half of the participants read a letter that was very supportive of 
the students. The other half read a harshly criticizing letter, the author argued rather 
sarcastically that today’s university students valued only what was costly and that they 
severely lacked self-dependence and motivation. Participants then judged how good each of 
the 12 statements described their experience after reading the letter to the editor on a 4-point 
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scale ranging from 1 (not at all) via 2 (not very well) and 3 (somewhat) to 4 (very well). After 
they returned the questionnaire, participants received their compensation, they were thanked 
and debriefed. 
A factor analysis14 with the extraction method principal axis factoring and the oblique 
rotation procedure Promax15 revealed the expected number of factors, the scree test and the 
eigenvalue > 1 criterion converged on the extraction of two factors. The unrotated factor 
solution accounted for only 45.86% of the variance16. All valence items loaded strongly and 
exclusively on the first factor (> .6017; loadings on the second factor were all < │.15│). The 
arousal items on the other hand were more problematic. “I am feeling placid.” also loaded 
strongly on the first factor (.62). “My mind is in a quiet state.” and “I am feeling full of 
verve.” severely violated the simple structure, loadings were .51 and -.58 on the first factor 
and .44 and .61 on the second factor, respectively. Only “I feel full of energy.” (.64), “I am 
full of tension.” (.57), and “My internal engine is running slowly.” (.55) qualified as marker 
items for the second factor, neither had secondary loadings ≥ .35. Still, the association of “I 
am full of tension.” with valence was far more pronounced than the other two arousal items’ 
associations. On the single item level, “I am full of tension.” was significantly correlated with 
four valence items, bivariate correlations with all valence items ranging from r(59) = .17 to 
r(60) = .44. The other two arousal items’ bivariate correlations with the valence items were 
all non-significant, ranging from r(60) =│.004│ to r(60) =│.17│. Therefore, only two items 
were retained for the arousal dimension (“I feel full of energy.”, “My internal engine is 
running slowly.”). The composite measure achieved a rather weak but acceptable reliability, 
Cronbach’s α = .6218. More satisfactorily was the reliability for valence, Cronbach’s α = .83 
for the full scale. In order to parallel the length of the arousal scale and to get an efficient 
measure for valence, the index to be used in subsequent studies was formed by averaging 
only those two items that loaded highest on the valence factor (“I am in positive spirits.”, 
“My mood is bad.”). Reliability dropped as a consequence to Cronbach’s α = .72. The final 
                                                 
14 The factor analytical method followed recommendations from Russell (2002). 
15 While Promax is an oblique rotation procedure it would still reveal orthogonal factors inasmuch as that fit the 
simple structure (Russell, 2002). 
16 For the rotated factor solution the percentage of variance accounted for cannot be determined by adding sums 
of squared loadings because the rotated factors share common variance. 
17 Reported factor loadings are loadings after rotation. 
18 Including “I am full of tension.” would actually have decreased reliability of the measure, Cronbach’s α = .59. 
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core affect scale thus only contained one item for each of the four poles. However, this is 
regarded sufficient, since people have difficulties differentially reflecting their affective state 
and unconfounded verbal expressions for valence and arousal, respectively, are extremely 
rare. Most importantly, the resulting valence index and the arousal index were statistically 
independent, r(60) = .02, p = .86. Although generally more extensive scales are preferable, 
including more items would have increased the risk of confounding both dimensions. 
5.5 Pretest: Pictorial Core Affect Scale 
As a consequence of the criticism concerning existing non-verbal measures, new 
pictorial items were designed to supplement or substitute the verbal core affect scale (see 
Appendix). The valence item displayed circled plus- and minus-signs of decreasing and 
increasing strength, respectively. Two bold plus-signs represented the lower pole, two bold 
minus-signs the upper pole. The mid-point of the 7-point scale was represented by a little 
square, thus neither representing positive nor negative valence but the center common to both 
signs. No labels interfered with participants’ comprehension, the item was merely introduced 
by the instruction to mark the one circle that represents best one’s current feeling. The arousal 
scale basically mimicked the appearance of an electrocardiogram. The 7-point scale displayed 
bent lines ranging from a smooth and shallow wave19 to a spiky wave with high frequency 
and high amplitude. Here, the instruction read to mark the one circle that represents best one's 
current state of arousal.  
A pretest was conducted in that the pictorial arousal measure was evaluated by 
experimentally manipulating physiological arousal. Participants were recruited in an 
undergraduate psychology class. Twenty-seven females and 5 males volunteered to take part 
in exchange for partial credit. All participants attested they were healthy, they ranged from 18 
to 27 years of age (M = 20.38, SD = 2.21) Participants came to the lab individually and were 
randomly assigned to the activation or the relaxation condition. In the activation condition, 
participants worked out on an exercise bike, doing stationary cycling for 5 minutes. In the 
relaxation condition, participants were seated on a padded chair and offered a selection of 
                                                 
19 The depiction is highly schematic. Particularly, the soft curve is clearly dissimilar to naturally occurring 
electrocardiographic curves. It build loosely on Köhler’s (1929) proposition that sensations experienced through 
different senses are associated with each other. The shapes are thus assumed to resemble the experience of 
calmness (soft curve) and high arousal (spiky curve). Frequency and amplitude were to enforce these 
impressions. 
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relaxation CDs to pick the one they liked best. After the experimenter started the CD-player 
she asked participants to put on the headset, to make themselves comfortable, close their 
eyes, and then relax for 5 minutes. In both conditions, the experimenter left the room and 
returned after the 5 minutes were over, so that participants would not feel uncomfortable in 
view of the possibility of being watched. 
After the experimental manipulation participants indicated their current core affect on 
the two pictorial measures. The subsequent verbal scale included two items for each core 
affect dimension (as explicated above). Additionally, three items that directly assessed 
participants’ appraisal of the experimental manipulation and three items that asked for 
participants’ physical state were included as filler items. As in the prior pretest, reliability of 
the verbal arousal index build through averaging both items was rather weak but still 
acceptable (Cronbach’s α = .63). The verbal valence items formed an index with 
satisfactorily reliability, Cronbach’s α = .80. 
The affective valence remained unaffected by the experimental manipulation as 
assessed by the verbal measure as well as by the pictorial measure, ts(30) < 1 (cf. Table 4 for 
means and standard deviations). Participants who worked out on the stationary cycle and 
participants who had been relaxing did not differ with regard to affective valence.  
Table 4. Means and standard deviations for pictorial and verbal core affect measures 
separately for the activation and the relaxation condition. 
 activation relaxation 
valence (pictorial) 3.31 (1.82) 2.94 (1.06) 
valence (verbal) 1.65 (0.45) 1.52 (0.77) 
arousal (pictorial) 5.13 (1.15) 1.81 (1.11) 
arousal (verbal) 3.09 (0.69) 2.19 (0.87) 
Note. Standard deviations are specified in brackets. Low valence scores represent positive 
valence. 
For perceived arousal there was however a clear effect of the activity. The mean in the 
activation condition clearly exceeded the relaxation condition mean, t(30) = 8.30, p < .001, d 
= 2.94 for the pictorial arousal measure and t(30) = 3.26, p < .01, d = 1.15 for the verbal 
arousal measure (cf. Table 4 for means and standard deviations). Significantly higher scores 
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for participants who worked out on the stationary cycle indicate that the new scale indeed 
measured physiological arousal. The finding, that the effect was stronger for the pictorial than 
for the verbal arousal measure suggests, that pictorial measures outperform the verbal 
measures. Correlational evidence further adds to this impression (see Table 5). The 
association between the corresponding core affect dimensions is descriptively smaller when 
assessed with the pictorial measures than with the verbal measures. Importantly, in line with 
the orthogonality requirement, the pictorial arousal scale is not significantly correlated with 
either valence measure, the same is true for the verbal arousal measure. 
Table 5. Bivariate correlations (Pearson’s r) among pictorial and verbal core affect measures.  
  valence (pictorial) valence (verbal) arousal (pictorial) arousal (verbal) 
valence (pictorial)  1    .42*   .07    -.16  
valence (verbal)   1   .19    -.14  
arousal (pictorial)    1    .56**  
arousal (verbal)     1  
Note. *: significant at p < .05; **: significant at p < .01.
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6 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM A QUESTIONNAIRE STUDY EMPLOYING A 
 CORE AFFECT SCALE  
Study 1 showed the moderating impact of provocation-elicited anger on threat 
perceived to be posed by an unrelated outgroup and subsequent derogation of that outgroup. 
The second questionnaire study implemented the newly developed pictorial core affect 
measure to assess the affective reaction to the initial provocation. This less blatant measure 
was expected to reduce participants’ reflection of their current affective state in terms of 
anger. Participants’ attempts to correct for suspected influences (Berkowitz et al., 2000) from 
their affective reaction to the provocation on their reaction to the trigger should thus be 
minimized. Moreover, potential associations between both affect measures that are due to 
methodological artifacts (e.g., contrast effects that may follow from using identical scales 
twice) should be evaded. The core affect measure thus advanced affect measurement 
compared with Study 1 insofar as participants were initially not explicitly prompted to reflect 
how much anger they felt. Participants who were provoked were expected to score higher on 
the arousal measure and to perceive their current affective state as more negatively valenced 
than participants who were not provoked.  
On the other hand, the second questionnaire study acknowledged the probability that 
the provocation manipulation in Study 1 may not have elicited genuine affective experiences. 
Therefore, the forthcoming elections for the German Bundestag (Germany’s national 
parliament) and the election campaigns constituted the setting for the provocation factor. At 
the time the study was conducted the topic was somewhat emotionally charged. Study 2 
aimed at conceptually replicating the triggered displacement of outgroup derogation observed 
in Study 1 within different intergroup contexts. Trigger-elicited anger was hypothesized to 
mediate the interactive effect of both provocations on outgroup derogation. Participants’ 
salient ingroup did not completely shift between provocation and trigger, it only changed 
from a subcategory level (East German) to the superordinate level (German).  
One limitation of Study 1 concerned the fact that the behavioral measure was confined 
to outgroup derogation. On the basis of Study 1 it could not be concluded whether the 
interactive effect of provocation and trigger pertains specifically to explicitly negative 
treatment of the outgroup. The behavioral measure in Study 2 therefore also incorporated 
prosocial behavior items. Denying prosocial behavior might also qualify as outgroup 
derogation provided the default was to exert the specified prosocial behavior. When generally 
prosocial behavior would be expected, participants in the provocation-trigger condition 
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would be predicted to show a lesser tendency to display such behaviors than participants in 
the other three conditions. To the extent, however, that inaction is the default with regard to 
prosocial behavior, no differences between conditions would be predicted. Technically 
speaking, whether or not a 3 -1 -1 -1 contrast effect should be expected for prosocial behavior 
was a question of item difficulty. 
6.1 Method 
Participants and Design. Sixty-four participants, aged 16 to 69 (M = 34.56, SD = 
16.50), 27 female, 37 male, were randomly assigned to conditions in a 2 (provocation, no 
provocation) × 2 (trigger, no trigger) between-subjects design. In order to address an 
entrenched East German sample rather than a student sample, an experimenter equipped with 
a clipboard asked passer-bys in downtown Jena (East Germany) to participate in two short 
surveys. As compensation, participants took part in a draw where they could win €5,- each. 
Procedure. The first experimental manipulation utilized the elections for the German 
Bundestag and the corresponding election campaigns. In the provoking condition, a brief 
report reproduced quotes from the chairman of a political party. These quotes contained 
contemptuous remarks about East German citizens and antidemocratic views. Members of 
other political parties and the media had reacted fiercely when those utterances became first 
publicly known. Accordingly, it seemed reasonable to expect genuine affective reactions 
from East German participants. In the non-provoking condition, a brief report gave facts 
about media coverage and some statistics concerning the election campaigns.  
Before answering the scales, an open response format prompted participants to 
deliberate about the provocation. They were requested to reflect their own view on the topic 
at hand and to sketch their thoughts in light of those utterances about the East German 
citizens and in light of the current election campaigns, respectively. Eight lines covering 
about half a page signaled that participants were expected to engage in more than just cursory 
considerations. In Study 1, participants had merely been asked to think about what they had 
read. The affective impact of the provocation may be enhanced through deliberating about it, 
the activation level of the associative network may be increased and maintained for a longer 
duration (Berkowitz, 1990, 1993). In interpersonal triggered displaced aggression research, 
participants regularly have to wait for a little while during the course of the experimental 
session while the experimenter had left the room (Pedersen et al., 2000; Vasquez et al., 2005), 
in another set of studies an experimental factor rumination proved to be critical for triggered 
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displaced aggression to occur (Bushman et al., 2005). In other words, participants either had 
time to or were even prompted to contemplate the provocation(s) encountered before they 
were asked to complete the dependent measures. 
Three cognitive appraisal items then assessed how participants perceived politicians 
and the election campaigns (“The election campaigns equally address East and West German 
voters.”, “Some politicians display arrogance towards the voter.”, “During election 
campaigns politicians’ humane insufficiencies become apparent.”). Reliability of a composite 
index was rather low (Cronbach’s α = .45), the three items were therefore analyzed 
separately. The 9-point Likert-type scale ranged from 1 (do not agree at all) to 9 (fully 
agree). Core affect ratings were obtained by the pictorial measures as described in the pretest 
(see chapter 5.5). The pictorial measures are single 7-point items assessing the core affect 
dimensions arousal and valence, respectively. The arousal item mimicked an 
electrocardiographic curve, the valence item displayed plus- and minus-signs of differential 
strength (see Appendix). High scores on the core affect items represent high arousal and 
negative valence, respectively. Arousal and valence were significantly correlated, r(62) = .41, 
p < .001. Identification as East German was measured with two items (“I feel as East 
German.”, “I identify with the East Germans.”; Cronbach’s α = .84). Items were rated on a 9-
point scale ranging from 1 (does not apply at all) to 9 (fully applies). 
The trigger targeted Germans’ relation to foreigners. The brief reports presented to 
participants in the triggering and the non-triggering conditions reproduced information 
provided by the German Foreign Office. All information was true, wording followed exactly 
the one on the official website. The information provided was largely identical for both levels 
of the trigger factor. The triggering condition additionally stated that a new law facilitated 
immigration into Germany. This claim was supported by references to some changes in legal 
regulations. The non-triggering condition by contrast focused on the enriching aspects of 
foreigners in German society. It stressed those implications of the new law that potentially 
benefit German citizens.  
The affective impact of the trigger manipulation was – like in Study 1 – assessed by a 
categorical emotion scale. It comprised six items, two each representing anger (“angry”, 
“outraged”; Cronbach’s α = .80), dejection (“dejected”, “sorrowful”; Cronbach’s α = .81), 
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and positive emotions (“happy”, “cheerful”; Cronbach’s α = .93)20. Instructions to the scale 
explicitly mentioned the information from the German Foreign Office as the relational object 
of affect. Ratings were made on a 7-point scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). Not 
surprisingly, both negative emotion indices were highly significantly correlated, r(49) = .82, 
p < .001, reflecting a low arousal focus (Feldman, 1995). Neither negative emotion index 
correlated significantly with the positive emotions index, r(49)anger-positive emotions = -.18, p = 
.22, and r(48)dejection-positive emotions = -.17, p = .24. 
Three items assessed how threatening participants perceived foreigners to be 
(“Foreigner have jobs, that Germans should have.”, “Foreigners receive money that Germans 
need more urgently.”, both modified from Pettigrew & Meertens (1995), “I appreciate 
foreigners as an enrichment of our society.”, reverse coded). Participants rated their 
agreement with the statements from 1 (do not agree at all) to 7 (fully agree). Averaging the 
threat items produced a highly reliable composite score, Cronbach’s α = .87. Next, 
participants rated to what extent foreigners in general possessed the listed bipolar traits, 
primarily tapping morality (“dishonorable – trustworthy21”, “indolent – industrious”, 
“calculating – good-natured”; Cronbach’s α = .85)  The mid-point of the scale was zero, 
representing equal applicability of the opposing attributes to foreigners as a group. Both poles 
of the 7-point scale were labeled 3, no signs indicated the attributes’ valence. Deviations from 
the mid-point in either direction hence merely reflected increasing applicability of the 
respective attribute, no evaluations as to the valence of the respective attributes were inherent 
in the answer format. Order of the opposed desirable and undesirable attributes was 
balanced. Trait rating scores were coded such that high scores indicate positive evaluations, 
low scores indicate negative evaluations.  
To approximate actual behavior more closely than in Study 1, the current study 
adapted the response format from Struch and Schwartz (1989) for the central dependent 
variable outgroup derogation. Participants learned that fellow ingroup members had allegedly 
performed the particular behaviors listed and were then asked for their judgment regarding 
                                                 
20 This study suffered from a comparatively large number of missing data. Trigger-elicited emotion indices were 
computed only for those participants who had both values for the respective index. 
21 This seemingly weird choice results from the translation. The German language has no single word to express 
“untrustworthy” and a composite was judged rather awkward. It is not to be expected that participants noted this 
as an inconsistency. 
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such actions. The response options were 1 (I agree with the action and would perform it 
myself in certain conditions.), 2 (I agree with the action, but would not perform it myself.), 3 
(I do not agree with the action, but see it as justifiable.), and 4 (I totally reject the action.). 
Three items assessed outgroup derogation (“demand that the police be more watchful on 
foreigners”, “demand that the exercise of foreign traditions and cultural practices be more 
regimented”, “dissuade own children from romantic relationships with foreign boys/girls”;  
Cronbach’s α = .70). These derogating items were reverse coded so that higher values 
indicated a stronger inclination to derogate foreigners. Two items assessed prosocial behavior 
towards foreigners (“intervene, when someone is making hostile remarks about foreigners”, 
“sign a petition for more facilities that help foreigners to integrate”). The composite index 
obtained only weak reliability, Cronbach’s α = .59. Since the second questionnaire did not 
relate to the subcategory East Germans but rather to Germans in general, two items at the end 
of the second questionnaire assessed the frequency with that participants perceived 
themselves as East German and German, respectively. This 5-point scale was labeled (1) 
never, (2) scarcely, (3) now and then, (4) often, (5) always. Usage of a different response 
format served to disguise the relatedness of both questionnaires. 
Furthermore, the layout of both questionnaires was clearly different to avoid raising 
suspicion with regard to their relatedness. Deviating from the procedure in Study 1, this time 
participants received both questionnaires at once. Yet, each questionnaire was first stapled 
separately. When putting the two together, a colored note was placed on top that declared that 
two questionnaires were investigating different topics and participants were asked to fill them 
in sequentially. 
Care was taken to confine the questionnaires to a tolerable number of items taking the 
research setting into account. The inappropriateness scale was therefore omitted, it was less 
central to the focus of the present thesis. After participants returned the packet of 
questionnaires, they were thanked and debriefed. On the spot, participants took part in a 
draw, 10% of all participants won €5,- each. Each lot had contact information printed on its 
back so that participants knew where to obtain further details on the study. In addition, the 
URL of the website containing the information about immigrants and immigration into 
Germany was printed on the lot so that participants also had a low threshold offer to attain in-
depth knowledge. 
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6.2 Results and Discussion 
First of all, the data set was checked for multivariate outliers. The variables outgroup 
derogation, attribute ratings, perceived threat, trigger-elicited anger, and the relative 
identification as East German were included in the analysis. One multivariate outlier was 
identified using Mahalanobis distance with a criterion α = .001, critical χ²(5, N = 44) = 
20.515. All variables except for outgroup derogation and trigger-elicited anger distinguished 
the outlier from all other cases, it was excluded from the analyses. 
Manipulation check provocation-elicited affect. Neither the valence nor the arousal 
measure revealed any effect of the initial provocation manipulation, ts(60) < 1 (cf. Table 6 for 
means and standard deviations). Participants in the provoking conditions did not report higher 
levels of arousal or more negatively valenced affective states than participants in the non-
provoking conditions. In line with these results for core affect, no differences between 
provoked and non-provoked participants were observed on the appraisal items. Those 
participants who read the provoking report were no more inclined than those participants who 
read the neutral report to call politicians arrogant or to regard elections as disclosing humane 
insufficiencies, ts < 1. The provocation and the no provocation conditions did also not 
statistically significantly differ regarding participants’ view, that East and West German 
voters are equally addressed by the election campaigns, t(60) = -1.33, p = .19, d = -0.34.  
Table 6. Means and standard deviations for provocation-elicited core affect, appraisal of 
provocation, and identification as East German separately for both provocation conditions 
(Study 2). 
 provocation no provocation 
core affect – valence 3.94 (1.63) 4.13 (1.20) 
core affect – arousal 3.06 (1.93) 2.77 (1.56) 
arrogant 6.35 (2.17) 6.77 (2.36) 
insufficiencies 6.31 (1.87) 6.06 (2.32) 
East = West 5.10 (2.18) 5.81 (2.02) 
identificationEast – German  5.77 (2.44) 6.37 (2.65) 
Note. Standard deviations are specified in brackets. 
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Identification with East Germans. With regard to identification as East German 
provoked participants should report higher levels of identification than non-provoked 
participants (cf. Kessler & Hollbach, 2005). Yet, no effect was revealed, t < 1. The absence of 
a statistically significant effect is however consistent with results for core affect. Since 
participants in the provocation conditions were apparently no more angered than participants 
in the no provocation conditions, no difference in strength of identification should appear. 
Strength of identification was marginally significantly above the mid-point of the scale in the 
provocation conditions, t(31) = 1.78, p = .09, d = 0.32, and statistically significantly above 
the mid-point of the scale in the no provocation conditions, t(30) = 2.88, p < .01, d = 0.52 (cf. 
Table 6 for means and standard deviations). Furthermore, identification as East German was 
highly significantly correlated with perceived arousal, r(62) = .36, p = .004. Stronger 
identification was associated with higher levels of arousal. The valence core affect dimension 
was only marginally significantly correlated with identification, r(62) = .24, p = .058. The 
tendency is however in line with expectations, more negative valence was associated with 
stronger identification. 
Planned contrast analyses 
Dependent measures. More outgroup derogation was expected in the provocation-
trigger condition than in the other three conditions. Consequently, a planned contrast analysis 
was conducted, the focal contrast was specified as 3 -1 -1 -1. However, the focal contrast was 
non-significant, at the same time no substantial systematic variance remained, both Fs < 1 
(cf. Table 7 for means and standard deviations). Similar results were obtained for the 
prosocial behavior index, neither the focal contrast nor the test for residual variance were 
statistically significant, F < 1 and F(1, 53) = 1.90, p = .17, ηp
2 = .035, respectively. The same 
3 -1 -1 -1 contrast that was predicted for the behavioral measures was expected for the 
attribute ratings of the outgroup. In line with results for outgroup derogation, the planned 
contrast analysis with the experimental factors showed no indication of any substantial 
systematic variance for the attribute ratings. The focal contrast was non-significant and so 
was the test for remaining between-group differences, Fs <1. Across conditions, participants 
did not differ regarding their behavioral inclinations and how they evaluated foreigners. 
Finally, perceived threat was predicted to be highest in the provocation-trigger condition. 
Somewhat surprising in light of the failure to find contrast effects for the attribute ratings and 
outgroup derogation, the focal contrast was indeed significant for perceived threat, F(1, 53) = 
5.77, p = .02, ηp
2 = .098, and no significant residual variance remained, F < 1. Provocation 
6 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM A QUESTIONNAIRE STUDY EMPLOYING A CORE AFFECT MEASURE  
 63 
and trigger interactively produced an increased level of perceived threat, participants who 
were first provoked by the politician’s contemptuous remark and then encountered a slightly 
provoking outgroup perceived this outgroup as more threatening than the participants in the 
other three conditions.  
Table 7. Means and standard deviations for the dependent measures and identification 
separately for all four conditions (Study 2). 
 provocation no provocation 
 trigger no trigger trigger no trigger 
outgroup derogation 1.67 (0.52) 1.82 (0.61) 1.79 (0.78) 1.77 (0.75) 
prosocial behavior 1.77 (0.68) 1.46 (0.56) 1.82 (0.89) 1.67 (0.56) 
attribute ratings 4.73 (0.90) 4.44 (0.92) 4.59 (1.12) 4.67 (0.83) 
perceived threat 3.02 (1.62) 2.11 (1.26) 2.12 (1.32) 2.00 (0.88) 
trigger-elicited emotions     
 anger 2.29 (1.37) 1.42 (0.51) 1.69 (1.18) 2.23 (1.87) 
 dejection 2.67 (1.44) 1.58 (1.04) 2.17 (1.40) 2.00 (1.50) 
 positive emotions 2.63 (1.15) 3.41 (1.91) 4.08 (1.84) 2.77 (1.88) 
identificationGerman 4.20 (1.01) 3.64 (1.15) 4.14 (0.95) 4.27 (0.88) 
identificationEast German – German   -1.14 (1.61) -0.31 (1.38) -1.07 (1.00) -0.64 (1.22) 
Note. Standard deviations are specified in brackets. 
Provocation and trigger were furthermore hypothesized to interactively produce 
augmented levels of anger in the provocation-trigger condition, therefore the 3 -1 -1 -1 
contrast was again the appropriate test for the trigger-elicited emotions. As it turned out, the 
focal contrast for anger was not significant, F(1, 46) = 1.34, p = .25, ηp
2 = .028, neither was 
the test for residual variance, F(1, 46) = 2.45, p = .12, ηp
2 = .051 (cf. Table 7 for means and 
standard deviations). Unexpectedly, an analogous focal contrast for dejection showed a non-
significant tendency, F(1, 45) = 2.75, p = .104, ηp
2 = .058. Participants in the provocation-
trigger condition tended to report higher levels of dejection than participants in the other three 
conditions. The test for residual variance was non-significant, F(1, 45) = 1.19, p = .28, ηp
2 = 
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.026. As to the positive emotions, the focal contrast was not significant, F(1, 45) = 1.92, p = 
.17, ηp
2 = .041, the test for residual variance only slightly missed conventional levels of 
statistical significance, F(1, 45) = 3.58, p = .06, ηp
2 = .074. A subsequent 2 × 2 between-
subjects ANOVA did not reveal a significant main effect of either provocation or trigger, Fs 
< 1. The interaction effect was however statistically significant, F(1, 45) = 4.49, p = .04, ηp
2 
= .091. Simple comparisons revealed no statistically significant difference regarding trigger-
elicited positive emotions depending on trigger level among provoked participants, F(1, 45) = 
1.19, p = .28, ηp
2 = .026. Among non-provoked participants however, marginally 
significantly higher levels of positive emotions were reported in the trigger than in the no 
trigger condition, F(1, 45) = 3.74, p = .06, ηp
2 = .077. It is not surprising that the 
hypothesized interactive augmentation of trigger-elicited affect did not occur, considering the 
failure to manipulate levels of arousal and valence by provocation. However, participants’ 
affective response to the trigger also did not reflect the irritating versus neutral level of this 
factor. All in all, though less so than for outgroup derogation and the attribute ratings, there 
was apparently little systematic variation of the categorical emotions across conditions. 
Self-perception as German. Following Kessler and Hollbach (2005), the reported 
frequency, how often participants perceived themselves as German, should be higher in the 
provocation-trigger condition than in the other three conditions assuming that the 
manipulation of anger had been successful. Not unexpectedly in light of the results for the 
affective measures, however, the focal contrast for self-perception as German was not 
significant, F < 1, marginally significant amounts of residual variance remained, F(1, 54) = 
3.08, p = .09, ηp
2 = .054 (cf. Table 7 for means and standard deviations). In a 2 × 2 between-
subjects ANOVA, no effect was statistically significant, Fs(1, 54) < 1.68, ps > .20, ηp
2s < 
.031. 
The correlations of the absolute frequency how often participants perceived 
themselves as German with the trigger-elicited emotions were not significant, r(50) = .23, p = 
.11, r(49) = .22, p = .13, and r(49) = .20, p = .16 for anger, dejection, and the positive 
emotions index, respectively. The relative frequency of self-perception as German22 was 
likewise not significantly correlated with any trigger-elicited emotion index, r(49) = .04, p = 
.79 for the correlation with anger, r(48) = .09, p = .56 for the correlation with dejection, and 
                                                 
22 This index was computed by subtracting the frequency score for perception as German from the frequency 
score for perception as East German. 
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r(48) = -.02, p = .88 for the correlation with the positive emotions index. This absence of 
statistically significant correlations is consistent with results that anger responses to unfair 
treatment of others depend not merely on categorization but on the strength of identification 
with the particular group (Gordijn et al., 2006).  
Planned contrast analyses with post-hoc affective factors 
Since neither the provocation manipulation nor the trigger manipulation elicited 
affective reactions as expected, subsequent analyses build on post-hoc affective factors. To 
this end, a dichotomous factor was computed from the core affect measures. Raw arousal and 
valence scores were multiplied, centered, and dichotomized via median splits. This product 
term is problematic inasmuch as the relative influence of arousal and valence cannot be 
established. Highly aroused participants who reported rather neutral valence received the 
same score as participants who reported a neutral arousal level and highly negative valence. 
This is however no extremely severe problem in the case of core affect, the prototypical anger 
episode has no fixed location in the two-dimensional space build by arousal and valence. 
Considerable interindividual variation has been found regarding the relative importance of 
both dimension (Barrett, 1998, 2004; Feldman, 1995), so that specifications of categorical 
emotions by core affect measures are inherently somewhat diffuse. To ensure that indeed the 
two levels of the composite core affect variable were significantly different from one another 
on both core affect dimensions, t tests were conducted. Indeed, for those participants who 
received a high core affect anger score level of arousal was significantly higher than for 
participants who received a low core affect anger score, M = 4.41, SD = 1.42 and M = 1.63, 
SD = 0.93, respectively, t(44.70) = 8.51, p < .001, d = 2.32. Likewise, level of negative 
valence was higher for participants who received a high core affect anger score than for 
participants with a low core affect anger score, M = 5.00, SD = 1.30 and M = 3.15, SD = 1.06, 
respectively, t(52) = 5.73, p < .001, d = 1.56. 
An analogous series of computations was conducted for dejection. Scores for the core 
affect dimension arousal were first reverse coded, then multiplied with valence scores, 
centered, and finally dichotomized via median split. A t test confirmed that participants who 
received a high score on the core affect index representing dejection reported significantly 
lower levels of arousal than participants who received a low core affect dejection score, M = 
2.03, SD = 1.30 and M = 3.70, SD = 1.74, respectively, t(58.49) = -4.30, p < .001, d = -1.08. 
The t test for the valence dimension was likewise significant. Higher negativity scores were 
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reported by participants who received a high as compared with a low core affect dejection 
score, M = 4.62, SD = 1.12 and M = 3.52, SD = 1.48, respectively, t(60) = 3.28, p < .01, d = 
0.83. 
Throughout the whole thesis (and almost all related research) positive emotions are 
not subjected to an equally fine-grained analysis as negative emotions, they are not 
distinguished according to arousal level. The trigger-elicited positive emotion items are 
theoretically neither particularly high nor particularly low on the arousal dimension. 
Consequently, the arousal score could not reasonably be considered in computing a positive 
emotions post-hoc factor. A dichotomous variable was obtained by median-splitting the 
centered valence variable23. Although the core affect dimensions are conceptualized as 
independent from each other, participants with a high core affect score representing positive 
emotions reported less arousal than participants with a low score, M = 2.57, SD = 1.36 and M 
= 4.29, SD = 1.79, respectively, t(40) = -3.49, p < .01, d = -1.08. Participants who received a 
high score reported significantly more positive affect24 than participants who received a low 
score, M = 5.52, SD = 0.68 and M = 2.38, SD = 0.74, respectively, t(40) = 14.33, p < .001, d 
= 4.42. The significant correlation between the arousal and valence core affect measure 
accounted for the difference on the arousal dimension between participants who received 
high versus low core affect positive emotions scores. Since no hypotheses pertained to the 
level of arousal when positive emotions were concerned, the observed difference is rather 
unproblematic. 
The respective second quasi-experimental affective factors were obtained by 
dichotomizing scores on the corresponding emotion measures following the trigger via 
median split.25 The corresponding dichotomous affective measures were then crossed to 
produce variables with four levels: (1) high core affect score26-high trigger-elicited emotions 
                                                 
23 Twenty participants received exactly the median score. In order to avoid highly unequal sample sizes, the 
dichotomized variable was build only for 42 participants. 
24 The valence item had been reverse coded. 
25 It was unnecessary to compute a nested median split for any trigger-elicited emotion variable, because all 
three were unrelated to the corresponding core affect measure, r(50) = .04, p = .79, r(49) = -.08, p = .58, r(49) = 
.05, p = .72, for anger, dejection, and positive emotions, respectively. 
26 High versus low core affect score denotes the composite indices computed to represent anger and dejection, 
respectively. In the case of positive emotions, it refers only to the valence dimension. The positive emotions 
variables were coded such that high scores represented low levels of positive emotions. 
6 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM A QUESTIONNAIRE STUDY EMPLOYING A CORE AFFECT MEASURE  
 67 
score, (2) high core affect score-low trigger-elicited emotions score, (3) low core affect score-
high trigger-elicited emotions score, and (4) low core affect score-low trigger-elicited 
emotions score. 
Entering the post-hoc anger variable as the fixed factor in a planned contrast analysis 
produced a significant 3 -1 -1 -1 focal contrast for outgroup derogation, F(1, 39) = 5.69, p = 
.02, ηp
2 = .127. Outgroup derogation was stronger when participants were angry after both 
manipulations as compared with participants who received no or only one high anger score. 
The focal contrast gave however no fully satisfying account of the data, marginally 
significant amounts of residual variance remained, F(1, 39) = 3.17, p = .08, ηp
2 = .075. An 
omnibus F test explored the between-group differences. A 2 × 2 between-subjects ANOVA 
revealed a statistically significant main effect of core affect anger, F(1, 39) = 6.45, p = .02, 
ηp
2 = .142. Higher levels of core affect anger were associated with a stronger inclination to 
derogate the outgroup. For trigger-elicited anger only a non-significant tendency for more 
outgroup derogation when trigger-elicited anger was high as compared with when it was low 
was observed, F(1, 39) = 2.70, p = .11, ηp
2 = .065, the interaction effect was non-significant, 
F < 1. In contrast, for prosocial behavior the focal contrast was not significant, F < 1, and no 
significant amount of residual variance remained, F(1, 39) = 1.92, p = .17, ηp
2 = .047. As the 
experimental factors, the post-hoc anger factor did not reveal the expected contrast effect for 
the attribute ratings. The focal contrast was not significant, F < 1, but a marginally significant 
amount of residual variance remained, F(1, 34) = 2.99, p = .09, ηp
2 = .081. In a 2 × 2 
between-subjects ANOVA, only the core affect anger main effect was marginally significant, 
F(1, 34) = 3.02, p = .09, ηp
2 = .81, for both other effects Fs < 1. Participants with high core 
affect anger scores rated foreigners less favorably than participants with low core affect anger 
scores. In line with results for outgroup derogation, participants with two high anger scores 
perceived more threat posed by foreigners than all other participants, the focal contrast was 
highly significant, F(1, 39) = 11.13, p = .002, ηp
2 = .222. In addition, however, a significant 
amount of residual variance remained, F(1, 39) = 7.33, p < .05, ηp
2 = .158. In the subsequent 
2 × 2 between-subjects ANOVA, the main effect of core affect anger was not statistically 
significant, F(1, 39) = 1.51, p = .23, ηp
2 = .037. For trigger-elicited anger a significant main 
effect was revealed, F(1, 39) = 16.96, p < .001, ηp
2 = .303, the interaction effect was non-
significant, F < 1. Participants who experienced high trigger-elicited anger perceived more 
threat than participants whose trigger-elicited anger was low. 
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The same set of analyses was next run with the post-hoc dejection factor. Consistent 
with the prediction that specifically anger was associated with outgroup derogation, the 3 -1  
-1 -1 focal contrast for outgroup derogation was not significant for dejection, F < 1. The test 
for significant amounts of residual variance only slightly missed conventional levels of 
significance, F(1, 45) = 3.98, p = .052, ηp
2 = .081. A 2 × 2 between-subjects ANOVA 
revealed only a marginally significant main effect of trigger-elicited dejection, F(1, 45) = 
3.10, p = .09, ηp
2 = .064, both other Fs < 1. Participants with high trigger-elicited dejection 
scores tended more strongly to derogate the outgroup than participants with low trigger-
elicited dejection scores. No systematic variance was observed for prosocial behavior, both 
Fs < 1. Similarly, the attribute ratings showed no significant between-group differences, F(1, 
40) = 2.15, p = .15, ηp
2 = .051 for the focal contrast and F < 1 for the test of residual 
variance. While the focal contrast was also non-significant for perceived threat, F < 1, 
significant residual variance remained unexplained, F(1, 45) = 18.59, p < .001, ηp
2 = .292. In 
a 2 × 2 between-subjects ANOVA, a marginally significant main effect of core affect 
dejection emerged, F(1, 45) = 2.96, p = .09, ηp
2 = .062, participants perceived marginally 
more threat when core affect dejection was low as compared with when it was high. 
Additionally, the main effect of trigger-elicited dejection was highly significant, F(1, 45) = 
15.80, p < .001, ηp
2 = .260, participants with high trigger-elicited dejection scores as 
compared with low scores perceived more threat. No interaction effect occurred, F < 1. 
Dejection as a results of provocation and as a result of trigger had thus opposing effects on 
the perception of threat 
Planned contrast analyses with the positive emotions factor only revealed non-
significant focal contrasts for all four dependent variables, Fs < 1, residual variance > 1 
remained for outgroup derogation, F(1, 30) = 1.74, p = .20, ηp
2 = .055, and for prosocial 
behavior, F(1, 30) = 5.15, p = .03, ηp
2 = .147. Hence, no substantial between-group variation 
occurred for the attribute ratings and perceived threat. A 2 × 2 between-subjects ANOVA 
explored the between-group differences for prosocial behavior. The main effect of core affect 
valence was not statistically significant, F < 1. For trigger-elicited positive emotions, 
however, a significant main effect was observed, F(1, 30) = 4.20, p = .049, ηp
2 = .123. 
Participants who experienced strong positive emotions were more willing to show prosocial 
behavior than participants who experienced weak positive emotions. The interaction effect 
was not statistically significant, F(1, 30) = 1.10, p = .30, ηp
2 = .035.  
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Moderation analysis 
Next, regression analyses according to Aiken and West (1991) were conducted to 
determine the relative contribution of provocation- and trigger-elicited affect and to 
investigate whether the expected interaction occurred. The core affect product terms 
representing anger and dejection, respectively, were z-standardized and so were the 
corresponding indices for trigger-elicited anger and dejection. The corresponding  
z-standardized variables were multiplied to form interaction terms. All three corresponding 
terms were entered simultaneously into a multiple regression analysis. On the grounds of the 
insubstantial association of positive emotions and all dependent variables revealed by the 
planned contrast analyses reported in the previous section, the positive emotions indices were 
not further considered. Similarly, no systematic variance of prosocial behavior was observed 
in the planned contrast analyses with anger and dejection factors. Consequently, no 
moderation analyses are reported for the criterion prosocial behavior. 
The regression model with the three anger-related terms explained significant 
amounts of variance in outgroup derogation, R² = .166, F(3, 46) = 3.06, p = .04. Core affect 
anger was no significant predictor, β = .09, t < 1, trigger-elicited anger instead statistically 
significantly predicted outgroup derogation, β = .37, t(46) = 2.67, p = .011. Higher levels of 
trigger-elicited anger were associated with more outgroup derogation. The interaction term 
did not significantly contribute to the prediction of outgroup derogation, β = .07, t < 1. 
The attribute ratings were marginally significantly explained by the anger terms, R² = 
.149, F(3, 41) = 2.39, p = .08. Core affect anger was a marginally significant predictor, β =  
-.25, t(41) = -1.70, p = .097. Higher levels of core affect anger were associated with lower 
levels of positive attributes participants conceded to foreigners. Trigger-elicited anger and the 
interaction term showed non-significant tendencies, β = .24, t(41) = 1.57, p = .12 and β =  
-.25, t(41) = -1.62, p = .11. Quite remarkable is the positive beta weight for trigger-elicited 
anger that indicates that stronger anger experiences tended to be associated with a more 
positive evaluation of foreigners. 
The anger regression model explained significant amounts of variance in perceived 
threat, R² = .270, F(3, 46) = 5.66, p = .002. Core affect anger was however no significant 
predictor, β = .17, t(46) = 1.31, p = .20. Trigger-elicited anger statistically significantly 
predicted perceived threat, β = .36, t(46) = 2.76, p = .008. High levels of trigger-elicited 
anger were associated with more severe perceived threat. The interaction term was 
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marginally statistically significant, β = .24, t(46) = 1.85, p = .07. To explore this interaction 
term, a simple slope analysis was conducted (cf. Figure 6). For high core affect anger trigger-
elicited anger highly significantly increased levels of perceived threat, β = .59, t(46) = 3.76, p 
< .001, for low core affect anger the association was not significant, β = .13, t < 1. 
 
 
Figure 6. Perceived threat as a function of provocation-elicited core affect anger and trigger-
elicited anger (Study 2). 
The regression analysis with outgroup derogation as the criterion and the dejection-
related terms as predictors yielded results comparable to the analysis with the anger-related 
terms. The model explained significant amounts of variance, R² = .191, F(3, 45) = 3.11, p = 
.02. Core affect dejection was no significant predictor, β = -.12, t < 1. Trigger-elicited 
dejection significantly predicted outgroup derogation, β = .39, t(45) = 2.91, p = .006. 
Stronger feelings of dejection were associated with a stronger inclination to derogate the 
outgroup. The interaction term was no significant predictor of outgroup derogation, β = -.10, t 
< 1. 
The amount of variance in the attribute ratings explained by the dejection regression 
model was not statistically significant, R² = .132, F(3, 40) = 2.03, p = .13. Nevertheless, the 
core affect dejection term was a significant predictor, β = .31, t(40) = 2.10, p = .04. A more 
positive evaluation of foreigners was associated with high levels of core affect dejection. 
Trigger-elicited dejection was no significant predictor, β = .04, t < 1, the dejection interaction 
term showed a non-significant tendency, β = .23, t(40) = 1.57, p = .12.  
Finally, perceived threat was subjected to the multiple regression analysis with the 
dejection terms. Surprisingly, the dejection-related terms emerged as more powerful 
predictors of perceived threat than the anger predictors. The model accounted for highly 
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three predictors were statistically significant, β = -.24, t(45) = -2.08, p = .04 for core affect 
dejection, β = .53, t(45) = 4.64, p < .001 for trigger-elicited dejection, and β = -.25, t(45) =  
-2.19, p = .03 for the interaction term. Note the sign for core affect dejection, indicating a 
mitigating influence of dejection experienced as a consequence of the provocation 
manipulation on threat perceived from an unrelated outgroup. A simple slope analysis was 
conducted to explore the significant interaction term. For high core affect dejection trigger-
elicited dejection was not statistically significantly associated with perceived threat, β = .28, 
t(45) = 1.66, p = .104. However, for low core affect dejection trigger-elicited dejection was 
highly significantly associated with an increase in perceived threat, β = .78, t(45) = 5.02, p < 





Figure 7. Perceived threat as a function of provocation-elicited core affect dejection and 
trigger-elicited dejection (Study 2). 
Simple linear regression analyses 
Simple linear regression analyses investigated whether and how the attribute ratings 
were associated with perception of threat posed by the outgroup as well as outgroup 
derogation. Analyses were conducted separately for participants who reported high versus 
low core affect anger. For high core affect anger the attribute ratings significantly predicted 
perceived threat, β = -.47, t(18) = -2.23, R² = .216, F(1, 18) = 4.97, p = .04, and marginally 
significantly predicted outgroup derogation, β = -.41, t(18) = -1.93, R² = .172, F(1, 18) = 
3.73, p = .07. The less positive the attribute ratings the more threat was perceived and the 
stronger the inclination to derogate the outgroup. For those participants, however, who 
experienced low core affect anger, the attribute ratings did not predicted as how threatening 
the foreigners would be perceived or how strongly outgroup derogation would be endorsed, β 
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6.3 Summary 
Higher levels of outgroup derogation were expected in the provocation-trigger 
condition than in the other three conditions. Similar patterns of results were expected to occur 
for the attribute ratings, perceived threat, and trigger-elicited anger. Empirically the predicted 
contrast was only observed for perceived threat. Little systematic between-group differences 
were observed for trigger-elicited affect. The affective measures as well as cognitive 
appraisal manipulation check items in the first questionnaire indicated that neither 
experimental manipulation was successful in eliciting the intended affective reaction. 
Therefore, quasi-experimental factors were substituted for the experimental factors. Indeed, a 
planned contrast analysis with an index representing the core affect dimensions arousal and 
valence and trigger-elicited anger, in other words representing anger reactions to both 
manipulations, revealed higher levels of outgroup derogation and also of perceived threat for 
participants who scored high on the composite anger index than for all other participants. The 
predicted contrast was however no parsimonious explanation of the observed between-group 
differences. 
For prosocial behavior and the attribute ratings the predicted post-hoc anger contrast 
was not significant. In fact, for prosocial behavior the only effect observed was a main effect 
of trigger-elicited positive emotions. Just as absence of positive emotions did not account for 
negative treatment of the outgroup, absence of negative emotions did not account for 
prosocial behavior. Denying an outgroup prosocial behavior can be tantamount to inflicting 
harm on them but it is not easily compatible with an angered individual’s general action 
tendency which is approach or a move-against tendency. 
Moderation analyses revealed that, unlike in Study 1, the effect of trigger-elicited 
anger on outgroup derogation was not moderated. A moderation was however observed for 
the criterion perceived threat. Notably, the moderating effect of core affect was reverse for 
core affect dejection as compared with core affect anger. For high core affect anger, trigger-
elicited anger increased perceived threat whereas no significant association existed when core 
affect anger was low. For high core affect dejection instead trigger-elicited dejection and 
perceived threat were unrelated, but trigger-elicited dejection significantly increased 
perceived threat when core affect dejection was low. Presence or absence of positive 
emotions did not impact on the perception of threat. 
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With regard to negative evaluations of an outgroup and outgroup derogating behavior 
other research has shown differential predictors to apply (Struch & Schwartz, 1989). 
Interestingly, the outgroup attribute ratings were significantly associated with outgroup 
derogation and perceived threat but only when core affect anger was high. 
The failure to find a significant difference between provocation conditions on the core 
affect measures can plausibly be explained by connectionist models (e.g., McClelland & 
Rumelhart, 1986; see Read & Miller, 1998, for applications of connectionist models in the 
realm of social psychology). Particularly the implementation of the open response format that 
prompted consideration of the election campaigns may have led to widely spreading 
activation within an associative network that was tapped by the provoking as well as by the 
non-provoking report. It may have been the case that explicitly mentioning the politician’s 
contemptuous remarks was unnecessary for them to be activated. The non-provoking material 
may also have activated their representation because they were quite prominent in media 
coverage and there was a public uproar. The contemptuous remarks were possibly highly 
accessible at the time the study was conducted. Thus, similar memory contents may have 
been activated across conditions. Results for the cognitive manipulation check items 
corroborate this interpretation. The bivariate correlations of the core affect dimensions with 
identification as East German also imply that the lack of significant between-group 
differences is not plausibly attributable to an inadequacy of the core affect measure. 
Similar reactions to both levels of the trigger manipulation may be a consequence of 
the particular intergroup context. Levels of xenophobia are non-negligible among the general 
population in East Germany so that merely mentioning foreigners might have functioned as a 
triggering event. The minor irritating aspects that were included in the triggering but not in 
the non-triggering report may not have added substantially to the provocation experienced by 
merely being exposed to this particular outgroup. Unlike Study 1, trigger-elicited emotions 
were not determined by provocation. It is conceivable that using dissimilar measures for the 
two measurement points decreased artificial associations between both scores.  
In sum, Studies 1 and 2 provided first evidence that triggered displaced aggression 
can also be a group-level phenomenon. Participants in the provocation-trigger condition 
displayed more agreement with statements derogating the elderly, an outgroup completely 
unrelated to the initial strong provocation, than participants in all other experimental 
conditions of Study 1. The moderated effect of trigger-elicited anger on perceived threat in 
both studies demonstrated that appraisal of particular dimensions of intergroup relations as 
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well as subsequent behavioral intentions towards a naturally occurring group in Study 1 
deteriorated substantially when participants were angered by a slightly irritating incident 
related to that group and had previously experienced anger in an unrelated context.  
The fact that such effects could be shown with regard to meaningful societal groups 
has implications regarding plasticity of attitudes towards outgroups. Unquestionably, 
participants did have preconceptions towards the particular groups before being exposed to 
the experimental manipulation. Assuming that no sampling error occurred, the experimental 
manipulations were sufficient to substantially impact how participants perceived and intended 
to behave towards the elderly and towards foreigners, respectively. The affective effects on 
perceived threat and the shared variance of the inappropriateness judgment and trigger-
elicited anger in the explanation of perceived threat and outgroup derogation, respectively, 
illustrate how emotion and cognition are interwoven. Triggered displacement has to be 
regarded potentially consequential for intergroup relations, particularly to the extent that 
anger emotions are experienced. 
In both studies, trigger-elicited anger and dejection were quite closely related. Such  
results are less an exception than the rule (see e.g., Berkowitz, 1993). No event or situation is 
hardly ever uni-dimensional, relations between naturally occurring groups are complex and 
consequently reasonably engender a mix of emotions, the salience of which may vary across 
situations. Even in studies in that participants were explicitly instructed to write about an 
event that had made them very angry participants reported higher levels of sadness on 
subsequent rating scales than participants in a neutral control condition (DeSteno, Dasgupta, 
Bartlett, & Cajdric, 2004). Tests statistics were not provided for this comparison, but the 
pattern of means strongly suggests that the sadness levels statistically significantly differed 
from each other. Although it is reasonable to assume that participants selected 
idiosyncratically prototypical anger episodes they still reported increased levels of sadness, 
too. In light of this, the strong association of anger and dejection in the contexts of Germans’ 
relation to foreigners and young people’s relations to the elderly is not particularly surprising. 
On top of this, the concept of arousal focus can account for the tendency of like-valenced 
emotions to co-occur (Barrett, 1998). Even so, I want to stress once more that anger and 
dejection were clearly not interchangeable. 
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7 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM MINIMAL GROUP RESEARCH 
In the current chapter, two laboratory studies are reported that aimed at a cross-
method validation of the results from the questionnaire studies. Participants were categorized 
into minimal groups (Tajfel et al., 1971). That way, triggered displaced aggression could be 
tested in an intergroup context where no preconceptions existed. It was assumed that negative 
appraisal of an outgroup would be easier established for a new group than pre-existing 
appraisals could be changed for known, naturally occurring groups. 
On the other hand, with regard to social discrimination in minimal intergroup 
relations, the positive-negative asymmetry is a well-established phenomenon (see 
Mummendey & Otten, 1998, for a review). Mere categorization that led to ingroup favoritism 
on positive comparison dimensions or with regard to positive resources is not sufficient to 
elicit ingroup favoritism in the negative domain. This consistent finding implies that for the 
occurrence of explicitly negative treatment of the outgroup further preconditions need to be 
given. The current studies investigated whether group-based anger would be sufficient for 
participants to treat the minimal outgroup explicitly negative. 
Laboratory research renders assessment of actual intergroup behavior comparatively 
easily possible whereas questionnaire studies are largely confined to the assessment of 
behavioral intentions. Anderson and Bushman (1997) demonstrated specifically for research 
on aggression that the relations between conceptual variables found in the laboratory indeed 
generalize to behavior outside the laboratory. In the current line of research, laboratory 
experiments further seemed a good opportunity to affect participants emotionally. Provided 
participants believe the social interactions to be unstaged, they are assumed to be less likely 
than participants who answer questionnaires to resort to situation-specific beliefs. 
7.1 Study 3 
For the affective route to outgroup derogation it is assumed to be insubstantial 
whether the initial strong provocation is directed at the group-self or at the personal self. 
Critical is a triggering provocation on the group level. Provocation manipulations directed at 
the individual participant can be implemented less conspicuously in laboratory experiments 
than group-level provocations and they are also more tangible. The assumption that triggered 
displaced outgroup derogation can base upon a person-directed initial provocation was put to 
an empirical test. As in the questionnaire studies, participants in the provocation-trigger 
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condition were expected to exert higher levels of outgroup derogation than the participants in 
the other conditions. This effect was hypothesized to be mediated by group-based anger. 
7.1.1 Method 
Participants and Design. Participants were 70 students from the Friedrich-Schiller-
University Jena (50 women, 20 men), aged 18 to 27 (M = 22.46, SD = 2.09), who received 
€5,- in exchange for participation. The 2 (provocation, no provocation) × 2 (trigger, no 
trigger) between-subjects design assigned participants randomly to conditions. Distribution 
across cells was almost equal. 
Procedure. Experimental sessions were run with single participants. Upon arrival at 
the laboratory, they were shown at which computer to take a seat. Instructions were 
standardized and given by the computer instead of the experimenter whenever possible. 
Initial instructions informed participants that the current experiments were part of a 
more comprehensive series investigating cognitive skills. The first part ostensibly assessed 
verbal problem solving skills and how auditory stimulation impacts on these skills, depending 
on the subjective evaluation of the stimuli. All participants spent 10 minutes solving 
anagrams while they were exposed to background noise via headphones. The instructions 
stressed the importance of working as quickly as possible and solving as many anagrams as 
possible. 
The computer ostensibly determined at random the noise participants would be 
exposed to during the anagram task. Once participants had started the selection process, they 
saw labels of different noises flickering on the screen mimicking the spinning wheels of 
gambling machines in operation. When the flickering stopped the screen read “classical 
music”. In addition, the instruction to call the experimenter appeared on the screen.  
Several characteristics of the task differed between the provoking and the non-
provoking conditions. Firstly, in the provocation conditions, the experimenter took a look at 
the result displayed on the computer screen, then stated aloud, “Classical music? No, that’s 
too easy.” She rummaged through a stack of CDs, selected the so-called Radio-Medley, and 
said with a slightly irritated voice “I’ll give you this one.”27. The Radio-Medley consisted of 
37 catchy German tunes, that were expected to be extremely distracting for verbal tasks 
                                                 
27 Hardly anybody objected, but if they did the experimenter repeated “Yeah, but that’s too easy.”. 
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(Martin, Wogalter, & Forlano, 1988). In effect, participants in the provoking conditions were 
exposed to loud, distracting auditory stimulation illegitimately imposed on them by the 
experimenter. Secondly, the maximal interval to work on a single anagram was restricted to 
40 seconds. In order to be able to maximize the total amount of anagrams solved, participants 
were offered the possibility to skip an anagram after 20 seconds in case they were not able to 
solve it. Whenever participants failed to enter the correct answer within 40 seconds or 
skipped an anagram, the computer slowly displayed a reprimand and the solution before the 
next anagram appeared on the screen (“You did not make a correct entry! The correct answer 
is [solution]. Try to answer quickly and correctly.”). Besides being potentially quite 
annoying28 the reprimand took up time. Thirdly, participants in the provocation conditions 
received a false feedback after the anagram task that their performance had been bad. The 
correct number of solved anagrams was stated in order to sustain credibility, but it allegedly 
corresponded to the lowest quarter of the performance in the sample used to gauge the verbal 
problem solving task. In sum, the illegitimate aggravation of conditions by the hands of the 
experimenter defying the computer’s random choice of the background noise and the frequent 
reprimands during the anagram task in conjunction with the negative feedback were supposed 
to elicit comparatively strong anger. Counterfactual thinking (see e.g., Roese, 1997) was 
expected to lead to an external attribution of the bad performance. It was assumed that it was 
easily conceivable that participants’ performance would have been much better and the 
anagram task would have been much less strenuous, had the experimenter played the classical 
music as she was supposed to. 
Participants in the non-provoking conditions listened to calm classical music (the 
beginning 74 seconds of Haydn’s Symphonie Nr. 7 C-Dur “Le Midi” – Adagio repeated 
several times) played with comfortable volume. Participants were also put under less pressure 
to solve the anagrams. The maximal interval to work on a single anagram was set to 60 
seconds and they could only skip an anagram after 40 seconds had passed. The program 
moved on directly to the next anagram even after unsolved anagrams, participants in the no 
provocation conditions were not reprimanded. The bogus feedback informed participants that 
their performance had been good, it allegedly corresponded to the upper quarter of the 
performance in the sample used to gauge the task. Since the initial provocation was applied in 
a face-to-face manner, experimenter-blind procedures where precluded. 
                                                 
28 Participants frequently sighed or moaned when they learned the correct solution. 
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After the feedback, four cognitive appraisal items measured how participants 
evaluated the auditory stimulation (e.g., “I found it hard to think with the background noise.”, 
see Appendix for the full scale; Cronbach’s α = .94). Mixed with the cognitive appraisal 
items were the core affect items, the valence and arousal core affect dimension were assessed 
by two verbal items each (cf. chapter 5.4; Cronbach’s α = .88 for the valence dimension and 
α = .60 for the arousal dimension). The items were displayed randomly. Participants rated all 
items on 7-point scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (absolutely). The arousal and valence 
measures were highly correlated, r(66) = -.61, p < .001. 
By means of the next task, participants were classified as sub- versus suprataxators 
following a minimal group procedure. This alleged trait is a more general concept, modified 
from the original dot overestimators and underestimators (Tajfel et al., 1971, study 1). The 
more sophisticated labels and a variety of different judgments (e.g., geographical distance, 
temporal distance, height of a building, amount of objects) served to increase credibility. The 
description of the trait stressed its relevance, its stability, and covariance with other 
personality traits. This information was to enhance perceived significance of group 
membership and identification with the new social category. Before actually taking the 
categorization test, participants self-categorized as either supra- or subtaxator following a 
forced-choice format. Then, they took the test and membership in the category they had 
chosen themselves was confirmed. This procedure was also implemented to increase 
identification with the minimal group.  
The trigger manipulation was ostensible remarks from former participants. 
Participants were asked to give information on their subjective conception of this personality 
trait. The computer displayed a list of text entries that resembled a protocol of an internet chat 
on the next screen. The comments were preceded by ascending numbers, they were 
ostensibly the answers previous participants had given. Earlier, participants had had ample 
chance to notice their own case number 12 that was now highlighted and next to which the 
cursor was blinking. The instructions what participants were to do were intentionally vague 
and had only been displayed insufficiently long to be fully read. These inadequate 
instructions were to induce participants to read the comments of previous participants in 
order to infer what they were supposed to do. Most content of the text entries was 
evaluatively neutral, they remarked for example how universal the applicability of this 
personality trait was. The second to the last entry asked whether one was better than the 
other, subtaxator or suprataxator. In the triggering conditions, the last entry replied that of 
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course the actual participant’s respective outgroup was better and that the previous participant 
was obviously a member of the actual participant’s ingroup to pose such a stupid question. 
Additionally, the second to last entry referred to number 2, inducing participants to read that 
entry as well. Participant number 2 had mocked the respective outgroup. The suprataxators 
were said to overestimate their own abilities and subtaxators were said to underestimate their 
inferiority to the suprataxators, respectively. In the non-triggering conditions, the last entry 
stated that the participant was thrilled by the discovery of this trait and that s/he intended to 
observe from now on when it applied. Participant number 2 simply stated that it was perfectly 
reasonable to assume that subtaxators and suprataxators perceive themselves and the world 
differently. 
In line with the cover-story, the core dependent measure involved allocation of noises 
and level of noise intensity. Participants learned that a subsequent study would investigate the 
differential impact of particular environmental noises on cognitive performance. The 
ostensible research question was whether subtaxators and suprataxators are differentially 
distracted by specific auditory stimuli. Participants than assigned both groups to two specific 
noise conditions following a forced-choice format, one was called “construction site”, the 
other “meadow in the summer”. In brackets, specifications read “jackhammer” and “chirping 
and rustling of leaves”, respectively. Subsequently, participants determined the loudness of 
noise exposure for the ingroup and for the outgroup by selecting the decibel (dB) level 
separately for each group. On two 14-point scales participants set the level of noise intensity 
for participants of their own group and the outgroup in an alleged follow-up experiment 
between 10 dB and 140 dB. These scales were not anchored verbally. The reason given for 
this procedure was to be able to implement experimenter-blind conditions. This dependent 
measure was an adaptation of the aggression measure duration and level of white noise used 
in interpersonal aggression research (Bushman et al., 2005, study 3; Pedersen et al., in 
progress, study 1). Importantly, this dependent measure was non-zero-sum, level of noise was 
set for outgroup members and ingroup members independently. 
After the behavioral dependent measure, participants reported their current affective 
state on a categorical emotion scale. Ratings were made on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 
(not at all) to 7 (very much). Anger was measured by the two items “angry” and “outraged” 
(Cronbach’s α = .68), dejection was assessed with the single-item measure “dejected”, the 
positive emotions index was computed by averaging scores for “happy” and 
“contented”(Cronbach’s α = .85). The three measures were highly intercorrelated, r(66) = 
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.60, p < .001 for anger and dejection, r(66) = -.62, p < .001 for anger and the positive 
emotions index, and r(66) = -.63, p < .001 for dejection and the positive emotions index. 
Contrary to the affective measures in the questionnaire studies, the trigger emotion scale did 
not explicitly relate to the intentional object trigger manipulation, because that would have 
raised doubt as to whether the triggering comments were truly from former participants. 
Next, participants rated subtaxators and suprataxators on a number of attributes. 
Selection of the particular attributes incorporated in the scale was guided by the warmth-
competence dichotomy introduced by the stereotype content model (Fiske et al., 2002; Fiske, 
Xu, Cuddy, & Glick, 1999). In the minimal-group context, there were however no differential 
hypotheses regarding both dimensions. Ratings were made on 7-point bipolar scales. 
Opposing attributes were assigned to the poles of the scale that both had the value 3 without 
evaluatively qualifying signs. The mid-point of the scale was zero, representing equal 
applicability of the opposing attributes to members of the respective group. Deviations from 
the mid-point in either direction indicated that the corresponding attribute more strongly 
characterized the group than the opposing attribute. Order of the opposed desirable and 
undesirable attributes was balanced. Participants rated first the ingroup and then the 
outgroup; within groups the pairs of attributes were displayed randomly. An outgroup 
warmth index was obtained by averaging scores for “tolerant”, “likable”, and “pleasant” 
(Cronbach’s α = .77). An outgroup competence index was obtained by averaging scores for 
“determined” and “self-confident” (Cronbach’s α = .83). Difference indices for both 
dimensions were computed by first subtracting outgroup scores from the corresponding 
ingroup scores and subsequently averaging the respective difference scores (Cronbach’s α = 
.73 for ∆ warmth and Cronbach’s α = .88 for ∆ competence). Attribute rating scores were 
coded such that high scores indicate positive evaluations and low scores indicate negative 
evaluations. 
Identification with the minimal ingroup was measured with two items (“I feel as a 
subtaxator (suprataxator).”, “I see myself as a subtaxator (suprataxator).”; Cronbach’s α = 
.80). In order to capture possible aggressive tendencies towards the experimenter, participants 
next evaluated the experimenter (“The experimenter was nice.”, “The experimenter did a 
good job.”, “I recommend to employ the experimenter for further experiments.”; Cronbach’s 
α = .86). Application of this measure was modified from Bushman et al. (2005, study 1), 
Pedersen et al. (2000, study 1), and Pedersen et al. (in progress, study 3). Apparently, a 
negative evaluation would harm the experimenter, precisely her chances for future 
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employment. Before the final scale, a forced-choice format asked participants to indicate their 
group membership. This measure ascertained whether participants were able to correctly 
identify the social category they belonged to. Then, two items measured how strongly 
participants rejected the minimal categorization; the scale is referred to as the discounting 
scale (“The test result that I am subtaxator (suprataxator), surprises me.” and “The result that 
I am subtaxator (suprataxator), is in line with my everyday experiences.”, reverse coded; 
Cronbach’s α = .72). Ratings for the identification, experimenter evaluation, and the 
discounting scale were made on 7-point scales. Participants indicated on scales ranging from 
1 (do not agree at all) to 7 (fully agree) how much they agreed with the respective statement. 
In order to obtain subtle affective manipulation checks, a monitoring measure adapted 
from Gilbert and colleagues (1995) assessed participants’ general affect repeatedly during the 
experimental session. Measurement points were pre-programmed but allegedly chosen at 
random by the computer. An orange flash signaled the disruption, participants rated their 
current affective state on a 9-point affective scale with poles labeled positive and negative, 
and afterwards the program proceeded with the same screen that had been displayed before 
the orange flash. 
At the end of the experimental session, participants were thanked, they received their 
reimbursement, and they were thoroughly debriefed. 
7.1.2 Results and Discussion 
Variables included in the multivariate outlier analysis were both dB levels, four scores 
for attribute ratings (two for each group), trigger-elicited anger, evaluation of the 
experimenter, and identification. No multivariate outliers were found using Mahalanobis 
distance with a criterion α = .001, critical χ²(9, N = 66) = 27.877. One participant, however, 
was excluded because she failed to correctly identify her group membership, 3 participants 
had to be excluded because German was not their mother tongue. Participants’ self-
categorization was evenly distributed, 35 participants self-categorized as suprataxators, 31 as 
subtaxators. 
Manipulation checks 
Manipulation check provocation. With regard to the cognitive appraisal of the initial 
phase the provocation conditions’ mean exceeded the no provocation conditions’ mean, t(64) 
= 6.45, p < .001, d = 1.58 (cf. Table 8 for means and standard deviations), indicating that 
7 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM MINIMAL GROUP RESEARCH  
 82 
more aversive conditions were established in the provocation conditions than in the no 
provocation conditions. Results for the core affect dimension affective valence corroborate 
this finding, t(51.39) = 6.09, p < .001, d = 1.52. Higher negative valence was reported in the 
provocation than in the no provocation conditions. The arousal measure yielded a significant 
effect opposite to prediction, t(64) = -2.43, p = .02, d = -0.59. This result can be interpreted 
such that provoked participants did not experience anger but rather dejection, a negative 
emotion low on the arousal dimension. The illegitimacy of the experimenter’s changing the 
background noise may not have been appraised accordingly.29 
Table 8. Means and standard deviations for cognitive appraisal of background noise, 
provocation-elicited core affect, and general affect measurements before and after the 
provocation manipulation separately for both provocation conditions (Study 3). 
 provocation no provocation 
cognitive appraisal 5.00 (1.47) 2.63 (1.52) 
core affect – arousal 3.63 (1.45) 4.41 (1.17) 
core affect – valence 4.14 (1.67) 2.04 (1.04) 
general affect1 3.50 (1.72) 2.82 (1.00) 
general affect2 5.13 (1.77) 2.76 (1.10) 
Note. Standard deviations are specified in brackets. General affect1 was assessed at the 
beginning of the experimental session, general affect2 was assessed after the feedback. 
A 2 × 2 mixed-model ANOVA with provocation as between-subjects factor and two 
general affect measurements, one at the beginning of the experimental session and one after 
the feedback, as within-subjects factor further indicated an effective provocation 
manipulation. Both main effects were significant, F(1, 64) = 23.23, p < .001, ηp
2 = .266 for 
the within-subjects factor and F(1, 64) = 23.52, p < .001, ηp
2 = .269 for the between-subjects 
factor (cf. Table 8 for means and standard deviations). The main effects were qualified by a 
significant two-way interaction, F(1, 64) = 26.86, p < .001, ηp
2 = .296. Simple comparisons 
                                                 
29 One participant, for example, stated after the debriefing she had thought that since the study was said to 
investigate the impact of background noises, more disturbing noise as compared with classical music would 
produce more conclusive data. 
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revealed that participants in the provocation conditions only marginally significantly differed 
from participants in the no provocation conditions with regard to their general affect ratings 
at the first measurement point, F(1, 64) = 3.86, p = .054, ηp
2 = .057. After the false feedback, 
the difference was much more pronounced, F(1, 64) = 42.71, p < .001, ηp
2 = .400. Initially, 
an experimenter effect may have accounted for the marginally significant difference between 
provoked and non-provoked participants, the augmentation of negative affect in the 
provocation conditions is however not plausibly attributable to such interfering influences but 
rather to the experimental manipulation. 
Manipulation check trigger. The effectiveness of the trigger manipulation was also 
assessed with general affect measurements. One measurement point was shortly before 
participants did the minimal group categorization task, the other measurement point was 
directly after the trigger. These measurements were entered as a within-subjects factor in a 2 
× 2 × 2 mixed-model ANOVA with provocation and trigger as between-subjects factors. The 
within-subjects factor was statistically significant, F(1, 62) = 6.83, p = .011, ηp
2 = .099, and 
so was the provocation main effect, F(1, 62) = 22.08, p < .001, ηp
2 = .263 (cf. Table 9 for 
means and standard deviations). Negative affect was higher before than after the trigger 
manipulation and provoked participants reported more negative affect than non-provoked 
participants. No significant main effect was observed for the trigger manipulation, F < 1. The 
two-way interaction of the within-subjects factor and provocation showed a non-significant 
tendency, F(1, 62) = 2.78, p = .101, ηp
2 = .043. The interaction of the within-subjects factor 
and trigger was not significant, F < 1, and the interaction of both experimental factors was 
marginally significant, F(1, 62) = 3.56, p = .06, ηp
2 = .054. Analysis of the simple effects 
revealed no difference between no provocation-trigger and no provocation-no trigger 
conditions, F < 1, but scores of negative general affect were marginally significantly higher 
in the provocation-trigger condition than in the provocation-no trigger condition, F(1, 62) = 
3.58, p = .06, ηp
2 = .055. The three-way interaction was not statistically significant, indicating 
that the difference between the provocation-trigger and the provocation-no trigger condition 
already existed before the trigger was actually applied.  
Ultimately, it is impossible to ascertain whether participants actually read the 
triggering remarks. Nonetheless, participants spent on average 164.14 seconds (SD = 61.54) 
from the first appearance of the trigger on the screen until they moved on to the next screen, 
suggesting that participants indeed looked at the previous entries. 
7 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM MINIMAL GROUP RESEARCH  
 84 
Table 9. Means and standard deviations for general affect measurements before and after the 
trigger manipulation separately for all four conditions (Study 3). 
 provocation no provocation 
 trigger no trigger trigger no trigger 
general affect3 5.13 (1.78) 4.19 (1.72) 2.65 (0.93) 3.12 (1.41) 
general affect4 4.56 (1.86) 3.69 (1.35) 2.65 (0.79) 2.88 (1.41) 
Note. Standard deviations are specified in brackets. General affect3 was assessed shortly 
before participants did the minimal group categorization task, general affect4 was assessed 
directly after the trigger. 
Preliminary analyses 
Across conditions, participants selected the unpleasant noise significantly more often 
for the outgroup than for the ingroup, χ²(1, N = 66) = 4.91, p = .03. This result could however 
have been produced by an outgroup derogating motive as well as by an ingroup favoring 
motive. A further expression of this general social differentiating tendency was the relatively 
louder noise exposure set for the outgroup than for the ingroup revealed by a 2 × 2 × 2 
mixed-model ANOVA with dB level for ingroup and outgroup as within-subjects factor and 
provocation and trigger as between-subjects factors. The within-subjects factor only slightly 
missed conventional levels of statistical significance, F(1, 62) = 3.86, p = .054, ηp
2 = .059. 
The difference between ingroup dB level and outgroup dB level was negative in all 
conditions, signifying that more intense dB levels were chosen for the outgroup than for the 
ingroup (cf. Table 10 for means and standard deviations). No other main effect was 
significant, Fs < 1. The interaction of the between-subjects factors was statistically 
significant, F(1, 62) = 5.14, p = .03, ηp
2 = .076. Simple effects revealed no difference 
between provoked and non-provoked participants who were subsequently triggered, F(1, 62) 
= 1.28, p = .26, ηp
2 = .020, but significantly higher dB levels chosen by participants in the no 
provocation-no trigger condition than in the no provocation-trigger condition, F(1, 62) = 
4.92, p < .04, ηp
2 = .065. No other two-way interaction nor the three-way interaction were 
statistically significant, Fs < 1. The higher noise level set for the outgroup relative to the 
choice for the ingroup was thus independent from experimental manipulations. 
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Table 10. Means and standard deviations for the dependent measures separately for all four 
conditions (Study 3). 
 provocation no provocation 
 trigger no trigger trigger no trigger 
Db level outgroup  6.94 (3.07) 5.75 (2.77) 6.53 (2.58) 7.00 (3.66) 
∆ Db level -1.13 (4.16) -0.75 (3.79) -1.76 (4.52) -0.59 (4.89) 
outgroup warmth 5.25 (1.01) 5.13 (0.73) 5.06 (0.87) 5.39 (1.13) 
∆ warmth -0.90 (1.15) -0.71 (1.11) -0.37 (0.98) -0.73 (1.63) 
outgroup competence 4.34 (1.70) 3.94 (1.30) 4.65 (1.32) 5.00 (1.46) 
∆ competence 0.44 (2.56) 0.75 (2.58) -0.65 (2.38) -0.91 (2.77) 
trigger-elicited emotions     
 anger 2.44 (1.39) 2.69 (1.45) 1.35 (0.55) 1.79 (0.85) 
 dejection 3.56 (1.93) 3.00 (1.59) 1.71 (1.05) 2.71 (1.71) 
 positive emotions 3.59 (1.73) 3.91 (1.32) 5.09 (0.78) 5.00 (1.16) 
experimenter evaluation 5.71 (1.13) 5.75 (1.10) 5.94 (1.12) 5.59 (1.10) 
identification 4.69 (1.30) 3.91 (1.54) 4.56 (1.33) 4.76 (1.78) 
discounting 3.25 (1.54) 3.13 (1.01) 2.88 (0.88) 2.71 (1.24) 
Note. Standard deviations are specified in brackets. 
Planned contrast analyses 
Next, planned contrast analyses were run to test the predicted interactive effects of 
provocation and trigger on the dependent measures. Identification with the minimal group 
was included as a covariate. The covariate was however not significant for the outgroup level, 
F(1, 61) = 1.89, p = .17, ηp
2 = .030, nor for the difference score, F < 1. The predicted 3 -1 -1 -
1 contrast failed to occur for both the dB level set for the outgroup and the difference score 
obtained by subtracting dB level set for the outgroup from the dB level set for the ingroup, Fs 
< 1 (cf. Table 10 for means and standard deviations). Significant amounts of residual variance 
remained for neither measure, Fs < 1. Participants who were both initially provoked and 
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subsequently triggered did not select statistically significantly higher dB levels for the 
outgroup nor did they display a higher tendency than participants in the other three conditions 
to maximize differences between the levels chosen for ingroup and outgroup. 
In the planned contrast analyses of the attribute ratings, the self-categorization as 
subtaxator or suprataxator was included as a further covariate. Self-categorization was a 
significant covariate for all attribute rating measures, Fs(1, 60) > 4.18, ps < .05, ηp
2 > .065, 
with the exception of the outgroup rating on the warmth dimension, F < 1. Identification only 
emerged as a significant covariate for the difference score on the warmth dimension, F(1, 60) 
= 8.03, p < .01, ηp
2 = .118, for the other measures Fs(1, 60) < 1.79, ps > .18, ηp
2s < .029. No 
focal contrast emerged statistically significant, Fs < 1 (cf. Table 10 for means and standard 
deviations). Marginally significant amounts of residual variance only remained for the 
competence measures, F(1, 60) = 3.66, p = .06, ηp
2 = .058 and F(1, 60) = 3.28, p = .08, ηp
2 = 
.052 for outgroup ratings and the difference score, respectively, for the warmth measures both 
Fs < 1. 2 × 2 between-subjects ANOVAs were conducted to explore the between-group 
differences on both competence measures. Identification and self-categorization were again 
included as covariates.30 In both analyses, the main effects were non-significant, Fs < 1. For 
the outgroup competence rating a marginally significant interaction effect was obtained, F(1, 
60) = 3.40, p = .07, ηp
2 = .054, for the difference score a non-significant tendency was 
observed for the interaction effect, F(1, 60) = 2.56, p = .11, ηp
2 = .041. Simple comparisons 
for the outgroup competence rating revealed no difference depending on trigger level for 
provoked participants, F(1, 60) = 1.05, p = .31, ηp
2 = .017, but a non-significant tendency for 
non-provoked participants, F(1, 60) = 2.60, p = .11, ηp
2 = .042. Participants tended to 
consider the outgroup less competent in the no provocation-trigger condition than in the no 
provocation-no trigger condition. 
The trigger-elicited emotions were also analyzed with planned contrast analyses, they 
were predicted to result interactively from both experimental manipulations in the 
provocation-trigger condition. Identification was entered as a covariate. However, 
identification only emerged as a marginally significant covariate for the positive emotions 
measure, F(1, 61) = 2.96, p = .09, ηp
2 = .046, for anger and dejection identification was no 
significant covariate, Fs(1, 61) < 1.67, ps > .20, ηp
2s < .027. While the focal contrast for 
                                                 
30 Results for the covariates are not reported again, they are identical with the ones from the previous analyses. 
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trigger-elicited anger showed only a non-significant tendency, F(1, 61) = 2.56, p = .11, ηp
2 = 
.040, it was statistically significant for trigger-elicited dejection and the positive emotions 
index, F(1, 61) = 5.82, p = .02, ηp
2 = .087 and F(1, 61) = 9.47, p < .01, ηp
2 = .134, 
respectively (cf. Table 10 for means and standard deviations). However, significant amounts 
of unexplained variance remained for all three indices, Fs(1, 61) > 5.13, ps < .03, ηp
2s > .077. 
To explore the observed residual variance for the trigger-elicited emotion scores 
omnibus F tests were conducted. Identification was again included as a covariate. The 2 × 2 
between-subjects ANOVA with provocation and trigger revealed a significant provocation 
main effect for trigger-elicited anger, F(1, 61) = 12.03, p < .001, ηp
2 = .165. Provoked 
participants reported higher levels of trigger-elicited anger than non-provoked participants. 
No other effect was statistically significant, F(1, 61) = 1.37, p = .25, ηp
2 = .022 for the trigger 
main effect and F < 1 for the interaction. A provocation main effect was also observed for 
dejection, F(1, 61) = 6.14, p = .02, ηp
2 = .091; it was of notably lesser magnitude than the 
provocation main effect for trigger-elicited anger, though. Provoked participants experienced 
stronger dejection than non-provoked participants. The trigger main effect was non-
significant, F < 1, the significant two-way interaction qualified the provocation main effect, 
F(1, 61) = 4.49, p = .04, ηp
2 = .069. Simple comparisons revealed that the intensity of the 
dejection experience did not differ depending on trigger manipulation for participants who 
had been previously provoked, F(1, 61) = 1.41, p = .24, ηp
2 = .023. Among unprovoked 
participants, triggered participants experienced marginally significantly less trigger-elicited 
dejection than non-trigger participants, F(1, 61) = 3.38, p = .07, ηp
2 = .052. The provocation 
main effect was also highly significant for the positive emotions index, F(1, 61) = 15.27, p < 
.001, ηp
2 = .200. Participants in the provocation conditions experienced significantly less 
positive emotions than participants in the no provocation conditions. The trigger main effect 
and the interaction were not significant, Fs < 1. In sum, the categorical emotions primarily 
reflected the provocation manipulation.  
The evaluative ratings of the experimenter were also analyzed with only identification 
as a covariate. No displacement of aggression on the outgroup had occurred and the source of 
the original provocation, the experimenter, was still available. Hence, it might have been the 
case, that participants’ evaluation of the experimenter further deteriorated in the provocation-
trigger condition as compared with the provocation-no trigger condition. The intermediately 
encountered triggering provocation might have enhanced the aggressive response to the 
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provocation by the experimenter. Therefore, the focal contrast was again specified as 3 -1 -1  
-1. Yet, neither the focal contrast nor the test for residual variance or the covariate were 
statistically significant, Fs < 1 (cf. Table 10 for means and standard deviations). 
A planned contrast analysis with 3 -1 -1 -1 as the focal contrast was also run for 
identification with the minimal group and the related discounting measure. The predicted 
focal contrasts were not statistically significant, Fs(1, 62) < 1.04, ps > .31, ηp
2s < .017. 
Remaining residual variance was marginally statistically significant for identification, F(1, 
62) = 2.91, p = .09, ηp
2 = .045, and non-significant for the discounting measure, F < 1 (cf. 
Table 10 for means and standard deviations). A 2 × 2 between-subjects ANOVA for 
identification only revealed non-significant effects, Fs(1, 62) < 1.78, ps > .18, ηp
2s < .028. 
Across conditions, identification with the minimal group was significantly above the mid-
point of the scale, t(65) = 2.61, p = .011, d = 0.32. 
Planned contrast analyses with post-hoc affective factors 
Since the experimental manipulations did not affect the affective measures as 
predicted post-hoc affective factors were computed from the core affect measures and from 
trigger-elicited affect measures. For the core affect measures raw arousal and valence scores 
were multiplied, centered, and dichotomized via median splits to obtain a single core affect 
index representing anger. An analogous index was computed for dejection after arousal had 
been reverse coded. The core affect index representing the positive emotions was obtained by 
simply median-splitting the centered valence score.  
For each of the three indices t tests were run on the arousal and the valence dimension 
to determine whether participants who received high scores reliably differed from 
participants who received low scores. Participants who received a high core affect anger 
score reported no statistically significantly higher levels of arousal than participants who 
received a low core affect anger score, M = 3.89, SD = 1.18 and M = 4.17, SD = 1.52, 
respectively, t < 1. The composite core affect index for provocation-elicited anger therefore 
needs to be interpreted with particular caution, it cannot unequivocally be interpreted as 
representing anger. On the valence dimension, however, participants who received a high 
core affect anger score obtained higher (i.e., more negative) ratings than participants who 
received a low core affect anger score, M = 4.17, SD = 1.37 and M = 1.95, SD = 1.29, 
respectively, t(64) = 6.75, p < .001, d = 1.67. In contrast, for the core affect dejection measure 
differences between participants who received high versus low scores were reliable on both 
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dimensions, M = 4.92, SD = 0.96 and M = 3.02, SD = 0.98, respectively, on the arousal 
dimension, t(64) = 7.99, p < .001, d = 1.96, and M = 4.44, SD = 1.29 and M = 1.68, SD = 0.71 
on the valence dimension, t(64) = 10.80, p < .001, d = 2.66. Although no difference on the 
arousal dimension was expected for the core affect measure representing positive emotions, 
participants who received high versus low scores were reliably different on both dimensions. 
Participants with a high positive emotions score reported more arousal and less negative 
valence than participants with a low score, M = 4.75, SD = 1.14 and M = 3.27, SD = 1.16, 
t(64) = 5.26, p < .000, d = 1.29 on the arousal dimension and M = 1.63, SD = 0.55 and M = 
4.58, SD = 1.15, t(44.06) = -13.12, p < .001, d = -3.68 on the valence dimension. The 
significant difference on the arousal dimension is not particularly problematic, no hypotheses 
pertained to the level of arousal in positive emotions. 
The respective second quasi-experimental affective factors were obtained by 
dichotomizing scores on the corresponding trigger-elicited emotion measures via median 
split. Nested median-splits were computed because the trigger-elicited emotions were 
significantly correlated with the corresponding core affect indices, r(66) = .40, p < .001, r(66) 
= .60, p < .001, and r(66) = .63, p < .001, for anger, dejection, and positive emotions, 
respectively. The corresponding dichotomous affective measures were then crossed to 
produce variables with four levels: (1) high core affect score31-high trigger-elicited emotion 
score, (2) high core affect score-low trigger-elicited emotion score, (3) low core affect score-
high trigger-elicited emotion score, and (4) low core affect score-low trigger-elicited emotion 
score. With these post-hoc variables new sets of planned contrast analyses were run. 
Identification was no longer included as a covariate since its impact is expected to be inherent 
in the affective measures. 
On both dB level measures, dB level for the outgroup and the difference between dB 
level selected for ingroup and outgroup, no systematic variance emerged in the planned 
contrast analyses with the post-hoc anger factor, Fs < 1 for the focal contrasts as well as for 
the tests for significant residual variance. Self-categorization was entered as a covariate in all 
attribute rating analyses. It was no significant covariate for outgroup warmth, F < 1. For all 
other attribute rating measures the covariate was significant, Fs(1, 61) > 4.57, ps < .04, ηp
2s > 
                                                 
31 High versus low core affect score denotes the composite indices computed to represent anger and dejection, 
respectively. In the case of positive emotions, it refers only to the valence dimension. The positive emotions 
variables were coded such that high scores represented low levels of positive emotions. 
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.069. For outgroup warmth a significant focal contrast was revealed, F(1, 61) = 6.00, p = .02, 
ηp
2 = .089, but significant amounts of unexplained variance remained, F(1, 61) = 4.57, p = 
.04, ηp
2 = .070. No systematic between group differences were revealed for the other three 
rating measures, Fs(1, 61) < 1.73, ps > .19, ηp
2s < .028. The residual variance for outgroup 
warmth ratings was explored with a 2 × 2 between-subjects ANOVA including self-
categorization as a covariate. The main effect of core affect anger was not significant, F < 1. 
A significant main effect was revealed for trigger-elicited anger, F(1, 61) = 9.20, p = .004, 
ηp
2 = .131, participants who experienced high trigger-elicited anger rated the outgroup less 
warm than participants who experienced low trigger-elicited anger. The interaction was not 
statistically significant, F(1, 61) = 1.77, p = .19, ηp
2 = .028.  
Next, it was tested whether the post-hoc anger factor produced the 3 -1 -1 -1 contrast 
effect for the evaluation of the experimenter. This was however not the case. The focal 
contrast was not significant, F(1, 62) = 1.55, p = .22, ηp
2 = .024, instead significant amounts 
of unexplained residual variance remained, F(1, 62) = 10.35, p = .002, ηp
2 = .143. Therefore, 
an omnibus F test was conducted. The pattern of results from the 2 × 2 between-subjects 
ANOVA resembled the one for the outgroup warmth rating. The core affect main effect was 
not significant, F < 1. The main effect of trigger-elicited anger was statistically significant, 
F(1, 62) = 8.88, p = .004, ηp
2 = .125, participants who experienced high anger after the 
trigger manipulation evaluated the experimenter less favorably than participants who 
experienced low trigger-elicited anger. The interaction effect was not significant, F(1, 62) = 
2.35, p = .13, ηp
2 = .036. Note, that trigger-elicited anger had been nested into core affect 
anger, consequently the observed trigger-elicited anger main effect cannot simply be 
interpreted to reflect persisting provocation-elicited anger. It rather seems to be the case that a 
triggering provocation experienced after the initial provocation augmented the aggressive 
response to the source of the original provocation, trigger-elicited anger was displaced on the 
experimenter. 
The absence of the expected interactively increased inclination towards aggressive 
behavior against either the outgroup or the experimenter finally becomes plausible through 
analysis of the identification and particularly the discounting measure. For identification the 
focal contrast missed statistical significance, F(1, 62) = 2.00, p = .16, ηp
2 = .031, while no 
significant residual variance remained, F < 1. Participants who received high anger scores for 
both measures were descriptively less identified with the minimal ingroup than participants 
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who received low anger scores for one or both measurements. A significant focal contrast for 
the discounting measure corroborated the notion that participants’ affective reactions to the 
experimental manipulations led them to reject the minimal social category they had been 
assigned to, F(1, 62) = 6.86, p = .011, ηp
2 = .100. The focal contrast parsimoniously 
accounted for the observed between-group differences, no significant amount of unexplained 
variance remained, F < 1.  
The same set of analyses was next computed with the post-hoc dejection factor. 
However, no focal contrast for any outgroup related-measure (i.e., the outgroup as well as the 
difference scores for the dB level and attribute ratings) was significant, Fs < 1. For the dB 
level measures the tests for significant residual variance were also non-significant, Fs(1, 58) 
< 1.69, ps > .19, ηp
2 < .029. The analyses for the attribute ratings again included the covariate 
self-categorization. As in the previous analyses, self-categorization was no significant 
covariate for outgroup warmth, F < 1, but was statistically significant for the other three 
attribute rating measures, Fs(1, 57) > 4.22, ps < .05, ηp
2s > .069. With regard to the warmth 
ratings, significant residual variance remained for the outgroup rating, F(1, 57) = 4.37, p = 
.04, ηp
2 = .071, and marginally significant residual variance remained for the difference 
score, F(1, 57) = 2.92, p = .09, ηp
2 = .049. The residual variance for both warmth rating 
measures was explored by omnibus F tests including the covariate self-categorization. The 
main effect of core affect dejection was not significant for outgroup warmth, F < 1. A 
marginally significant main effect of trigger-elicited dejection was revealed, F(1, 57) = 3.73, 
p = .06, ηp
2 = .061. Participants with a high score for trigger-elicited dejection evaluated the 
outgroup as less warm than participants with a low trigger-elicited dejection score. The 
interaction effect was not significant, F < 1. For the warmth difference score no significant 
effect was observed, Fs(1, 57) < 1.36, ps > .24, ηp
2s < .024. 
The evaluation of the experimenter did not statistically significantly vary depending 
on the level of dejection participants experienced, F < 1 for the focal contrast and F(1, 58) = 
2.65, p = .11, ηp
2 = .044 for the test of residual variance. The focal contrast for identification 
was not significant, F < 1, but significant amounts of unexplained variance remained, F(1, 
58) = 4.51, p = .04, ηp
2 = .072. However, neither main effect nor the interaction effect 
emerged statistically significant in a 2 × 2 between-subjects ANOVA, F < 1, F(1, 58) = 2.47, 
p = .12, ηp
2 = .041, and F(1, 58) = 1.74, p = .19, ηp
2 = .029 for core affect dejection, trigger-
elicited dejection, and the interaction term, respectively. The only significant focal contrast 
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with the dejection factor was obtained for the discounting measure, F(1, 58) = 6.97, p = .011, 
ηp
2 = .107, significant amounts of unexplained variance remained, though, F(1, 58) = 4.22, p 
= .04, ηp
2 = .068. A 2 × 2 between-subjects ANOVA revealed a marginally significant main 
effect of core affect dejection and a statistically significant main effect of trigger-elicited 
dejection, F(1, 58) = 3.16, p = .08, ηp
2 = .052 and F(1, 58) = 7.99, p = .006, ηp
2 = .121, 
respectively. For both dejection measures a high score was associated with more discounting. 
The interaction effect was not significant, F < 1. 
A third time, the planned contrast analyses were computed with post-hoc positive 
emotions. The focal contrasts for both dB measures were non-significant, Fs < 1. Significant 
amounts of residual variance remained only for the outgroup dB level, F(1, 62) = 18.63, p < 
.001, ηp
2 = .032, for the difference score F < 1. An omnibus F test was conducted to explore 
the between-group differences for the dB level set for the outgroup, yet no significant effect 
was revealed, Fs < 1 for both main effects and F(1, 62) = 1.60, p = .21, ηp
2 = .025 for the 
interaction effect.  
The only significant focal contrast was observed for the outgroup warmth rating, F(1, 
61) = 4.38, p = .04, ηp
2 = .067, for the other attribute rating scores Fs < 1. Similar to the 
outgroup dB level measure, significant residual between-group differences remained for both 
outgroup ratings, F(1, 61) = 4.16, p = .046, ηp
2 = .064 and F(1, 61) = 4.53, p = .04, ηp
2 = .069 
for warmth and competence, respectively, but not for the corresponding difference measures, 
Fs(1, 61) < 1.54, ps > .21, ηp
2s < .024. As in the other planned contrast analyses, self-
categorization was no significant covariate in the analysis of outgroup warmth, F < 1, but a 
(marginally) significant covariate in the other 3 analyses, Fs(1, 61) > 3.88, ps < .054, ηp
2s > 
.059. The residual variance for both outgroup ratings was explored by 2 × 2 between-subjects 
ANOVAs with self-categorization as a covariate. The core affect main effect and the 
interaction effect were non-significant in both analyses, Fs(1, 61) < 1.33, ps > .25, ηp
2s < 
.022. For outgroup warmth, the main effect of trigger-elicited positive emotions was 
statistically significant, F(1, 61) = 8.00, p = .006, ηp
2 = .116, for outgroup competence, the 
main effect of trigger-elicited positive emotions was marginally significant, F(1, 61) = 3.55, p 
= .06, ηp
2 = .055. The outgroup was evaluated less warm and less competent by participants 
with low trigger-elicited positive emotion scores as compared with participants with high 
trigger-elicited positive emotion scores. Absence of positive affect after the trigger 
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manipulation (i.e., after participants had read the alleged remarks from other participants) 
thus produced the devaluation of the outgroup. 
No systematic variance was observed with regard to the experimenter evaluation, Fs < 
1. For identification both focal contrast and the test for residual variance showed non-
significant tendencies, F(1, 62) = 2.47, p = .12, ηp
2 = .038 and F(1, 62) = 2.76, p = .102, ηp
2 
= .043, respectively. A marginally significant focal contrast was revealed for the discounting 
measure, F(1, 62) = 3.72, p = .06, ηp
2 = .057. Participants who experienced only weak 
positive emotions following both manipulations, discounted the minimal group more than all 
other participants. The marginally significant focal contrast accounted for the observed 
between-group differences, the test for residual variance was not significant, F < 1. 
The pattern of results was largely comparable across the three different affective 
factors. Particularly participants who experienced high levels of anger after both 
manipulations, but also participants who experienced absence of positive emotions after both 
manipulations most strongly rejected the new ingroup. No such interactive effect was 
observed for dejection. Still, strong experiences of dejection after either manipulation lead to 
discounting, but independent of the respective other dejection measure. 
Exploratory analyses 
Simple linear regression analyses investigated whether and how the attribute ratings 
were associated with the behavioral outgroup derogation measure. Neither attribute rating of 
the outgroup significantly predicted outgroup derogation, β = .13 and β = .09 for warmth and 
competence, respectively, ts(64) < 1.06, R²s < .018, Fs < 1.12. 
7.1.3 Summary 
Higher levels of noise intensity and less favorable attribute ratings for the outgroup 
were expected in the provocation-trigger condition. Although differential treatment of 
ingroup and outgroup occurred for selection and intensity of noise, it was independent of 
experimental conditions. Manipulation checks indicate that participants were not angered by 
the initial provocation but that they rather felt dejected. Consequently, augmentation of 
trigger-elicited anger and outgroup derogation in the provocation-trigger condition was no 
longer expected. 
The initial provocation failed to induce anger. Apparently, participants did not 
perceive the experimenter’s behavior as illegitimate and unfair, the evaluation of the 
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experimenter did not differ across conditions. The participants themselves generated a 
rationale for the experimenter’s behavior, although it had been disadvantageous for them32. 
The experimenter’s social role might have caused the implicit assumption that her behavior 
towards the participant was reasonable. Therefore, in the next study the experimenter’s 
provoking behavior was clearly unfair and not attributable to a rational cause. Interestingly, 
however, analyses with post-hoc affective factors revealed that trigger-elicited anger led to a 
displacement of aggression on the experimenter. 
The background-noise in the provocation conditions, the Radio-Medley, was 
presumed to be an aversive stimulus. Whereas some participants indeed strongly disliked it, 
other participants actually enjoyed it. Thus, although the Radio-Medley might have been 
disturbing, it was not unequivocally experienced as aversive. 
Experimental minimal groups afford a comparatively easy way to evade negative 
affect associated with the group: discounting the personal relevance of the group and 
reducing identification with the group. A similar process may account for the observed higher 
levels of group-based guilt in lowly identified participants as compared with highly identified 
participants (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Gordijn et al., 2006). 
Discounting the suprataxator and subtaxator category, respectively, was stronger when 
participants reported high levels of anger after both experimental manipulations than for the 
other three possible combinations of experienced anger. Absence of positive emotions 
produced a similar 3 -1 -1 -1 contrast effect, but of lesser magnitude. For dejection 
discounting was higher for high than for low levels of either dejection measure. All in all, 
participants did not vent their unpleasant affective state by aggressing against the minimal 
outgroup, but they diminished the psychological significance by means of discounting the 
assigned category. 
7.2 Study 4 
As a consequence of the affective reaction to the provocation manipulation in Study 3 
that was rather dejection than anger, a modified initial provocation was employed. Changes 
followed theorizing of Miller et al. (2003), who depicted centrality of the goal as a potentially 
important factor. Therefore, instead of giving a bad performance feedback to a comparatively 
insignificant task, participants were promised financial gain which was then illegitimately 
                                                 
32 Participants assumed, for example, that classical music had already been played a couple of times that day. 
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withheld. The auditory stimulation in the provocation conditions was changed to industrial 
noise so that it would unequivocally be experienced as aversive. Further minor changes to the 
procedure are specified in the method section. 
Moreover, an additional experimental factor “delay” was introduced to examine 
whether the incessant procedure of the experimental session in Study 3 inhibited effects of 
triggered displacement. In interpersonal triggered displaced aggression research, participants 
regularly have to wait for some minutes, for example, while the experimenter allegedly 
exchanges material of the participants (Pedersen et al., 2000; Pedersen et al., in progress; 
Vasquez et al., 2005). 
The delay factor was introduced to foster the understanding of the process underlying 
outgroup derogation. It was assumed that a long as compared with a short delay would 
increase rumination among provoked participants but not among unprovoked participants. 
Consequently, in accordance with Bushman and collaborators (2005), trigger-elicited anger 
and outgroup derogation in the provocation-trigger condition were expected to be higher 
when the delay was long than when the delay was short. Note, however, that the current delay 
factor was not suitable to distinguish arousal-based from rumination-based triggered 
displaced aggression. Even the time span in the long delay conditions was too short to 
exclude persisting arousal as a potential explanation. The experimental procedure was 
disruptive in all conditions, but only in the delay conditions were participants left to 
themselves for a substantial period of time. 
7.2.1 Method 
Participants and Design. Fifty-eight female and 49 male students of the Friedrich-
Schiller-University Jena volunteered to take part in the study in exchange for €5,- to €10,-, 
one participant was actually a high-school student. The participants were aged 17 to 36 (M = 
22.66, SD = 3.18)33. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions of the 2 (provocation, 
no provocation) × 2 (delay, no delay)  × 2 (trigger, no trigger) between-subjects design, yet 
the full design was realized before starting the next replication. 
Procedure. Participants were tested individually. The general procedure was identical 
with Study 3. In the provocation conditions, a female experimenter welcomed participants 
and introduced them to the experimental session. Other than in Study 3, a male experimenter 
                                                 
33 Due to a recording error, information about participants’ age is only available for n = 86. 
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entered the laboratory after a couple of minutes and told the female to leave, he would 
proceed with the session. The male experimenter verbally instructed participants to write the 
solutions to the anagram task on an answer sheet in addition to entering them via the 
computer keyboard. A particular performance criterion was set and whoever fulfilled it 
qualified for an additional incentive of  €5,- that was allegedly made possible by the 
availability of additional subsidies. Together with the anagram answer sheet participants had 
received a form that would function as a voucher for the additional money. A big box sat on 
the experimenter’s desk into which the vouchers were evidently to be dropped. A large and 
bright blue sign on the box read “EUR 5,- recipients (subsidies)”. All participants ostensibly 
reached the performance criterion. The positive feedback again mentioned the €5,-, the gain 
of the money was thus highly salient. Additionally, the request appeared on the computer 
screen to fill in the voucher form if participants did reach the criterion and to call the 
experimenter afterwards. The computer screen still displayed that participants ostensibly had 
attained the required performance level, yet, the experimenter produced an invalid reason to 
deny receipt of the money. He accused participants of not having numbered the anagram 
solutions on the sheet of paper which he had never instructed them to do. The experimenter 
took the answer sheet as well as the voucher and, instead of setting the voucher in the box, 
tore both sheets, turned his back, and dropped them in the trashcan. When participants 
protested that they had not been properly instructed or that they could still add the numbers 
the experimenter said coldly “Please go on with the next task!”. Denial of the money 
participants believed they had earned is a frustration (Dollard et al., 1939). The illegitimacy 
of the experimenter’s action should have made the incident particularly anger-arousing  
(Frijda et al., 1989; Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990). An aspect assumed to add to the 
perceived illegitimacy is that the unfair male experimenter should not have been there in the 
first place, consequently potentially giving rise to counterfactual thinking (see e.g., Roese, 
1997). A strong anger response to the loss of the additional €5,- was further assumed because 
participants had earned them under highly aversive conditions: They had been put under 
comparatively high pressure by short intervals for single anagrams while they were exposed 
to industrial noise and whenever they failed to enter the correct solution they were 
reprimanded. 
The female experimenter was only present in the provocation conditions. As in Study 
3, participants in the no provocation conditions were exposed to classical music and they 
were put under less time pressure. Participants also had to write the anagram solutions on an 
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answer sheet in addition to entering them into the computer. Yet, no performance criterion 
was set and participants received a positive performance feedback. Participants in the no 
provocation conditions also learned about the chance to receive additional money prior to the 
anagram task. However, they were told that all participants would take part in a draw. 
Four cognitive appraisal items measured how participants evaluated the auditory 
stimulation (e.g., “The auditory stimulation interfered with my concentration.”, see Appendix 
for the full scale; Cronbach’s α = .92). Participants rated the items on 7-point scales ranging 
from 1 (not at all) to 7 (absolutely). Changes to the experimental manipulation as compared 
with Study 3 yielded this scale no longer a true manipulation check, but it was retained to 
strengthen the cover story. Besides, the industrial noise was assumed to be an aversive 
stimulus by itself, thus potentially inducing negative affect. After the cognitive appraisal 
items participants answered the pictorial core affect measures (see Appendix; cf. chapter 5.5). 
The core affect measures were significantly correlated, r(98) = .30, p < .01. 
After the manipulation check of the provocation manipulation, the computer appeared 
to have a technical problem. The screen started to flicker, only rapidly moving white lines 
were visible.34 The experimenter waited until the participant informed him, then stated that he 
would have to have a look at the computer and try to fix it. He told participants to wait next 
door, he would call them back in once they could proceed. In the delay conditions, 
participants spent 4 minutes alone in an adjacent room. No additional task (e.g., internally 
focused tasks) explicitly induced rumination. Yet, not much time had passed since the 
interaction with the experimenter in the provocation conditions and directly prior to the delay 
participants had answered the provocation manipulation check items asking for the 
perception of the first task and the affective reaction to it. Therefore, it seemed reasonable to 
assume that provoked participants’ thoughts would focus on the provocation manipulation. In 
the no delay conditions, the experimenter started the second part of the computer program as 
soon as participants were out of sight and immediately after that called them in again.  
Next, participants learned about the subtaxator-suprataxator personality trait. They 
self-categorized, took the test, and their self-categorization was confirmed. The trigger 
manipulation was slightly changed to reduce the probability that participants would fail to 
read the triggering remarks. Participants’ case number was 6, thus, only five previous entries 
                                                 
34 Even students of computer science were deluded into believing a technical problem had occurred. 
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existed. The second to last and the last entry were identical with those in Study 3. After the 
trigger manipulation, participants assigned both groups to the background noises following a 
forced-choice format. The loudness scale was reduced to a 10-point scale and the dB levels 
associated with the scale points now covered a smaller range. Smaller amounts of error 
variance were expected to result. Participants set the loudness for future participants between 
55 dB and 100 dB. The dB level for the outgroup was always set first. Order of ingroup and 
outgroup related items has been shown to impact participants judgments, outgroup evaluation 
on positive attributes was worst when assessed prior to the ingroup evaluation (Otten, 2001).  
Next, participants reported their current affective state on 7-point categorical emotion 
scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). Anger was measured by the items “angry” 
and “outraged” (Cronbach’s α = .78), dejection by “dejected” and “sorrowful” (Cronbach’s α 
= .87), and positive emotions were assessed with the items “happy” and “contented” 
(Cronbach’s α = .77). The three trigger-elicited emotion indices were highly significantly 
correlated, r(98) = .44, p < .001 for both negative emotions and r(98) = -.51, p < .001 and 
r(98) = -.68, p < .001 for the positive emotions index with anger and dejection, respectively. 
The attribute ratings were – like the dB levels – assessed firstly for the outgroup and 
secondly for the ingroup (cf. Otten, 2001). The outgroup warmth index was again formed by 
averaging scores for “tolerant”, “likable”, and “pleasant”, but unlike in Study 3, the reliability 
of this index was weak, Cronbach’s α = .47. Competence was assessed with the single item 
“determined”. Difference indices were computed by subtracting outgroup scores from the 
corresponding ingroup scores, then the three warmth difference scores were averaged to 
obtain a composite index (Cronbach’s α = .59). Ratings were made on 7-point bipolar scales. 
The mid-point of the scale was zero, representing equal applicability of the desired and 
undesired attribute. Both poles were labeled 3, no signs indicated the valence of the 
respective attributes. Assignment of desirable and undesirable attributes to the left- versus 
right-hand side of the scale was balanced. 
The forced-choice format assessing whether participants correctly identified their own 
group membership was displayed before participants answered the identification scale to 
preclude the possibility, that participants were unaware of their own group membership while 
working on the dependent measures and only deduced to which category they belonged from 
the identification scale. As in the previous study, participants answered the identification 
scale (Cronbach’s α = .83), the experimenter evaluation scale (Cronbach’s α = .90), and the 
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discounting scale at the end of the experimental session. Reliability of the discounting scale 
was rather unsatisfactorily, Cronbach’s α = .33. For reasons of parsimony results are reported 
for the first item only. Because participants in the provocation condition interacted with two 
experimenters, participants indicated the sex of the experimenter before they worked on the 
experimenter evaluation scale. Ratings for the identification, experimenter evaluation, and the 
discounting scale were made on 7-point scales. For the first two scales, participants indicated 
on scales ranging from 1 (do not agree at all) to 7 (fully agree) how much they agreed with 
the respective statement. For the discounting scale participants indicated how well the 
statement applied to them from 1 (does not apply at all) to 7 (fully applies). 
Furthermore, habitual rumination was assessed so that individual differences could be 
controlled for. Two items measuring preoccupation with negative experiences were adapted 
from the anger rumination scale (Sukhodolsky, Golub, & Cromwell, 2001), direct references 
to anger and provocation were replaced with less explicit phrases (“After an argument is 
over, I keep thinking about it for a long time.”, “I often ponder for a long time about 
unpleasant experiences I had because of other people.”;  Cronbach’s α = .77). Besides 
habitual rumination, rumination about the initial provocation was indirectly tapped by a 
single item (“During this sub-/suprataxator study, other things were coming to my mind.”). 
On a 7-point scale from 1 (does not apply at all) to 7 (fully applies), participants indicated 
how much each statement applied to them personally. 
Participants’ general affect was again assessed repeatedly during the experimental 
session. Each time, an orange flash indicated the disruption. Participants rated their current 
affective state on a 9-point scale with poles labeled positive and negative. At the end of the 
experimental session, participants were thanked and thoroughly debriefed. Following the 
procedure depicted in the no provocation conditions, participants drew lots for receipt of up 
to €5,- in addition to the €5,- everyone received as reimbursement. 
7.2.2 Results and Discussion 
Checking for multivariate outliers, variables included in the analysis were both dB 
levels, four scores for attribute ratings (two for each group), trigger-elicited anger, evaluation 
of the experimenter, and identification. Two multivariate outliers were identified using 
Mahalanobis distance with a criterion α = .001, critical χ²(9, N = 100) = 27.877. Ratings of 
both ingroup and outgroup on the warmth dimension as well as identification distinguished 
one outlier from the other cases. The other multivariate outlier was distinguished by trigger-
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elicited anger, rating of the outgroup’s determination, and three ingroup related measures (dB 
level, warmth rating, and determination rating) from the other cases. Both were excluded 
from further analyses. Additionally, 6 participants whose mother-tongue was not German and 
one participant who failed to identify her group membership correctly were excluded from 
analyses. Self-categorization was evenly distributed, 52 participants categorized themselves 
as suprataxators, 55 as subtaxators. 
Manipulation checks 
Manipulation check provocation. Participants in the provocation conditions evaluated 
the auditory stimulation more negatively than participants in the no provocation conditions, 
t(82.25) = 9.91, p < .001, d = 2.03 (cf. Table 11 for means and standard deviations). Results 
for the core affect measures are largely consistent with the affective reactions expected. The 
pictorial valence measure revealed that participants in the provocation conditions experienced 
more negative valence than participants in the no provocation conditions, t(92.18) = 3.18, p < 
.01, d = 0.64. Furthermore, provoked participants reported significantly higher levels of 
arousal than unprovoked participants, t(96) = 2.22, p = .03, d = 0.45.  
Table 11. Means and standard deviations for cognitive appraisal of background noise, 
provocation-elicited core affect, and general affect measurements before and after the 
provocation manipulation separately for both provocation conditions (Study 4). 
 provocation no provocation 
cognitive appraisal 5.42 (1.08) 2.75 (1.53) 
core affect – arousal (pictorial) 3.96 (1.51) 3.30 (1.44) 
core affect – valence (pictorial) 3.39 (1.52) 2.53 (1.14) 
general affect1 2.84 (0.95) 3.45 (1.43) 
general affect2 4.14 (1.39) 3.87 (1.51) 
general affect3 4.27 (1.76) 3.34 (1.32) 
Note. Standard deviations are specified in brackets. General affect1 was assessed during 
the introduction of the anagram task, general affect2 was assessed halfway through the 
anagram task, and general affect3 was assessed shortly after the interaction with the 
experimenter. 
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An additional manipulation check for provocation is a 2 × 2 mixed-model ANOVA 
with provocation as between-subjects factor and two general affect measures, one during the 
introduction of the anagram task, one shortly after the interaction with the experimenter, as 
within-subjects factor. Across conditions, participants reported higher levels of negative 
affect after the provocation than at the beginning of the experimental session, F(1, 96) = 
20.51, p < .001, ηp
2 = .176 (cf. Table 11 for means and standard deviations). The main effect 
of provocation was not significant, F < 1. The within-subjects factor main effect was 
qualified by a significant two-way interaction, F(1, 96) = 27.63, p < .001, ηp
2 = .223. Simple 
comparisons actually revealed, that participants in the provocation conditions started out with 
statistically significantly better general affect than participants in the no provocation 
conditions, F(1, 96) = 6.18, p = .015, ηp
2 = .061. After they had been exposed to the 
provocation manipulation, however, participants in the provocation conditions reported 
significantly worse general affect than participants in the no provocation conditions, F(1, 96) 
= 8.73, p < .01, ηp
2 = .083. 
A second 2 × 2 mixed-model ANOVA was computed to explore which aspect of the 
provocation manipulation particularly impacted on participants’ affective state. Provocation 
was entered as the between-subjects factor and two general affect scores as the within-
subjects factor. One general affect score was assessed halfway through the anagram task, the 
other shortly after the interaction with the experimenter (the second affect score is thus 
identical with the previous analysis). Both main effects were statistically significant, F(1, 96) 
= 4.96, p = .03, ηp
2 = .049 and F(1, 96) = 4.23, p = .04, ηp
2 = .042, for the within-subjects 
factor and provocation, respectively (cf. Table 11 for means and standard deviations). 
Halfway through the anagram task general affect was more negative than after the interaction 
with the experimenter and provoked participants reported more negative general affect than 
non-provoked participants. The main effects were however qualified by a significant two-way 
interaction, F(1, 96) = 14.26, p < .001, ηp
2 = .129. Interestingly, the simple effect of 
provocation was non-significant at the measurement point in the middle of the anagram task, 
F < 1, but after the interaction with the experimenter, provoked participants reported 
significantly more negative affect than non-provoked participants, F(1, 96) = 8.73, p < .01, 
ηp
2 = .083 (cf. Table 11 for means and standard deviations). The pattern of means however 
suggests that these simple effects are primarily due to the fact, that general affect improved in 
the no provocation conditions rather than deteriorated in the provocation conditions. It hence 
indicates that the illegitimate act of the experimenter, like in Study 3, largely failed to elicit 
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an anger response in provoked participants. The successful manipulation checks reflect the 
aversive and stressful conditions established in the provocation as compared with the no 
provocation conditions. 
Manipulation check rumination. A 2 × 2 ANOVA with provocation and delay as 
between-subjects factors revealed no statistically significant effect of the experimental 
manipulations on how strongly participants’ mind was occupied during the subtaxator/ 
suprataxator part of the experimental session, F(1, 94) = 1.33, p = .25, ηp
2 = .014 for 
provocation main effect, both other Fs < 1 (cf. Table 12 for means and standard deviations). 
Provocation and delay did not interact as expected to produce higher levels of rumination. 
Table 12. Means and standard deviations for current rumination and general affect 
measurements before and after the delay manipulation separately for provocation and delay 
conditions (Study 4). 
 provocation no provocation 
 delay no delay delay no delay 
current rumination 3.48 (1.58) 3.50 (1.98) 3.08 (1.64) 3.09 (1.68) 
general affect3 4.52 (1.94) 4.04 (1.56) 3.75 (1.39) 2.91 (1.12) 
general affect4 4.32 (1.68) 3.65 (1.35) 3.29 (1.37) 2.91 (1.16) 
Note. Standard deviations are specified in brackets. General affect3 was assessed shortly 
after the interaction with the experimenter, general affect4 was assessed at the beginning of 
the second part of the experimental session. 
A 2 × 2 × 2 mixed-model ANOVA assessed whether the delay manipulation increased 
negative affect among provoked participants. Thus, the general affect measurement shortly 
after the interaction with the experimenter and the measurement at the beginning of the 
second part of the experimental session were entered as a within-subjects factor. Provocation 
and delay were entered as between-subjects factors. All main effects were statistically 
significant. Negative general affect was more pronounced before than after the delay, F(1, 
94) = 6.24, p = .014, ηp
2 = .062 (cf. Table 12 for means and standard deviations). Provoked 
participants reported more negative affect than non-provoked participants, F(1, 94) = 10.73, p 
< .01, ηp
2 = .102, and participants reported more negative affect in the delay condition than in 
the no delay condition, F(1, 94) = 4.46, p = .04, ηp
2 = .045. No two-way interaction was 
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significant, Fs < 1. Furthermore, the three-way interaction was non-significant, F(1, 94) = 
2.37, p = .13, ηp
2 = .025. Contrary to predictions, the delay did not lead to an increase of 
negative affect among provoked participants. Results indicate instead dissipation of negative 
affect over time, but still more negative affect in the provocation than in the no provocation 
conditions at the beginning of the second part of the experimental session. Besides, 
participants generally disliked having to wait next door, the effect of delay was not 
conditional on provocation condition.  
Manipulation check trigger. The manipulation check for trigger is a 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 
mixed-model analysis of variance with provocation, delay, and trigger as between-subjects 
factors and the two general affect measures before the categorization task and after the trigger 
manipulation as within-subjects factor. All main effects were (marginally) significant. 
Participants reported higher levels of negative affect before exposition to the trigger than 
after the trigger manipulation, F(1, 90) = 5.78, p = .018, ηp
2 = .060 (cf. Table 13 for means 
and standard deviations). Provoked participants reported still more negative affect than non-
provoked participants, F(1, 90) = 6.33, p = .014, ηp
2 = .066, participants in the delay 
conditions reported marginally significantly higher levels of negative affect than participants 
in the no delay conditions, F(1, 90) = 3.27, p = .07, ηp
2 = .035, and triggered participants 
reported lower levels of negative affect than non-triggered participants, F(1, 90) = 4.96, p = 
.03, ηp
2 = .052. Among the two-way interactions, only the within-subjects factor × delay 
interaction was statistically significant, F(1, 90) = 4.64, p = .03, ηp
2 = .049, all other Fs < 
1.20. Neither the three-way interactions nor the four-way interaction were statistically 
significant, Fs < 1.12. Simple effect analyses of the within-subjects factor × delay interaction 
revealed higher levels of negative affect in the delay than in the no delay condition before the 
categorization task, F(1, 90) = 5.29, p = .02, ηp
2 = .056, after the trigger manipulation the 
difference between delay conditions was however no longer significant, F(1, 90) = 1.39, p = 
.24, ηp
2 = .015. The observed interaction thus seemed to be again due to simple dissipation of 
negative affect, negative affect that had been elicited by having been sent to wait in an 
adjacent room for a couple of minutes, but independent from either the comparatively strong 
initial provocation or the minor triggering provocation. Since the trigger-main effect was not 
qualified by an interaction of trigger with the within-subjects factor, the difference between 
trigger conditions already existed before the experimental manipulation was applied. This 
implies an α-error of random assignment to conditions. 
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Table 13. Means and standard deviations for general affect measurements before and after the 
trigger manipulation separately for all eight conditions (Study 4). 
 provocation no provocation 
 trigger no trigger trigger no trigger 



































Note. Standard deviations are specified in brackets. General affect5 was assessed shortly 
before participants did the minimal group categorization task and general affect6 was 
assessed after the trigger manipulation. 
In order to investigate the possibility of an α-error of randomization, independent t 
tests were conducted for all five measurement points of general affect preceding the trigger 
manipulation. Whereas the difference between trigger conditions was not statistically 
significant during the introduction of the anagram task, t < 1, all later measurement points 
revealed higher levels of negative affect in the no trigger conditions than in the trigger 
conditions, t(96) = -2.21, p = .03, t(96) = -1.85, p = .07, t(96) = -2.52, p = .013, and t(87.67) = 
-2.20, p = .03, for the second to fifth measurement, respectively. Both experimenters had 
been blind to trigger condition. These results thus corroborate the assumption of an α-error of 
random assignment to conditions. 
Preliminary analyses 
The effects of provocation, delay, and trigger on all outgroup-related dependent 
measures were tested using a 2 × 2 × 2 between-subjects ANOVA. There was no statistically 
significant main effect of delay nor any statistically significant interaction with delay, Fs(1, 
90) < 2.17, ps > .14, ηp
2s < .024. For subsequent analyses data were collapsed across 
conditions of delay. Current rumination was retained as a covariate, though. 
The dreadful noise was significantly more often assigned to the outgroup than to the 
ingroup, χ²(1, N = 98) = 11.80, p < .001. While this indisputably reflected social 
differentiation, the underlying motive might as well have been establishing best possible 
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conditions for the ingroup as it might have been doing harm to the outgroup. No expression 
of a social differentiating tendency was observed with regard to the loudness of the noise 
exposure set for both groups. A 2 × 2 × 2 mixed-model ANOVA with dB level for ingroup 
and outgroup as within-subjects factor and provocation and trigger as between-subjects 
factors revealed neither significant main effects nor any significant interaction, all Fs(1, 94)  
< 1.69, ps > .19, ηp
2s < .018 (cf. Table 14 for means and standard deviations). 
Table 14. Means and standard deviations for the dependent measures separately for 
provocation and trigger conditions (Study 4). 
 provocation no provocation 
 trigger no trigger trigger no trigger 
Db level outgroup  68.60 (9.30) 69.62 (11.57) 72.61 (13.30) 68.33 (12.57) 
∆ Db level -2.80 (10.81) -1.15 (15.19) -1.74 (17.03) 0.63 (17.34) 
outgroup warmth 4.20 (0.71) 4.26 (0.68) 4.22 (0.78) 3.97 (0.64) 
∆ warmth 0.61 (1.36) 0.41 (1.15) 0.45 (0.94) 0.33 (0.98) 
outgroup determination 4.00 (1.19) 4.85 (1.16) 4.22 (1.04) 4.08 (1.06) 
∆ determination 0.64 (1.73) -0.42 (1.27) 0.43 (1.56) 0.29 (1.83) 
trigger-elicited emotions     
 anger 2.72 (1.63) 2.90 (1.64) 1.52 (0.67) 1.60 (0.82) 
 dejection 2.82 (1.28) 2.69 (1.63) 2.11 (1.57) 2.29 (1.28) 
 positive emotions 4.10 (1.29) 4.04 (1.30) 4.87 (1.41) 4.54 (1.41) 
experimenter evaluation 4.14 (1.52) 3.78 (1.19) 6.09 (0.78) 5.75 (1.31) 
identification 4.12 (1.58) 3.96 (1.54) 4.52 (1.45) 3.67 (1.66) 
discounting 3.68 (1.52) 3.69 (1.74) 2.43 (1.38) 3.96 (2.01) 
Note. Standard deviations are specified in brackets. 
Planned contrast analyses 
Planned contrast analyses were conducted to test the contrast hypothesis that 
provocation and trigger manipulation would interact to produce different results in the 
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provocation-trigger condition as compared with the other conditions. As previously the focal 
contrast was specified as 3 -1 -1 -1. Current and habitual rumination as well as identification 
were included as covariates and self-categorization as a fourth covariate for analyses of the 
attribute ratings. For the analysis of identification and discounting only the rumination 
measures were included as covariates. Identification with the minimal group emerged only 
once a marginally significant covariate, F(1, 90) = 3.32, p = .07, ηp
2 = .036 for the warmth 
difference score, in all other analyses identification was no significant covariate, Fs < 2.76, ps 
> .10, ηp
2s < .030. 
The predicted contrast was not significant for the dB level measures, for both focal 
contrasts Fs < 1 (cf. Table 14 for means and standard deviations). At the same time, the tests 
for significant residual variance were non-significant, Fs(1, 91) < 1.41, ps > .23, ηp
2s < .016. 
Likewise, neither rumination covariate was significant, Fs < 1.  
The focal contrast was not significant for any attribute measure, Fs(1, 90) < 1.87, ps > 
.17, ηp
2s < .021 (cf. Table 14 for means and standard deviations). Significant residual 
variance remained for both determination measures, F(1, 90) = 7.66, p = .007, ηp
2 = .078 and 
F(1, 90) = 5.97, p = .017, ηp
2 = .062 for outgroup rating and difference score, respectively. 
For the warmth ratings no statistically significant residual variance was observed, Fs(1, 90) < 
2.59, ps > .11, ηp
2s < .028. Current rumination was a marginally significant covariate for the 
outgroup warmth rating, F(1, 90) = 3.11, p = .08, ηp
2 = .033, apart from that neither 
rumination covariate was significant for any attribute rating measure, Fs(1, 90) < 2.34, ps > 
.12, ηp
2s < .026. A statistically significant covariate for all attribute rating measures was self-
categorization, Fs(1, 90) > 4.04, ps < .05, ηp
2s > .042. 
A 2 × 2 between-subjects ANOVA with provocation and trigger was conducted to 
explore the significant between-group differences on the determination measures that were 
not explained by the 3 -1 -1 -1 contrast. All four covariates were included in the ANOVA (cf. 
the previous planned contrast analysis for test statistics for the covariates). For the outgroup 
rating the provocation main effect was not significant, F(1, 90) = 2.09, p = .15, ηp
2 = .023, 
but the trigger main effect and the interaction effect were both marginally significant, F(1, 
90) = 3.45, p = .07, ηp
2 = .037 and F(1, 90) = 3.65, p = .06, ηp
2 = .039, respectively. Reliably 
lower outgroup determination ratings in the trigger as compared with the no trigger condition 
emerged only for participants who had been previously provoked, F(1, 90) = 7.56, p = .007, 
ηp
2 = .078, for non-provoked participants no such effect was observed, F < 1. For the 
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determination difference score the provocation main effect was again non-significant, F(1, 
90) = 1.39, p = .24, ηp
2 = .015. Only the trigger main effect was statistically significant, F(1, 
90) = 4.09, p = .046, ηp
2 = .043, for the interaction effect F(1, 90) = 1.95, p = .17, ηp
2 = .021. 
Participants who had been exposed to the trigger manipulation rated the outgroup as less 
determined than the ingroup, more so than participants in the no trigger conditions. All in all, 
the predicted 3 -1 -1 -1 contrast did not account for the observed pattern of means for 
outgroup-related measures. 
Next, the categorical trigger-elicited emotions were subjected to planned contrast 
analyses with both rumination measures and identification as covariates. The focal contrast 
was statistically significant only for trigger-elicited anger, F(1, 91) = 6.61, p = .012, ηp
2 = 
.068, however significant amounts of residual variance remained, F(1, 91) = 17.21, p <  .001, 
ηp
2 = .159 (cf. Table 14 for means and standard deviations). For dejection neither the focal 
contrast nor the test for residual variance were significant, F(1, 91) = 2.49, p = .12, ηp
2 = .027 
and F(1, 91) = 1.56, p = .21, ηp
2 = .017, respectively. For the positive emotions measure the 
focal contrast was not significant, but significant systematic between-group differences 
remained, F(1, 91) = 2.31, p = .13, ηp
2 = .025 and F(1, 91) = 4.27, p = .04, ηp
2 = .045. 
Current rumination was a significant covariate in all three analyses, Fs(1, 91) > 5.67, ps < 
.02, ηp
2s > .059. Habitual rumination was a marginally significant covariate for trigger-
elicited anger, F(1, 91) = 3.88, p = .052, ηp
2 = .041, and significant for dejection and positive 
emotions, Fs(1, 91) > 7.40, ps < .008, ηp
2s > .075. 
Omnibus F tests were conducted to explore the significant between-group differences 
for anger and positive emotions that were not explained by the focal contrast. 2 × 2 between-
subjects ANOVAs with provocation and trigger and the three covariates current and habitual 
rumination as well as identification were conducted. A significant provocation main effect 
emerged for anger, F(1, 91) = 23.05, p < .001, ηp
2 = .202. Provoked participants reported 
more trigger-elicited anger than non-provoked participants. No other effect was statistically 
significant, Fs < 1. Similarly, for positive emotions a main effect of provocation was 
observed, F(1, 91) = 5.85, p = .02, ηp
2 = .060, while no other effect was significant, Fs < 1. 
Provoked participants also reported weaker experience of positive emotions than non-
provoked participants. Still, the effect of provocation was notably stronger for trigger-elicited 
anger than for trigger-elicited positive emotions. 
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Evaluation of the experimenter was only analyzed for those participants who indicated 
that they judged the male experimenter. The focal contrast was highly significant, F(1, 81) = 
12.63, p < .001, ηp
2 = .135, but at the same time significant residual variance was observed, 
F(1, 81) = 38.91, p < .001, ηp
2 = .325 (cf. Table 14 for means and standard deviations). 
Current rumination was a highly significant covariate for the evaluation of the experimenter, 
F(1, 81) = 9.99, p = .002, ηp
2 = .110, habitual rumination was no significant covariate, F(1, 
81) = 1.11, p = .29, ηp
2 = .014. A subsequent 2 × 2 between-subjects ANOVA with both 
rumination covariates revealed a significant provocation main effect, F(1, 81) = 48.49, p < 
.001, ηp
2 = .374. Provoked participants evaluated the experimenter less positively than non-
provoked participants. Both trigger main effect and interaction effect were not statistically 
significant, F(1, 81) = 1.36, p = .25, ηp
2 = .017 and F < 1. The significant focal contrast was 
thus obtained because of the large effect size of the provocation main effect. 
For identification and discounting the focal contrasts were not significant, Fs < 1. 
Unexplained between-group differences were marginally significant for identification and 
significant for discounting, F(1, 92) = 3.61, p = .06, ηp
2 = .038 and F(1, 92) = 10.99, p = 
.0013, ηp
2 = .107, respectively (cf. Table 14 for means and standard deviations). The 
rumination covariates were non-significant, all Fs(1, 92) < 1.37, ps > .24, ηp
2s < .015. 
Subsequently, 2 × 2 ANOVAs were conducted to explore the between-group differences for 
identification and the discounting measure. The provocation main effect and the interaction 
were not significant for identification, Fs(1, 92) < 1.13, ps > .29, ηp
2s < .013. A non-
significant tendency was observed for the trigger main effect, F(1, 92) = 2.69, p = .105, ηp
2 = 
.028. Participants in the trigger conditions tended to identify stronger than participants in the 
no trigger conditions. For discounting the provocation main effect was not significant, F(1, 
92) = 1.45, p = .23, ηp
2 = .016. The main effect of trigger was statistically significant, F(1, 
92) = 5.39, p = .02, ηp
2 = .055, participants in the trigger conditions discounted less than 
participants in the no trigger conditions. The trigger main effect was however qualified by a 
significant interaction effect, F(1, 92) = 4.87, p = .03, ηp
2 = .050. Provoked participants did 
not differentially discount depending on trigger level, F < 1, only among unprovoked 
participants did those in the trigger conditions discount less than those in the no trigger 
condition, F(1, 92) = 9.87, p = .002, ηp
2 = .097. Across conditions, identification with the 
minimal group was not statistically different from the mid-point of the scale, t < 1. 
 
7 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM MINIMAL GROUP RESEARCH  
 109 
Planned contrast analyses with post-hoc affective factors 
As in the previous studies, analyses with post-hoc affective factors were conducted 
next. Following the same procedure circumstantiated for Studies 2 and 3, four level variables 
representing anger35, dejection, and the positive emotions36 for both measurement points, 
respectively, were computed by crossing the corresponding dichotomized measures. To 
explore whether participants who received high versus low scores on the composite indices 
for core affect were indeed significantly different from one another on both core affect 
dimensions, t tests were computed for both dimensions, separately. Participants who received 
a high core affect anger score reported reliably higher arousal than participants who received 
a low core affect anger score, M = 4.84, SD = 0.99 and M = 2.61, SD = 1.18, respectively, 
t(88) = 9.70, p < .001, d = 2.04. The difference between participants who received a high 
versus low core affect anger score on the valence dimension was likewise statistically 
significant, M = 3.89, SD = 1.48 and M = 2.11, SD = 0.80, t(65.22) = 7.05, p < .001, d = 1.51. 
For the core affect dejection score, too, differences between participants who received a high 
versus low score were statistically significant on both dimensions, M = 4.92, SD = 1.40 and 
M = 3.72, SD = 1.38, t(96) = 4.29, p < .001, d = 0.86 for the arousal dimension and M = 3.65, 
SD = 1.34 and M = 2.22, SD = 1.07, t(95.08) = 5.88, p < .001, d = 1.17 for the valence 
dimension. With regard to the core affect measure representing positive emotions, the 
difference between participants who received a high versus low score was marginally 
significant on the arousal dimension, t(96) = -1.84, p = .07, d = -0.37. Participants who 
received a high core affect positive emotions score reported lower levels of arousal than 
participants who received a low score, M = 3.35, SD = 1.45 and M = 3.90, SD = 1.52, 
respectively. On the valence dimension, participants who received a high score reported 
significantly less negative valence that participants who received a low score, M = 1.83, SD = 
0.38 and M = 4.00, SD = 1.19, t(62.72) = -12.48, p < .001, d = -2.40. Since no hypotheses 
pertained to the level of arousal when positive emotions were concerned, the observed 
marginal difference is rather unproblematic. 
                                                 
35 For core affect anger, 8 participants who received exactly the median score are not represented by the 
dichotomized variable. 
36 The nested median-split of trigger-elicited positive emotions necessitated exclusion of 9 participants who 
received exactly the median score in order to avoid an unequal distribution. 
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Identification was no longer included as a covariate in the planned contrast analyses 
with the post-hoc affective factors, the group-based emotions were expected to contain the 
impact of identification. First, the analyses for the anger factor are reported, next the analyses 
for the dejection factor, and finally for positive emotions. 
In the planned contrast analyses with the post-hoc anger factor, no systematic variance 
was observed for the outgroup dB level, for focal contrast as well as residual variance and 
both covariates Fs < 1. For the difference score, however, the focal contrast was significant, 
F(1, 84) = 5.44, p = .02, ηp
2 = .061, no other effect was significant, Fs < 1. The  
3 -1 -1 -1 focal contrast parsimoniously described the observed between-group differences, 
participants who received high scores for both anger measures chose lower dB levels for the 
ingroup as compared with the outgroup than all other participants. As the previous analysis 
indicates, this contrast is due to the reduced dB level participants with high anger scores after 
provocation and trigger selected for their ingroup, not to increased dB levels set for the 
outgroup. 
Focal contrasts for the attribute ratings were all non-significant, Fs(1, 83) < 1.11, ps > 
.29, ηp
2s < .14. Marginally significant residual variance only remained for outgroup warmth, 
F(1, 83) = 3.27, p = .07, ηp
2 = .038, all other tests were non-significant, Fs(1, 83) < 1.36, ps > 
.24, ηp
2s < .017. With regard to the rumination covariates, only current rumination slightly 
missed conventional levels of significance for outgroup warmth, F(1, 83) = 3.95, p = .0502, 
ηp
2 = .045, all other Fs(1, 83) < 1.40, ps > .24, ηp
2s < .017. Self-categorization was a 
marginally significant covariate for the outgroup determination rating, F(1, 83) = 3.20, p = 
.08, ηp
2 = .037, and a significant covariate for the other three measures, Fs(1, 83) > 7.20, ps < 
.01, ηp
2s > .079. Exploration of the marginally significant residual variance for outgroup 
warmth with a 2 × 2 between-subjects ANOVA revealed a marginally significant main effect 
of trigger-elicited anger, F(1, 83) = 2.87, p = .09, ηp
2 = .033, the main effect of core affect 
anger and the interaction were both non-significant, Fs < 1. Participants who reported high 
trigger-elicited anger rated the outgroup as less warm than participants who reported low 
trigger-elicited anger. 
The focal contrast was highly significant for the experimenter evaluation, F(1, 75) = 
16.37, p < .001, ηp
2 = .179, but it did not account for all systematic between-group 
differences. Significant amounts of residual variance remained, F(1, 75) = 6.35, p = .014, ηp
2 
= .078. Current rumination was a significant covariate of the experimenter evaluation, F(1, 
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75) = 10.01, p = .002, ηp
2 = .118, but habitual rumination was not significant, F < 1. A 2 × 2 
between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to investigate the between-group differences. A 
significant main effect of core affect anger was revealed, F(1, 75) = 16.02, p < .001, ηp
2 = 
.160, and also a significant main effect of trigger-elicited anger, F(1, 75) = 15.59, p < .001, 
ηp
2 = .157. The interaction effect was not significant, F < 1. Participants who reported high 
core affect anger evaluated the experimenter less favorably than participants who reported 
low core affect anger. Similarly, participants who reported high trigger-elicited anger 
evaluated the experimenter less favorably than participants who reported low trigger-elicited 
anger. As in Study 3, trigger-elicited anger had been nested into core affect anger so that it 
did not simply represent a further measurement point of core affect anger.  
For identification, neither the focal contrast nor the test for residual variance were 
statistically significant, Fs(1, 84) < 2.01, ps > .16, ηp
2s < .024. The focal contrast, however, 
only slightly missed conventional levels of statistical significance for discounting, F(1, 84) = 
3.85, p = .053, ηp
2 = .044. Participants with high anger scores for both measurement points 
discounted more than all other participants. This focal contrast parsimoniously accounted for 
the observed between-group differences, no significant residual variance remained, F(1, 84) = 
1.46, p = .23, ηp
2 = .017. The rumination covariates were not statistically significant for 
identification or discounting, Fs(1, 84) < 2.28, ps > .13, ηp
2s < .027. 
Anger participants experienced predominantly resulted in negative evaluations of the 
experimenter. Although a statistically significant 3 -1 -1 -1 contrast was obtained for the dB 
difference measure, the effect was driven by the dB level set for the ingroup. On the other 
hand, as in Study 3, experienced anger led participants to distance themselves from the 
minimal ingroup. 
In the planned contrast analyses with the post-hoc dejection factor, a significant focal 
contrast for outgroup dB level was observed, F(1, 92) = 4.42, p = .04, ηp
2 = .046. However, 
significant amounts of residual variance remained, F(1, 92) = 4.16, p = .04, ηp
2 = .043. For 
the difference score the focal contrast only showed a non-significant tendency, F(1, 92) = 
2.63, p = .11, ηp
2 = .028, the test for residual variance was marginally significant, F(1, 92) = 
3.74, p = .06, ηp
2 = .039. The rumination measures were no significant covariates, Fs(1, 92) < 
1.16, ps > .28, ηp
2s < .013. 2 × 2 between-subjects ANOVAs were conducted to explore the 
between-group differences for both dB level measures. The main effect of core affect 
dejection was significant for the outgroup dB level, F(1, 92) = 6.82, p = .011, ηp
2 = .069. The 
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main effect of trigger-elicited dejection and the interaction effect were not significant, F(1, 
92) = 2.15, p = .15, ηp
2 = .032 and F < 1, respectively. Notably, participants with high core 
affect dejection scores assigned lower noise levels to the outgroup than participants with low 
core affect dejection scores. Similarly, a significant main effect of core affect dejection was 
obtained for the difference score, F(1, 92) = 6.41, p = .013, ηp
2 = .065, while both other 
effects were non-significant, Fs < 1. Participants with high core affect dejection scores set 
descriptively higher dB levels for the ingroup than for the outgroup whereas the opposite was 
true for participants with low core affect dejection scores. Anger and dejection thus markedly 
differently related to outgroup treatment. 
For the attribute ratings, neither focal contrasts nor tests for residual variance were 
significant, Fs(1, 91) < 1.63, ps > .20, ηp
2s < .018. Current as well as habitual rumination 
were no significant covariates for all attribute rating measures, Fs(1, 91) < 2.52, ps > .11, 
ηp
2s < .027. As the only exception, current rumination was a significant covariate for 
outgroup warmth, F(1, 91) = 4.17, p = .04, ηp
2 = .044. Self-categorization was a marginally 
significant covariate for outgroup determination, F(1, 91) = 2.84, p = .095, ηp
2 = .030, and a 
significant covariate for the other three attribute measures, Fs(1, 91) > 8.52, ps < .005, ηp
2s > 
.085. 
For the experimenter evaluation, the focal contrast was not significant, F(1, 82) = 
1.19, p = .28, ηp
2 = .014, instead significant residual variance was observed, F(1, 82) = 10.90, 
p < .01, ηp
2 = .117. Current rumination was a significant covariate, F(1, 82) = 9.94, p = .002, 
ηp
2 = .108, habitual rumination was no significant covariate, F < 1. Exploring the residual 
variance with a 2 × 2 between-subjects ANOVA, the core affect dejection main effect 
emerged non-significant, F(1, 82) = 1.12, p = .29, ηp
2 = .013. However, a significant main 
effect of trigger-elicited dejection was observed, F(1, 82) = 7.58, p = .007, ηp
2 = .085. 
Participants with high as compared with low trigger-elicited dejection scores rated the 
experimenter less favorably. The interaction emerged marginally significant, F(1, 82) = 3.52, 
p = .06, ηp
2 = .041. No difference depending on the intensity of trigger-elicited dejection was 
observed for participants who experienced high core affect dejection, F < 1. Among 
participants who experienced low core affect dejection instead, the experimenter evaluation 
was significantly less favorable when trigger-elicited dejection was high than when it was 
also low, F(1, 82) = 10.54, p = .002, ηp
2 = .114. 
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For identification and discounting neither focal contrasts nor tests for residual 
variance were statistically significant, Fs(1, 92) < 2.27, ps > .13, ηp
2s < .025. Habitual 
rumination was a marginally significant covariate for discounting, F(1, 92) = 3.09, p = .08, 
ηp
2 = .033, no other rumination covariate was significant, Fs(1, 92) < 1.19, ps > .27, ηp
2s < 
.013. 
Dejection participants experienced after the provocation manipulation accounted for 
observed between-group differences on the dB level measures. Interestingly, high core affect 
dejection was associated with good instead of bad treatment of the outgroup. Conversely, 
core affect dejection was not directly related to the evaluation of the experimenter. Instead, 
core affect dejection moderated the association between trigger-elicited dejection and the 
experimenter evaluation.  
Finally, the planned contrast analyses were conducted with the post-hoc factor 
positive emotions. The focal contrasts for both dB level measures were non-significant, Fs(1, 
83) < 1.35, ps > .24, ηp
2s < .016. Marginally significant amounts of residual variance 
remained for outgroup level, F(1, 83) = 3.40, p = .07, ηp
2 = .039, but not for the difference 
score, F < 1. Neither rumination measure was a significant covariate, Fs(1, 83) < 2.20, ps > 
.14, ηp
2s < .026. In a subsequent 2 × 2 between-subjects ANOVA exploring the residual 
variance for the outgroup dB level, the main effect of trigger-elicited positive emotions 
emerged marginally significant, F(1, 83) = 3.72, p = .06, ηp
2 = .043, for both other effects Fs 
< 1. Participants who reported high as compared with low trigger-elicited positive emotions 
set higher dB levels for the outgroup. 
For the attribute ratings no focal contrast was significant, Fs < 1, neither was any 
residual variance observed, Fs(1, 82) < 1.13, ps > .29, ηp
2s < .014. Current as well as habitual 
rumination were no significant covariates. The only rumination covariate for that an F > 1 
was observed was a non-significant tendency for current rumination and the dependent 
variable outgroup warmth, F(1, 82) = 2.68, p = .105, ηp
2 = .032. Self-categorization was a 
significant covariate for all attribute rating measures, Fs(1, 82) > 5.09, ps < .03, ηp
2s > .058. 
A significant focal contrast was revealed for evaluation of the experimenter, F(1, 75) 
= 5.78, p = .02, ηp
2 = .072, but significant residual variance remained, F(1, 75) = 5.01, p = 
.03, ηp
2 = .063. As in all previous analyses of the experimenter evaluation, current rumination 
was a significant covariate, F(1, 75) = 7.26, p = .009, ηp
2 = .088, and habitual rumination was 
a non-significant covariate, F < 1. As in the analysis with the post-hoc anger factor, in the 
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subsequently conducted 2 × 2 between-subjects ANOVA both main effects were statistically 
significant, F(1, 75) = 4.92, p = .03, ηp
2 = .062 for the provocation main effect and F(1, 75) = 
5.67, p = .02, ηp
2 = .070 for the trigger main effect. The interaction was not significant, F < 1. 
For both measures strong positive emotions were associated with a more favorable evaluation 
of the experimenter as compared with low intensity positive emotions. 
For identification, the focal contrast was significant, F(1, 83) = 4.86, p = .03, ηp
2 = 
.055; it was marginally significant for discounting, F(1, 83) = 3.51, p = .06, ηp
2 = .041. 
Participants with low scores for positive emotions at both measurement points were 
significantly lower identified and discounted their minimal group more than all other 
participants. No significant residual variance remained, Fs(1, 83) < 1.30, ps > .25, ηp
2s <  
.016, indicating that the focal contrasts described the between-group differences well. Neither 
current nor habitual rumination were significant covariates for identification or discounting, 
Fs(1, 83) < 1.98, ps > .16, ηp
2s < .024. 
The intensity of positive emotions participants experienced produced largely reverse 
results than dejection. High scores for trigger-elicited positive emotions were associated with 
higher dB levels set for the outgroup. At the same time, high scores for trigger-elicited 
positive emotions as well as high core affect positive emotions scores were associated with 
better evaluation of the experimenter. Mirroring results for anger, absence of positive 
emotions led participants to reduce personal relevance of the new group and identification 
with that group. 
Exploratory analyses 
Simple linear regression analyses investigated whether and how the attribute ratings 
were related to outgroup derogation. As in the previous study, the ratings of the outgroup as 
determined and warm were both no significant predictors of the dB level participants set for 
the outgroup, β = .06 and β = -.05, ts < 1, R²s < .004, Fs < 1. 
Finally, the influence of the rumination covariates was explored. Current rumination 
was dichotomized and introduced as a quasi-experimental factor in 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVAs with 
provocation and trigger as further between-subjects factors. Analyses were run for the 
dependent variables trigger-elicited emotions and experimenter evaluation. A significant 
main effect of provocation was revealed for trigger-elicited anger, F(1, 90) = 25.23, p < .001, 
ηp
2 = .219. Provoked participants reported higher levels of trigger-elicited anger than non-
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provoked participants. Additionally, the main effect of current rumination showed a non-
significant tendency, F(1, 90) = 2.72, p = .103, ηp
2 = .029. High ruminators tended to 
experience higher levels of trigger-elicited anger than low ruminators. However, both two-
way interactions of current rumination with provocation and trigger qualified the main effect, 
F(1, 90) = 4.16, p = .04, ηp
2 = .044 and F(1, 90) = 3.00, p = .09, ηp
2 = .032, for the interaction 
with provocation and trigger, respectively. Simple comparisons revealed that provoked 
participants experienced significantly more trigger-elicited anger than non-provoked 
participants when current rumination was high, F(1, 90) = 21.21, p < .001, ηp
2 = .191. When 
rumination was low, provoked participants also experienced reliably more trigger-elicited 
anger than non-provoked participants, but the effect was considerably smaller, F(1, 90) = 
5.40, p = .02, ηp
2 = .057. Rumination was thus demonstrated to increase the impact of the 
initial provocation on participants’ anger experience. The simple effects of trigger were not 
statistically significant, Fs(1, 90) < 2.40, ps > .12, ηp
2s < .026. The main effect of trigger as 
well as the provocation × trigger interaction and the three-way interaction were non-
significant, Fs < 1. 
For trigger-elicited dejection, the main effect of provocation was marginally 
significant, F(1, 90) = 3.71, p = .06, ηp
2 = .040. Provoked participants experienced more 
dejection than unprovoked participants. The main effect of current rumination was 
statistically significant, F(1, 90) = 5.95, p = .02, ηp
2 = .062. Dejection scores were higher for 
high as compared with low rumination. No other effect was statistically significant, Fs(1, 90) 
< 2.05, ps > .15, ηp
2s < .023. 
For positive trigger-elicited emotions, again only the two main effects of provocation 
and current rumination were (marginally) significant, all other Fs > 1. Provoked participants 
experienced less positive emotions than unprovoked participants, F(1, 90) = 5.30, p = .02, ηp
2 
= .056, and less positive emotions where reported when rumination was high than when it 
was low, F(1, 90) = 3.88, p = .052, ηp
2 = .041. 
For the experimenter evaluation, all three main effects were (marginally) significant. 
Provoked participants evaluated the experimenter less favorably than unprovoked 
participants, F(1, 90) = 62.75, p < .001, ηp
2 = .411. Participants who were exposed to the 
trigger as compared with no trigger evaluated the experimenter more favorably, F(1, 90) = 
2.80, p = .098, ηp
2 = .030. Although contrary to prediction, this effect is consistent with the 
observed α-error of random assignment to the trigger conditions. Thirdly, the experimenter 
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was evaluated less favorably when rumination was high as compared with when rumination 
was low, F(1, 90) = 3.65, p = .06, ηp
2 = .039. A significant two-way interaction of 
provocation and current rumination qualified the respective main effects, F(1, 90) = 4.70, p = 
.03, ηp
2 = .050. Simple comparisons revealed that the effect of provocation was considerably 
stronger for high rumination as compared with low rumination, F(1, 90) = 43.29, p < .001, 
ηp
2 = .325 and F(1, 90) = 20.08, p < .001, ηp
2 = .182, respectively. No other effect was 
statistically significant, Fs < 1. 
The analyses of trigger-elicited emotions were next repeated with the habitual 
rumination variable. Habitual rumination was subjected to a median-split and entered as a 
quasi-experimental factor in a 2 × 2 × 2 between-subjects ANOVA with the additional factors 
provocation and trigger. In the analysis of trigger-elicited anger, however, only the 
provocation main effect emerged statistically significant, F(1, 90) = 22.11, p < .001, ηp
2 = 
.197, all other Fs(1, 90) < 1.04, ps > .31, ηp
2s < .012. Provoked participants reported higher 
levels of trigger-elicited anger than non-provoked participants. For trigger-elicited dejection 
instead, a significant main effect of habitual rumination was revealed next to the significant 
main effect of provocation, F(1, 90) = 10.05, p = .002, ηp
2 = .100 and F(1, 90) = 4.54, p = 
.04, ηp
2 = .048, respectively. All other Fs < 1. More dejection was reported when habitual 
rumination was high as compared with when habitual rumination was low and provoked 
participants reported more dejection than non-provoked participants. For the positive trigger-
elicited emotions, again the provocation main effect and the habitual rumination main effect 
were statistically significant, F(1, 90) = 7.70, p = .007, ηp
2 = .079 and F(1, 90) = 15.02, p < 
.001, ηp
2 = .143, respectively. Provoked participants experienced less positive emotions than 
non-provoked participants. For high habitual rumination, less positive emotions were 
experienced than for low habitual rumination. Additionally, the three-way interaction was 
marginally significant, F(1, 90) = 3.16, p = .08, ηp
2 = .034. All other effects were non-
significant, Fs(1, 90) < 1.08, ps > .30, ηp
2s < .012. Exploration of the three-way interaction 
revealed significantly less positive emotions for high as compared with low scores for 
habitual rumination in the provocation-trigger condition, F(1, 90) = 5.30, p = .02, ηp
2 = .056. 
At the same time, positive emotions were significantly lower for high as compared with low 
scores for habitual rumination in the no provocation-no trigger condition, F(1, 90) = 11.72, p 
< .001, ηp
2 = .115. Both other simple effects of habitual rumination were non-significant, 
Fs(1, 90) < 2.00, ps > .16, ηp
2s < .022.  
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7.2.3 Summary 
In the provocation-delay-trigger condition, trigger-elicited anger and outgroup 
derogation were expected to be stronger than in all other conditions. The delay factor did  
however not produce the predicted interactive effect with provocation. Apparently, 
participants did not spent the delay ruminating about the initial provocation. Across 
conditions, participants may have been annoyed since they had no clue how long it would 
take to fix the computer, that is, how much additional time they would have to spend. 
Nonetheless, other than in Study 3, the initial provocation induced higher levels of 
arousal and more negative valence in the provocation than in the no provocation conditions. 
This can be conceived as a successful manipulation of anger. The most potent anger-arousing 
aspect of the initial provocation seems to have been the aversive and stressful conditions. The 
illegitimate act of the experimenter again seemed to have largely failed to elicit an anger 
response. Yet, an alternative interpretation of the absence of a further increase of negative 
affect after the interaction with the experimenter in the provocation conditions is, that 
participants’ relief about the end of the anagram task counterbalanced the anger reaction to 
the experimenter’s action. 
A severe impediment for the investigation of the interactive effect of provocation and 
trigger on trigger-elicited emotions and subsequent behavior is the apparent α-error of 
random assignment to trigger conditions. Post-hoc analyses with quasi-experimental factors 
are not subject to the same error. Indeed, the predicted 3 -1 -1 -1 contrast was revealed for the 
difference between dB level set for ingroup and outgroup in an analysis with a post-hoc anger 
factor. Contrary to expectations, closer inspection of the obtained effect disclosed that it was 
produced by the dB level participants set for the ingroup, the dB level for the outgroup did 
not differ across conditions. An observed differentiation between ingroup and outgroup was 
in the current study an expression of ingroup favoritism rather than outgroup derogation. 
The dejection or the positive emotions factor did not analogously account for 
differential treatment of ingroup and outgroup. Unexpectedly though, higher levels of 
outgroup derogation were observed for low as compared with high core affect dejection and 
for high as compared with low trigger-elicited positive emotions. At the same time, low as 
compared with high core affect dejection and high as compared with low trigger-elicited 
positive emotions were associated with a more favorable evaluation of the experimenter. 
Furthermore, core affect valence was associated with the experimenter evaluation, high levels 
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of positive valence were associated with a more favorable evaluation of the experimenter. 
Whereas it is not extremely surprising that high versus low levels of dejection and positive 
emotions show opposite effects, the direction of the effects on outgroup treatment is rather 
unexpected. It is not consistent with theorizing that outgroups increasingly suffer at the hands 
of people who experience highly positive emotions or low levels of dejection. Interestingly, 
reverse effects of dejection and positive emotions, respectively, on outgroup treatment and on 
experimenter evaluation occurred. Possibly, both potential targets lend themselves 
differentially well to the execution of emotion appropriate behavior (cf. Maitner et al., in 
press). For the anger factor, data on the experimenter evaluation were consistent with the 
view that anger can lead to aggression, the experimenter was evaluated less favorably when 
levels of core effect anger and of trigger-elicited anger, respectively, were high as compared 
with low. On top of this, paralleling results of Study 3, high levels of anger and low levels of 
positive emotions for both respective measures led to more discounting than the other 
patterns of experienced affect. 
Although the delay factor appeared as no efficient manipulation of rumination, 
measurement of current rumination demonstrated that recurrent thoughts about the initial 
provocation increased its affective and behavioral impact. It has to be noted, however, that 
the item wording did not explicitly refer to the initial provocation. Thus, it remains 
speculative what the thoughts that were coming to participants’ minds were concerned with. 
The effect of provocation on trigger-elicited anger and also on evaluation of the experimenter 
was substantially increased through rumination. For dejection and the positive emotions, no 
such interactive effect occurred, but mere rumination, current as well as habitual, increased 
dejection and decreased positive emotions. 
One potentially critical aspect of both laboratory studies is the fact that the 
experimenter, the source of the original provocation, remained present throughout the 
experimental session. (S)He was still available as a target for aggression, participants may 
have intended to confront the experimenter after the experiment was over. A change of 
experimenters might be more efficient when performed at a different point in time. The first 
experimenter could actually be the nasty one, insufficiently instruct participants, and tear 
their voucher forms. The first experimenter could leave once the alleged technical problem 
occurs to call another person and not return. That way, the intended illegitimacy would be 
somewhat extenuated, but the unfair experimenter would be unmistakably unavailable for an 
aggressive response. 
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It might further have been useful to have let participants listen to the noises 
“construction site” and “meadow in the summer” before asking participants to assign the 
groups to the noise conditions and to set the dB levels. One needs to be aware, though, that 
suspicion might have been raised had too much emphasis been placed on the assignment of 
noises.
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8 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Negative behavior in intergroup relations is not well understood to date. The present 
thesis proposed one mechanism potentially underlying outgroup derogation. Specifically, 
group-based anger (i.e., anger felt on behalf of one’s group; Smith, 1999) was proposed to 
constitute an affective route to outgroup derogation. 
8.1 Overview of the Presented Studies 
Four experimental studies, two questionnaire studies and two laboratory studies, 
aimed at showing triggered displacement (Miller, Pedersen, Earleywine, & Pollock, 2003; 
Miller & Marcus-Newhall, 1997) of outgroup derogation and investigated the role of group-
based anger in the generation of outgroup derogation. Whereas the questionnaire studies 
related to naturally occurring groups, the laboratory studies introduced minimal groups 
(Tajfel et al., 1971). Furthermore, Studies 2 through 4 utilized core affect (Russell, 2003) 
measures to assess the affective reaction to the first experimental manipulation. 
An initial comparatively strong and a subsequent minor provocation, the triggering 
provocation, were manipulated orthogonally. In the questionnaire studies, both manipulations 
were group-based, in the laboratory studies, the initial provocation was person-based. An 
interactive effect of both provocations was expected to produce more outgroup derogation in 
the provocation-trigger condition than in the other three conditions. Indeed, in Study 1, 
participants in the provocation-trigger condition more strongly agreed with statements 
demanding outgroup derogating measures than participants in the other three experimental 
conditions. In Study 2, the 3 -1 -1 -1 contrast with experimental factors was only observed for 
the perception of threat posed by the outgroup. Trigger-elicited group-based anger 
significantly predicted outgroup derogation and perceived threat in both questionnaire 
studies. With the exception of outgroup derogation in Study 2, provocation-elicited anger was 
revealed to moderate the effect of trigger-elicited group-based anger on outgroup derogation 
and perceived threat, respectively. 
The laboratory studies introduced minimal groups. Social differentiation was 
observable in both studies, but participants in the provocation-trigger condition did not treat 
the outgroup more negatively than participants in the other conditions. In Study 3, post-hoc 
affective factors revealed that high levels of negative emotions and also low levels of positive 
emotions after both experimental manipulations produced more discounting of one’s minimal 
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group than other patterns of experienced affect. Thus, the aversive situation was evaded. The 
effect was most pronounced for anger. However, the post-hoc provocation-elicited anger 
factor cannot unequivocally be interpreted as representing anger, participants who received 
high versus low core affect anger scores did not score reliably different on the core affect 
dimension arousal. In Study 4, the post-hoc anger factor produced the highest noise intensity 
set for the outgroup relative to the ingroup when anger was high after both experimental 
manipulations. However, this maximal difference between ingroup and outgroup level when 
participants’ anger was high at both measurement points resulted from the noise intensity set 
for the ingroup. The dB level participants set for the outgroup was not conditional on 
participants’ anger experiences. Additionally, like in Study 3, a 3 -1 -1 -1 contrast effect of 
anger and positive emotions emerged for discounting of group membership. 
8.2 Integration and Implications of the Presented Studies 
The questionnaire studies demonstrated that appraisal of naturally occurring 
intergroup relations and derogation of meaningful societal groups can change as a 
consequence of comparatively minor influences. A trivially provoking report about 
immigration in conjunction with a previous unrelated provocation ensued increased 
perception of threat posed by foreigners. Increased perception of threat posed by the elderly 
and foreigners, respectively, was predicted by trigger-elicited anger when provocation-
elicited anger was high. In other words, conditional on an unrelated previous affective state 
did the anger reaction that was elicited by the outgroup predict appraisal of that outgroup as 
threatening. Apparently, the affective route to outgroup derogation does not produce an 
emotional act independent from cognition. The affective route to outgroup derogation also 
altered appraisals of the intergroup relation. Emotion and cognition thus seem inextricably 
linked. On the basis of deteriorated appraisal outgroup derogation can be reasonable 
behavior, it can be perceived as legitimate. 
A previous comparatively strong provocation is not the only factor capable of 
preparing the grounds for distorted appraisals and disproportionately aggressive responses to 
targets providing a minor provocation. A personality variable, for example, that has been 
shown to serve a similar function as the initial strong provocation is narcissism. Persons high 
in narcissism reacted aggressively towards targets that provided a bad evaluation whereas 
persons low in narcissism were less likely to aggress against that target (Bushman & 
Baumeister, 1998). Interestingly, persons low in narcissism were also less likely than persons 
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high in narcissism to perceive the bad evaluation as threatening, suggesting that the 
evaluation-threat-aggression network is chronically activated in narcissists. Stereotypes and 
prejudice may similarly imply chronically increased accessibility of knowledge structures 
that predispose towards augmentation of aggressive responses to particular targets who 
provide minor provocations. Highly prejudiced persons may be particularly susceptible to 
minor triggers delivered through the respective outgroup. In intergroup relations that are 
characterized by conflict, the mere presence or thought of the outgroup might suffice as a 
triggering incident. To the extent that quite insignificant incidents are appraised as provoking, 
the associative network is strengthened and aggressive responses are increasingly easily 
elicited. Such a perpetuating process is probably not easily disrupted, particularly as 
appraisals of the intergroup relation seem subject to the same influences. Whereas the 
triggered displaced aggression research paradigm might seem to rely on highly specific 
conditions, the addressed mechanism is much more widely applicable. 
In Study 1, the initial provocation may not have elicited genuine affect. Possibly, 
semantic knowledge rather than experiential knowledge was activated by the provocation 
manipulation (cf. Robinson & Clore, 2002). In Study 2, experienced affect as a consequence 
of the initial provocation did not differ across conditions. It may have been the case that both 
levels of the provocation manipulation activated identical or closely related cognitive 
networks, resulting in similar affective reactions. The illegitimate treatment by the 
experimenter that was intended as the core component of the initial provocation in the 
laboratory studies did not seem to contribute substantially to the elicitation of anger. 
Potentially as a consequence of the experimenter’s social role, participants seemed to have 
rationalized the experimenter’s behavior. More negatively valenced affect and, in Study 4, 
higher arousal in the provocation than in the no provocation conditions were elicited by the 
strenuous anagram task and the noise exposure. The reverse effect for core affect arousal in 
Study 3 can be interpreted to indicate that participants in the provocation conditions were 
rather dejected than angry. 
A contrast effect had been observed for the trigger-elicited emotions in Study 1. 
Higher levels of trigger-elicited anger and dejection were observed in the non-provoking 
conditions than in the provoking conditions, independent of the level of trigger. Little 
systematic variance for the trigger-elicited emotions was observed in Study 2. In the 
laboratory studies, provocation-elicited affect prevailed. Assimilation effects on 
methodological grounds were precluded by the use of dissimilar affect measures. The 
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positively skewed distributions for trigger-elicited negative emotions testify to the weak 
affective impact of the triggering manipulation. Overall, it appears difficult to elicit genuine 
affect and even more difficult to produce the interactive effect on emotions that was expected 
in the provocation-trigger condition. 
Nevertheless, affective reactions to the second experimental manipulation were not 
independent from the affective reaction to the first experimental manipulation. In our daily 
lives, the affective impact of distinct episodes might be even less easily isolated. I would 
argue, that emotions evoked by different incidents are more likely to blend in real live than in 
experimental situations, because being a research participant increases monitoring of one’s 
behavior and reactions to the experimental material. Heightened self-awareness is likely to 
increase corrections for suspected influences from affect resulting from unrelated episodes. In 
daily life, people are less likely to reflect whether any persisting affect stemming from an 
unrelated episode might affect current behavior. 
In the laboratory studies, less so in Study 3 than in Study 4, affect stemming from a 
person-based provocation was transferred to an intergroup context. Evaluation of and 
behavior towards the outgroup was in part an effect of a previous person-based provocation. 
These results again hint at the wide applicability of the researched mechanism. Derogation of 
outgroups may be enhanced by previously elicited anger irrespective of its source. 
Nonetheless, parameters like similarity of target outgroup and original provocateur are likely 
to moderate the effect (Marcus-Newhall et al., 2000). 
Tentative evidence on the impact of rumination on trigger-elicited affect and on 
behavior was obtained in Study 4. Whereas the manipulation of rumination was not 
successful, measured current and habitual rumination increased experienced dejection and 
decreased the experience of positive emotions. Most importantly, interaction effects of 
current rumination and provocation emerged for trigger-elicited anger and the experimenter 
evaluation. The effect of provocation was much stronger for high as compared with low 
rumination. The results thus further corroborate the notion that rumination contributes to 
triggered displacement of aggression (Miller et al., 2003; Bushman et al., 2005). Although the 
behavioral response was not displaced on the outgroup but directed at the source of the 
original provocation, the current findings demonstrate how rumination can impact 
experienced affect. Provoked participants who strongly ruminated did not simply maintain 
the aggressive internal state but they actually wound themselves up. 
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Anger, dejection, and fear are categorical terms that facilitate communication about 
affect, but experiential affect might not be a matter of distinct categories. On the contrary, it 
is questionable whether there actually is such a thing as discrete emotion (Barrett, 2006). 
People might cluster similar emotional episodes that then receive a common label; those 
labels are socially validated. On top of this, antecedent events are commonly not 
unidimensional. Usually, different appraisal dimensions can be applied that result in mixtures 
of emotions as when parents whose children leave for college are proud but at the same time 
sad. 
The concept arousal focus can explain the observed tendency of like-valenced 
emotions to co-occur (Barrett, 1998). The emphasis people place on arousal as a property of 
their experience to differentiate between like-valenced emotions varies tremendously and 
some persons basically ignore the arousal dimension (Barrett, 1998, 2004; Feldman, 1995). 
Berkowitz (1990) likewise stressed the point that anger is frequently accompanied by other 
negative emotions. Still, with regard to their effects on appraisal of intergroup relations or 
outgroup derogation anger and dejection were clearly not interchangeable in the present 
studies. Arousal might be perceived as the energizing, the action-fuelling component of  
affect (cf. Zillmann, 1983). 
The usage of dissimilar measures for the two assessments of affective reactions to the 
experimental manipulations apparently precludes contrast or assimilation effects on 
methodological grounds. The pre-tests revealed the verbal as well as the pictorial core affect 
scale as suitable measures to assess arousal and affective valence independently. In the 
experimental studies, however, the core affect dimensions were significantly correlated for 
both modes of assessment.  
The core affect dimensions further appear differentially accessible. Measurement of 
arousal proved far more difficult than measurement of valence as indicated by the 
comparably weak reliability of the verbal arousal measure. Reflecting one’s current state of 
arousal is a rather unusual task, people are more used to think about their affective state in 
terms of good or bad or in terms of categorical emotions. Results from Barrett, Quigley, 
Bliss-Moreau, and Aronson (2004) indicate that a person’s arousal focus is associated with its 
interoceptive sensitivity. It is however questionable whether the ability to reflect and report 
one’s current affective state systematically relates to the impact affect has on behavior. 
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The attributes in Study 2 related to stereotype-content, hence there was a semantic 
correspondence between attribute rating and perceived threat as well as outgroup derogation. 
Indeed, the attribute rating predicted perceived threat and outgroup derogation for 
participants who had experienced high core affect anger. In the laboratory studies, the 
selection of attributes was semantically unrelated to other measures. As the groups were 
minimal, no stereotypes existed about them. In analogy to Ajzen and Fishbein (1977) who 
postulated equal specificity of attitudinal and behavioral component as a critical condition for 
their correspondence, the strength of the association of devaluating the outgroup on particular 
attributes with outgroup derogating behavior might be conditional on how well they match. It 
would thus not be particularly surprising that attribute ratings of the minimal outgroup and 
their treatment were not significantly associated. On the other hand, the laboratory studies 
indicate that devaluation of the outgroup does not occur indiscriminately on any attribute. 
The only effect on attribute ratings found in both studies was a main effect of trigger-elicited 
anger on the outgroup warmth rating. Participants who had experienced high trigger-elicited 
anger rated the outgroup less warm than participants who had experienced low trigger-
elicited anger. Devaluation of the outgroup as low on the warmth dimension fits participants’ 
affective state. Moreover, the finding in Study 2 that attribute ratings only predicted outgroup 
derogation when core affect anger was high further suggests the possibility that increased 
reliance on the simple heuristic cue stereotype may have produced the effect (cf. 
Bodenhausen et al., 1994). 
An interesting perspective on the present studies is offered by the conception of 
aggression as goal-oriented behavior (Denzler, 2006). Such a conception is consistent with 
the idea that particular behaviors are emotion-appropriate and their execution diminishes the 
experience of the respective emotion (Maitner et al., in press). This alludes again to a 
question of fit. Outside the laboratory, outgroups may be more prone to become a target of 
displaced derogation to the extent that derogation of the particular outgroup fulfills a goal or 
a need of the aggressor. Highly prejudiced persons can thus be assumed to attain more goal-
fulfillment through negative treatment of an outgroup than less prejudiced persons. 
Moreover, goal-attainment is experienced as rewarding, hence further consolidating prejudice 
and outgroup derogating tendencies. Explicitly negative treatment of other persons is not 
necessarily in conflict with a pleasurable experience. In contrast, increased dorsal striatal 
activity has been observed in participants punishing a defector in an economic exchange; the 
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striatum is a subcortical brain region implicated in reward processing (de Quervain et al., 
2004).  
Inside the laboratory, the question arises whether the behavioral options offered by the 
experimental design were suitable to fulfill participants’ goals. The dependent variable, 
particularly in the current minimal group studies, might have been too abstract or temporarily 
too distal to be recognized as potentially goal-fulfilling. In most interpersonal triggered 
displaced aggression studies, the target of the aggressive behavior is believed to sit in an 
adjacent room and to receive the tormenting treatment online or within a couple of minutes. 
One exception is the recommendation for the applicant for paid assistantship (Bushman et al., 
2005, study 1; Pedersen et al., 2000, study 1; Pedersen et al., in progress, study 3); aggression 
against her is not effective immediately. Still, having seen her on a video-tape makes the 
whole situation more palpable as compared with setting a dB level for a noise one has not 
heard oneself and without knowing when the outgroup members will be exposed to it. A 
further complication concerns the continued presence of the experimenter. Participants may 
have remained focused on the experimenter as the target of their aggression. The assumption, 
however, that triggered displaced aggression results from a priming effect, so that minor 
irritating incidences are more likely to be perceived or to be interpreted as provoking, does 
not change depending on whether the source of the original provocation remains present or 
not. 
The specificity of anger’s predictive power for outgroup derogation indicates that 
group-based emotions indeed serve a regulatory function for intergroup behavior. Anger was 
most strongly associated with explicitly negative treatment of the outgroup. Unexpectedly 
though, in Study 4, the post-hoc anger factor produced a 3 -1 -1 -1 contrast effect for the 
difference score of the dB level participants set for both minimal groups. This effect was 
driven by the dB level participants set for their ingroup, it thus represented ingroup 
favoritism. Preferential treatment of one’s ingroup is no prototypical response to the 
experience of anger, but it is consistent with the view that aggression is not the only possible 
reaction to anger (e.g., Averill, 1983). The affective route to outgroup derogation need not be 
taken whenever group-based anger arises. People may engage in emotion regulation. One 
possibility to deal with an aversive group-based situation is to reduce identification with 
one’s own social category and to discount the group’s personal relevance. Discounting and 
reduction of identification was the preferred strategy pursued in Study 3 and was again 
employed in Study 4. In real life, psychologically distancing from the groups one belongs to 
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when high negative or low positive emotions are associated with the respective group 
memberships is presumably not as easily performed as from the minimal groups. The 
preferred strategy to deal with group-based anger is presumably conditional on a number of 
factors such as the centrality of the respective group membership or perceived ingroup 
strength (cf. Mackie et al., 2000).  
Maximal differentiation in Study 4 could unequivocally be ascribed to preferential 
treatment of the ingroup, it was no instance of outgroup derogation. This result empirically 
illustrates the necessity to be cautious when interpreting maximal differentiating behavior, 
maximizing the difference between ingroup and outgroup does not necessarily equal negative 
treatment of the outgroup. 
8.3 Future Research Objectives 
Elicitation of negative affect and a dependent measure that is defined as explicitly 
harmful treatment is constrained by ethical concerns. Furthermore, outgroup derogation is a 
difficult subject of research because in principle explicitly negative treatment of other people 
is non-normative. While this latter point would suggest research with participants who do not 
know they take part in an experiment, this is of course not possible on ethical grounds. The 
ideal experiment would elicit genuine anger experiences and uncensored behavior. 
One major caveat of the current studies pertains to the fact that only in Study 1 the 
experimental factors produced the expected effect for outgroup derogation. Most results base 
upon quasi-experimental factors. Therefore, it would be highly desirable to replicate triggered 
displaced outgroup derogation with the experimental factors provocation and trigger. 
Many questions relating to explicitly negative treatment of outgroups remain 
unresolved. Research should systematically establish that ingroup favoritism and outgroup 
derogation result from different underlying processes. To begin with, additional empirical 
evidence for the affective route to outgroup derogation should be obtained. Further minimal 
group studies should explore, whether indeed discounting and reduction of identification 
constitute the preferred strategy when to social category one was assigned to is associated 
with negative affect or absence of positive affect. Critically, the operationalization in 
subsequent studies should ensure that participants did perceive the triggering manipulation. 
Otherwise, some uncertainty remains with regard to the interpretation of absence or presence 
of effects of the trigger manipulation. For the provocation conditions, it might be advisable to 
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refrain from utilizing highly aversive conditions since their termination might actually elicit 
positive affect. In principle, the advantage of written or programmed manipulations is that 
they can be applied in a completely standardized fashion. The advantage of personally 
applied manipulations, on the other hand, is their palpability. Interpersonal triggered 
displaced aggression researchers ingeniously combined both advantages by using videotapes 
and voice recordings, respectively (cf. Pedersen et al., 2000). If indeed no derogation of 
minimal outgroups could be established, it might be worthwhile to realize Tajfel and 
collaborators’ original intention and successively enrich the intergroup situation. Thus, the 
necessary conditions for outgroup derogation would be detected. 
The assessment of core affect might gain from a bogus pipeline. Making participants 
believe that their true affect is objectively measured might increase their attention to 
interoceptive sensations and thus promote the assessment of core affect arousal. On the other 
hand, a bogus pipeline bears the risk of promoting a highly analytic attitude. Participants may 
watch themselves carefully and as a consequence avert arousal- as well as rumination-based 
triggered displacement.  
At the same time, actually measuring objective physiological data and holding them 
against the subjective self-report data might provide valuable insight. The debate about the 
underlying processes would profit, since the study frequently cited to substantiate that arousal 
dissipates after 5 to 10 minutes actually assessed self-reported anger (Fridhandler & Averill, 
1982). So far, the relation between physiological arousal and the experienced arousal is not 
well understood. However, the same reservations brought forward with regard to the bogus 
pipeline pertain to assessment of physiology. 
Once the affective route to outgroup derogation is firmly established, the scope of 
displaced outgroup derogation and potential moderators such as group status should be 
explored. Is it indeed the case that stereotypic beliefs and prejudiced attitudes predispose 
towards derogation of outgroups that provide minor irritating provocations? Would even a 
clenched fist function similarly as an initial provocation and bias subsequent perception and 
ultimately intergroup behavior?37 The present thesis demonstrated that consideration of affect 
does contribute to the explanation of negative intergroup behavior. Therefore, further 
research endeavors should address the proposed mechanism. 
                                                 
37 Thanks to Thomas Schubert for this intriguing suggestion. 
8 GENERAL DISCUSSION   
 129 
8.4 Final Conclusions 
Malcolm X envisioned the Black people in the United States of America, a 
discriminated group, taking action to ameliorate their ingroup’s condition. Van Zomeren and 
collaborators (2004) suggest that group-based anger might indeed function as a driving force 
of collective action (see Mummendey et al., 1999, for results on the related emotion 
resentment). Yet, anger is inherently an emotion that directs the focus on harming someone 
else. It is conceivable that anger may sometimes be in the service of a superordinate goal 
(Denzler, 2006). Explicitly negative treatment of an outgroup may serve to restore justice as 
when a disadvantaged group takes collective action. The present thesis contributed empirical 
evidence that an affective route to outgroup derogation exists. Paralleling research on 
attitudes (Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993; Stangor, Sullivan, & Ford, 1991), affect has been 
shown to predict negative intergroup behavior. The strongest and most consistent relation 
between outgroup derogation and emotions was demonstrated for anger. Although affect is in 
principle thought of as a temporary, a short-lived phenomenon, it can account for enduring 
intergroup conflicts. Anger can be maintained by means of rumination and can be 
consolidated by minor subsequent irritations. In addition, data suggest that single anger 
episodes may last longer than a day (Fridhandler & Averill, 1982). 
Negative behavior in intergroup relations is a fact of human social life. The severe 
consequences of negative intergroup behavior call for intensified research activities despite 
the difficulties associated with this particular topic.
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SUMMARY 
Outgroup derogation is explicitly negative treatment based on the target’s 
membership in a particular social category. The present thesis addressed a mechanism 
potentially underlying outgroup derogation. Outgroup derogation is intergroup behavior, thus 
it does not bear on the target’s individual characteristics or its individual behavior. At the 
same time, outgroup derogation can be performed by an aggressor who was not personally 
affected by the instigation of the aggressive behavior. Outgroup derogation covers a wide 
range of behaviors, extending from derisive remarks to genocide. 
Group memberships may guide behavior towards other people as well as how one 
thinks and feels about them (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). Group memberships however 
only impact a person’s feelings, cognitions, and behaviors, when the person identifies with 
the respective group. Identification with a group entails attachment to the group and 
emotional involvement in the group’s concerns (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). Intergroup 
emotion theory (Smith, 1993, 1999) integrated the social identity approach (cf. Turner, 1999; 
social identity theory and self-categorization theory) with appraisal theories of emotion 
(Frijda, 1986; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1988; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Sufficiently 
identified group members are proposed to experience group-based emotions in situations with 
affective significance for the respective ingroup. Group-based emotions follow from an 
appraisal of events and situations in relation to the ingroup’s needs and goals. Group-based 
emotions are proposed to serve a regulatory function for intergroup behavior, specific 
emotions are assumed and have been empirically shown to be associated with specific action 
tendencies (Mackie et al., 2000). The present thesis investigated the role of group-based 
anger for outgroup derogation.  
Triggered displaced aggression theory provided the research paradigm for all four 
reported studies (Miller et al., 2003; Pedersen et al., 2000). Triggered displaced aggression 
denotes a phenomenon in that an initial comparatively strong provocation and a subsequent 
triggering provocation of minor intensity interact to produce a disproportionately aggressive 
response towards the target who delivered the triggering provocation. Triggered displaced 
outgroup derogation was expected to occur when a minor group-based provocation was 
experienced subsequent to an unrelated comparatively strong provocation. Whether the initial 
provocation was person-based or group-based was conceptually no substantial distinction. 
Trigger-elicited anger was expected to increase outgroup derogation, but only when 
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participants had previously experienced anger elicited by the initial provocation, not without 
a prior strong anger experience. To the extent that triggered displacement results from 
activation of particular cognitive representations (cf. Miller et al. 2003; Bushman et al., 
2005), particular cognitive appraisals of the intergroup relation should also be subject to an 
interactive effect of provocation and trigger.  
Four studies aimed at demonstrating triggered displaced outgroup derogation. The 
first two studies related to naturally occurring groups; they were conducted as paper-and-
pencil questionnaire studies. Study 1 revealed triggered displaced derogation of the elderly, 
participants were members of the young generation. Outgroup derogation was significantly 
stronger in the provocation-trigger condition than in the other experimental conditions. 
Furthermore, the anger reaction to the initial provocation was demonstrated to moderate the 
effect of the affective reaction to the triggering provocation on outgroup derogation. When 
the anger reaction to the initial provocation was strong, trigger-elicited anger led to an 
increase in outgroup derogation, when the initial anger reaction was weak, trigger-elicited 
anger and outgroup derogation were unrelated. The same moderation effect could be shown 
for the criterion perceived threat. 
In Study 2, trigger-elicited anger significantly predicted derogation of foreigners but 
the effect was not moderated by the affective reaction to the initial provocation. The 
interactive effect of provocation and trigger was found for perceived threat. More severe 
threat posed by foreigners was perceived in the provocation-trigger condition than in the 
other three conditions. For perceived threat the moderated effect of trigger-elicited anger was 
also found. Trigger-elicited anger significantly increased perceived threat when participants 
had experienced high anger after the provocation, no statistically significant association 
between trigger-elicited anger and perceived threat existed when anger after the provocation 
was low. The affective reaction to the initial provocation had been assessed as core affect 
(Russell, 2003). 
The next two studies employed a minimal group paradigm (Tajfel et al., 1971). 
Minimal groups are devoid of any specification besides the feature on that the categorization 
is based. In contrast to naturally occurring groups, no preconceptions exist about particular 
minimal groups. Core affect measures were again used to assess the affective reaction to the 
initial provocation. 
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No outgroup derogation was observed in Study 3. The absence of harmful treatment 
directed at outgroup members is however coherent in light of the result for discounting. 
Participants with high core affect anger and high trigger-elicited anger distanced themselves 
significantly more strongly from the minimal group they had been categorized into than all 
other participants. In Study 4, the treatment of the outgroup relative to the treatment of the 
ingroup was significantly worse for participants with high core affect anger and high trigger-
elicited anger than for all other participants. This effect was however driven by ingroup 
treatment, the treatment of the outgroup did not differ depending on how much anger 
participants experienced. 
To my knowledge, the research presented in this thesis is the first to provide empirical 
evidence for triggered displacement of aggressive behavior on a group level. Group-based 
emotions and specifically group-based anger has been shown to predict outgroup derogation 
and the appraisals of the outgroup as threatening. Anger resulting from an unrelated episode 
moderated the functional link of group-based anger and outgroup derogation as well as the 
link of group-based anger and the threat appraisal. Accordingly, considering particular affect 
contributes to explanation of negative intergroup behavior.
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Fremdgruppenabwertung bezeichnet die explizit negative Behandlung von 
Zielpersonen auf Grundlage von deren Mitgliedschaft in einer bestimmten sozialen 
Kategorie. Die vorliegende Arbeit untersuchte einen Mechanismus, welcher als 
Fremdgruppenabwertung zu Grunde liegend angenommen wurde. Fremdgruppenabwertung 
ist Intergruppenverhalten, es basiert nicht auf individuellen Eigenschaften oder 
Verhaltensweisen der Zielperson. Gleichermaßen kann Fremdgruppenabwertung durch einen 
Aggressor erfolgen, welcher nicht persönlich von dem Auslöser des aggressiven Verhaltens 
betroffen war. Fremdgruppenabwertung umfasst eine breite Vielzahl von Verhaltensweisen, 
welche von spöttischen Bemerkungen bis zum Genozid reicht. 
Gruppenmitgliedschaften können Verhalten gegenüber anderen Menschen sowie 
Gefühle und Kognitionen gegenüber diesen Menschen leiten (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). 
Gruppenmitgliedschaften sind jedoch nur dann für die Gefühle, Kognitionen und 
Verhaltensweisen einer Person relevant, wenn sich die Person mit der betreffenden Gruppe 
identifiziert. Identifikation mit einer Gruppe erzeugt Gefühle der Zugehörigkeit zu dieser 
Gruppe und emotionale Involviertheit in die Belange der Gruppe (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 
1986). Die Intergruppen-Emotionstheorie (Smith, 1993, 1999) integrierte den Ansatz der 
Sozialen Identität (s. Turner, 1999; Soziale Identitätstheorie und Selbstkategorisierungs-
theorie) mit Bewertungstheorien der Emotion (Frijda, 1986; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1988; 
Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Die Intergruppen-Emotionstheorie postuliert, dass hinreichend 
identifizierte Gruppenmitglieder gruppenbasierte Emotionen empfinden, sofern eine Situation 
für die jeweilige Eigengruppe emotional bedeutsam ist. Gruppenbasierte Emotionen 
resultieren aus der Bewertung von Ereignissen und Situationen im Hinblick auf ihre 
Bedeutung für die Bedürfnisse und Ziele der eigenen Gruppe. Weiter wird postuliert, dass 
gruppenbasierten Emotionen eine Regulationsfunktion für Intergruppenverhalten zukommt. 
Spezifische Emotionen sind mit spezifischen Verhaltenstendenzen verbunden. Die 
spezifischen Verhaltenskonsequenzen gruppenbasierter Emotionen konnten auch bereits 
empirisch gezeigt werden (Mackie et al., 2000). Die vorliegende Arbeit untersuchte die Rolle 
gruppenbasierten Ärgers für Fremdgruppenabwertung. 
Das Untersuchungsparadigma aller vier berichteten Studien entstammt der „Triggered 
Displaced Aggression Theory“ (Miller et al., 2003; Pedersen et al., 2000). Triggered 
displaced aggression bezeichnet folgendes Phänomen: Eine initiale, vergleichsweise starke 
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Provokation und eine nachfolgende auslösende Provokation geringerer Intensität bringen 
interaktiv eine unverhältnismäßig aggressive Reaktion gegenüber der Person hervor, von 
welcher die auslösende Provokation ausging. Es wurde erwartet, dass eine ausgelöste 
(triggered) und verlagerte (displaced) Abwertung der Fremdgruppe aufträte, wenn eine 
geringfügige gruppenbasierte Provokation auf eine unzusammenhängende vergleichsweise 
starke Provokation folgte. Die Unterscheidung in person-basierte und gruppen-basierte 
Provokation ist für die auslösende, nicht aber für die starke, initiale Provokation konzeptuell 
von substantieller Bedeutung. Weiterhin wurde erwartet, dass durch die auslösende 
Provokation evozierter Ärger zu mehr Fremdgruppenabwertung führen würde, dies jedoch 
nur dann, wenn die Probanden zuvor Ärger empfunden hatten, welcher durch die initiale 
Provokation hervorgerufen wurde. Ohne vorheriges starkes Ärgererleben sollte der durch den 
Auslöser erzeugte Ärger zu keinem Anstieg an Fremdgruppenabwertung führen. In dem Maß, 
in welchem die ausgelöste Verlagerung aus der Aktivierung bestimmter kognitiver 
Repräsentationen resultiert (s. Miller et al., 2003; Bushman et al., 2005), sollten auch 
bestimmte kognitive Bewertungen der Intergruppenbeziehung einem Interaktionseffekt der 
initialen Provokation und des Auslösers unterliegen. 
Vier Studien zielten darauf ab, ausgelöste Verlagerung von Fremdgruppenabwertung 
zu zeigen. Die beiden ersten Studien bezogen sich auf tatsächlich existierende Gruppen; sie 
wurden als Papier-und-Bleistift-Fragebogenstudien durchgeführt. Studie 1 zeigte ausgelöste 
verlagerte Abwertung von älteren Menschen, die Probanden gehörten der jungen Generation 
an. Fremdgruppenabwertung war in der Bedingung, in welcher Probanden mit beiden 
Provokationen konfrontiert wurden, signifikant stärker ausgeprägt als in den anderen 
Experimentalbedingungen. Zudem konnte gezeigt werden, dass die Ärgerreaktion auf die 
initiale Provokation den Effekt der affektiven Reaktion auf die auslösende Provokation auf 
Fremdgruppenabwertung moderiert. Gab es eine starke Ärgerreaktion auf die initiale 
Provokation, führte durch den Auslöser evozierter Ärger zu einem Anstieg von 
Fremdgruppenabwertung. War die Ärgerreaktion auf die initiale Provokation schwach, waren 
durch den Auslöser evozierter Ärger und Fremdgruppenabwertung unverbunden. Der selbe 
Moderationseffekt konnte für das Kriterium wahrgenommene Bedrohung gezeigt werden. 
In Studie 2 sagte Auslöser-evozierter Ärger signifikant die Abwertung von 
Ausländern vorher. Hier war der Effekt nicht durch die affektive Reaktion auf die initiale 
Provokation moderiert. Der interaktive Effekt von Provokation und Auslöser trat für 
wahrgenommene Bedrohung auf. In der Provokation-Auslöser-Bedingung wurde stärkere 
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Bedrohung durch Ausländer wahrgenommen als in den anderen drei Bedingungen. Für 
wahrgenommene Bedrohung trat zudem der moderierte Effekt Auslöser-evozierten Ärgers 
auf. Bei Probanden, welche starken Ärger nach der Provokation empfunden hatten, führte 
Auslöser-evozierter Ärger zu einem signifikanten Anstieg wahrgenommener Bedrohung. 
Kein statistisch signifikanter Zusammenhang bestand zwischen Auslöser-evoziertem Ärger 
und wahrgenommener Bedrohung, wenn nach der Provokation nur geringer Ärger 
empfunden wurde. Die affektive Reaktion auf die initiale Provokation wurde als Grund-
Affekt (core affect) gemessen (Russell, 2003). 
Die nächsten beiden Studien setzen ein Minimales Gruppen-Paradigma (Tajfel et al., 
1971) ein. Minimalen Gruppen fehlt jegliche Spezifikation über jenes Merkmal hinaus, auf 
dessen Grundlage die Gruppen gebildet werden. Im Gegensatz zu tatsächlich existierenden 
Gruppen bestehen für minimale Gruppen keine Voreinstellungen bei den Probanden. Grund-
Affekt-Maße wurden erneut für die Erfassung der affektiven Reaktion auf die initiale 
Provokation eingesetzt. 
Keinerlei Fremdgruppenabwertung wurde in Studie 3 beobachtet. Die Abwesenheit 
schädigenden Verhaltens gegen die Fremdgruppe ist jedoch stimmig angesichts der 
Ergebnisse für Entwertung der Kategorie. Probanden mit starkem Grund-Affekt-Ärger und 
starkem Auslöser-evozierten Ärger wiesen die minimale Gruppe signifikant stärker zurück 
als alle anderen Probanden. In Studie 4 war die Behandlung der Fremdgruppe relativ zu der 
Behandlung der Eigengruppe durch Probanden mit starkem Grund-Affekt-Ärger und starkem 
Auslöser-evozierten Ärger signifikant schlechter als durch alle anderen Probanden. Dieser 
Effekt war jedoch bedingt durch die Behandlung der Eigengruppe, die Behandlung der 
Fremdgruppe war nicht unterschiedlich in Abhängigkeit des erlebten Ärgers. 
Meines Wissens stellt die vorliegende Arbeit den ersten empirischen Nachweis für 
ausgelöste Verlagerung aggressiven Verhaltens auf Gruppenebene dar. Es wurde gezeigt, 
dass gruppenbasierte Emotionen und im Besonderen gruppenbasierter Ärger 
Fremdgruppenabwertung und die Bewertung der Fremdgruppe als bedrohlich vorhersagt. 
Ärger, welcher durch eine unverbundene Episode hervorgerufen wurde, moderierte die 
funktionelle Verknüpfung von gruppenbasiertem Ärger und Fremdgruppenabwertung sowie 
die Verknüpfung von gruppenbasiertem Ärger und der Bedrohungseinschätzung. Die 
Berücksichtigung spezifischen Affekts trägt demnach zur Erklärung negativen 
Intergruppenverhaltens bei.
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Filler scale for the provoking conditions of Study 1 
I already knew that the US-administration is carrying people off to torture-states. 
I have seen the reports by the program ‘Monitor’. 
I know descriptions from Europeans concerning arbitrariness of American authorities. 
I know the provision of law concerning the treatment of suspected terrorists. 
I cannot image that such things could happen here in Europe. 
I have knowledge about the detention conditions at Guantanamo. 
 
Filler scale for the non-provoking conditions of Study 1  
I already knew that thousands of US-soldiers died in the course of the liberation of Europe. 
I have seen TV programs on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of D-Day. 
I know descriptions from war veterans about events at the front. 
I know about the historical significance of June 6, 1944. 
I cannot image what Europe would look like today without D-Day. 
I have knowledge about the events on D-Day. 
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Verbal Core Affect Scale – English Version 
I am feeling placid. (L) 
I feel unhappy. (N) 
I feel full of energy. (H) 
I am in positive spirits. (P) 
My internal engine is running slowly. (L) 
My mood is bad. (N) 
I am full of tension. (H) 
I feel light-hearted. (P) 
My mind is in a quiet state. (L) 
I am distressed. (N) 
I am feeling full of verve. (H) 
Overall, I am satisfied. (P) 
(L) = low arousal, reverse coded; (N) = negative; (H) = high arousal; (P) = positive, 
reverse coded 
Verbal Core Affect Scale – German Version 
Ich fühle mich gelassen. (L) 
Ich fühle mich unglücklich. (N) 
Ich fühle mich energiegeladen. (H) 
Ich bin positiv gestimmt. (P) 
Mein innerer Motor läuft langsam. (L) 
Meine Laune ist schlecht. (N) 
Ich bin voller Spannung. (H) 
Ich fühle mich unbeschwert. (P) 
Mein Geist ist in einem ruhigen Zustand. (L) 
Ich bin bekümmert. (N) 
Ich fühle mich schwungvoll. (H) 
Insgesamt bin ich zufrieden. (P) 
(L) = geringe Erregung, rekodiert; (N) = negativ; (H) = starke Erregung; (P) = positiv, 
rekodiert 
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Pictorial Core Affect Scale 
Mark the circle that represents best your current feeling. 






Mark the circle that represents best your current state of arousal. 








Cognitive Appraisal Scale of Studies 3 and 4 
I liked the auditory stimulation. (reverse coded) 
The auditory stimulation interfered with my concentration. 
I found it hard to think with the background noise. 
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